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Part I traces the evolution of EU telecommunications policy (from 1987 to
1998) and presents an overview of and commentary on the main provisions of
the current EU telecommunications regulatory framework. It discusses the
principal policy documents which set the tone for the transition from a
monopoly to a fully liberalised market and focuses on both liberalisation and
harmonisation legislative measures in the EU.
Part II concentrates on specific abusive behaviour of the incumbents aimed
at preserving their key bottleneck positions against newcomers, and examines
how competition law can deal with such cases. In particular, it discusses the
jurisprudence of the ECJ involving cases of refusal to supply and the European
Commission's essential facilities cases, and attempts to define to what extent
Article 82 (ex 86) of the Treaty is applicable to the control of bottlenecks.
Furthermore, it analyses EU competition policy on the strategic alliances and
mergers arising from the accelerating convergence of the telecommunications,
media and information technology sectors.
Part III examines how the current EU telecommunications regulatory regime
should be adapted to the emerging multimedia environment. It concludes that,
at least during the transition phase towards the realisation of an effectively
competitive market, specific regulation will play a fundamental role alongside
competition law. It also assesses the scope and nature of the new regulatory
regime in the converging environment and submits that a light-touch and
predictable regulatory framework - based on the new commercial realities
rather than on arbitrary and obsolete regulatory distinctions - is required. This
means that a large majority of the prescriptive regulations currently in place will
need to be replaced by a harmonised framework of general principles and
overall targets which can identify and monitor barriers to competition within a
converging market and can ensure equal and fair conditions for market
players.
Part IV comments on the proposed Framework, Access, and Licensing
Directives. It attempts to assess whether the forthcoming regulation for
electronic communications networks and associated services is in line with the
main policy objectives and those regulatory principles that underpin the existing
regulatory framework and whose significance has been affirmed in responses
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Traditionally, throughout the world telecommunications services were provided
in each country by one monopoly carrier. Such carriers were almost always
owned by the government and operators as state agencies, often as part of the
postal service.
Generally speaking, for industries where competition is easily introduced, a
policy of free entry is not only appropriate but also indispensable. This is the
only means through which the benefits of the competitive market will be
realized. As Bellamy and Child, in relation to the advantages of a competitive
market economy, have put it:
"the Community rules on competition are founded on the principle that a
competitive market, rather than state control or private monopoly, is the best
means of securing economic efficiency, as regards both allocation of
resources and efficient production. ... The EC Treaty assumes that the
Community is based on a market economy, i.e. an economy in which it is
mainly left to competitive market forces to determine what products are bought
and sold when, where and at what price. In such a society, the competitive
activities of undertakings, driven by self-interest, will further economic
development, and therefore the welfare of consumers and, at least in the long-
term, higher employment".1
In addition, in support of the desirability of a competitive market structure, the
European Commission has stated:
"a vigorous competition policy is a key element in maintaining both the efficient
functioning of market and competitive pressures. Experience in the Community
and elswhere in the world has shown that competition is an efficient tool for
ensuring that producers remain dynamic, consentrate on innovation, listen to
the market, reduce costs and provide high-quality goods and services at the
lowest possible prices. Continuing enforcement of the competition rules
therefore is of paramount importance in bringing out the best in Community
1
Bellamy and Child, European Community Law of Competition, London, Sweet and Maxwell,
Fifth Edition, 2001, at para. 1-076, pp. 39-40.
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industry".2
However, there are arguments according to which free entry is not considered
desirable or efficient. Thus the advantages of competition (which presupposes
free entry) are less clear-cut in some sectors of the telecommunications
industry (especially in the operation of networks) where substantial economies
of scale exist, and some of them would be lost if the market was divided
between two or more operators. Although it is generally accepted that a
competitive market creates incentives for individual firms to produce efficiently,
it does not necessarily mean that the most efficient form of production will
involve large numbers of firms. Indeed, when economies of scale are present,
the result is that a single firm can produce outputs at a lower unit costs than
can many small firms. So if there is more than one firm in the market, their
combined costs will be higher than those of a single firm supplying the same
customers. The consequence of this is that the lowest-cost provision of a
service can only be achieved if a single firm supplies the entire market;
competition becomes inefficient.3
So a possible rationale for restricting entry into industries with economies of
scale is the public interest argument that entry can lead to wasteful and,
therefore, undesirable duplication of fixed costs. This is the so-called 'natural
monopoly' or 'destructive competition' theory, according to which
telecommunications networks are natural monopolies, so that replicating the
physical infrastructure is inevitably uneconomic.4 The influence of the 'natural
monopoly' theory is obvious from the early papers of the Office of
2
European Commission, XXIst Report on Competition Policy (1991), point 3.
3
For further analysis see, for instance: Phlips, L., Competition Policy: A Game Theoretic
Perspective, 1995, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Rosenberg, N. and Landau, R.
(eds.) The Positive Sum Strategy, 1986, Washington DC: National Academy Press;
Samuelson, P. and Nordhaus, W.D. (1985). Economics, 1985, 12th ed.; Stigler, G. (1964).
"The Theory of Oligopoly", (1964), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, p. 44; Tirole, J. The
Theory of Industrial Organisation, 1998, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; Panzar J.C. and Willig
R.D., "Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly", (1977), 8 (1) RAND Journal of
Economics 1; Coursey D., Isaac R.M., Luke M. and Smith V.L., "Market Contestability in the
Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs", (1984), 15(1) RAND Journal of Economics 69.
4
See for instance: Posner R., "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation: A Reply," (1970) 22
Stanford Law Review 540; Posner R., "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation," (1969) 21
Stanford Law Review 518; Stigler, G., "The Theory of Oligopoly", (1964), Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 72, p. 44.
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Telecommunications (Oftel),5 the regulator for the UK telecommunications
industry which was set up under the Telecommunications Act 1984. The Oftel's
papers are important and carry significant weight due to the fact that the UK
telecommunications regulator is considered to be the most influential and most
sophisticated amongst the national regulatory authorities across Europe.
Natural monopoly is defined as a market in which a single firm is more cost-
efficient than two or more firms, meaning that competition is inefficient.6 Hence,
as the theory in question goes, even if perfect competition was possible, it
would be undesirable and impracticable because, as it requires a large number
of small firms, it would miss the advantages that a single powerful firm can
offer.
Mankiw and Whinston are amongst the economists who argued against the
presumption that free entry is desirable for social efficiency.7 They
demonstrated that, in a monopolistically competitive market, free entry can
result in excessive entry from a social standpoint. So they pointed out that
entry restrictions are often socially desirable. They accepted the notion that
there is no such thing as perfect competition, and underlined the concept of
'business-stealing effect' - a phenomenon which characterizes most markets,
and exists when the entry of new competitors causes the firms which are
already in the market to reduce output. They illustrated that "the marginal
entrant's contribution to social surplus is equal to his profits less the social
value of the output lost owning to the output restriction he engenders in other
firms" and, therefore, "the business-stealing effect makes entry more attractive
than is socially warranted".8 Their conclusion was that (also because of the
existence of imperfect competition) excessive entry is present as "marginal
entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society because of the output
reduction entry causes in other firms".9 And Suzumura and Kiyono argue that
the results suggest the strengthening of the protection of incumbent firms from
5 See for instance, Oftel, "Report of the Director General of Telecommunications for the Period 1
August to 31 September 1984 to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry", H.C. 457,
1984-1985 (London: HMSO, 1985), at para. 1.5. Also, Oftel, "Report of the Director General of
Telecommunications for the Period 1 January to 31 December 1985 to the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry", H.C. 461, 1985-1986 (London: HMSO, 1986), at para. 1.3.
0
Pelkmans, Jacques and Young, David, Telecoms - 98. Centre for European Policy Studies,
Brussels 1998, at p. 32.
7
N. Gregory Mankiw and Michael D. Whinston, "Free entry and social inefficiency", 1986, Rand
Journal of Economics, 17(1), 48.
8
ibid., at p. 49.
9
ibid., at p. 57.
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the threat of potential entry.10
From the above, it seems that there is a conflict between the objective of
promoting competition, on the one hand, and the undesirable results that
competition can bring where economies of scale are present, on the other.
What is clearly needed is to find the right balance which will allow us to have
the advantages of competition without having to bear the higher unit costs as
more firms enter the market. This kind of trade-off is recognized by Vickers
and Yarrow when they point out that
"the problem is that market power is greater when there are fewer firms, and
monopolistic behaviour worsens allocative efficiency. The trade-off between
allocative efficiency and scale economies is central to many problems in
competition policy, and precisely the same question arises for example in
relation to the licensing of network operators to compete with BT [British
Telecom]".11
However, the natural monopoly argument is not so strong. Indeed, it is believed
that the claim that competition is not possible in the utility industries has been
over-extended. The results of Shin and Ying's analysis, for instance, suggest
that local telephone companies are not classical natural monopolies.12 So the
fact that local exchange carriers are protected monopoly markets is regarded
as unjustified.13 In addition, since the BOCs (Baby Bells) were found not being
natural monopolies, it is supported that AT&T (which was providing long
distance services) was also remotely possible to have monopoly characteristics
before its breakup.14 Moreover - and contrary to Mankiw's and Whinston's
results (who talk about excessive entry) - Shin and Ying conclude that "the
results suggest that the benefits to breaking up the monopoly outputs of
existing local exchange carriers substantially outweigh the potential losses in
efficiency", that this "would likely produce considerable cost savings to society"
10 See K. Suzumura and K. Kiyono, "Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare", 1987, Review of
Economic Studies LIV: 156. For more analysts who reach the same conclusions, see A.K. Dixit
and J. E. Stiglitz, "Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product Diversity", 1977, American
Economic Review 67:297; also M.K. Perry, "Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and
Public Policy", 1984, Journal of Industries Economics 32:313.
11
J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, Privatisation: An Economic Analysis, 1988, at p. 48.
12
Richard T. Shin and John S. Ying, "Unnatural monopolies in local telephone", 1992, Rand
Journal of Economics, 23(2): 171.
13
ibid., at p. 182.
14
ibid., at p. 179.
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and that entry into local exchange markets should be permitted.15 Apart from
the economic arguments, there is empirical evidence - based on the strategy
and the huge investment undertaken by telecommunications companies -
suggesting that (at least) longlines telecommunications do not have the
characteristics of a natural monopoly.16
Another weakness in the natural monopoly argument is the fact that the
telecommunications industry is unique among the utility industries: rapid
technological developments can transform a natural monopoly into an industry
where efficient competition prevails. As J.G. Sidak illustrated, the local
telephone monopoly will "pass away as consumers by the turn of the century
are able to buy local telephone service from the cable television company, the
cellular company, a competing access provider that has installed its own fiber¬
optic loop, or any one of several providers of wireless personal
communications services".17 The notion that technical change can alter the
profile and structure of the telecommunications industry was already
recognized by Sharkey in 1982 when he concluded that "changing technology
is expanding the boundaries of the industry and blurring the distinctions
between communications and information processing. Certainly under the
broadest definition this evolving industry is not a natural monopoly".18 Moreover
the aforementioned technological advances - mainly the microwave radio
technology - give many large companies the opportunity to bypass the local
network (i.e. without using the established local exchanges) and offer long
distance telephone services to certain major customers.19
From the above it is concluded, therefore, that in recent years, there has
been an increasing realization throughout the world that in many respects the
telecommunications sector, which was traditionally dominated by monopoly
undertakings is not in fact a natural monopoly, and that its liberation from the
15
at p. 181. The same conclusions are supported by L.C. Hunt and E.L. Lynk, "Industrial
structure in US telecommunications: Some empirical evidence", 1991, Applied Economics
23:1655, while the opposite ones are reached by L.H. Roller, "Proper quadratic cost functions
with an application to the Bell system", 1990, Review of Economics and Statistics 72:202.
16 See for instance, Stephen G. Breyer, "Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated
Marketplace", 1987, California Law Review 75:1005, at pp. 1020-1021.
17 J.G. Sidak, "Telecommunications in Jericho", 1993, California Law Review 81:1209, at p.
1210.
18 W.W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, 1982, at p. 213.
19
For the method of bypassing, the problems associated with that and the potential approaches
to the problem, see Stephen G. Breyer, "Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated
Marketplace", 1987, California Law Review 75:1005, at pp. 1027-1031.
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ownership of the State would stimulate efficiency and investment in new
technology.
This new awareness has accelerated the trend towards gradually opening
commercial activities in these areas to competition, coupled with, or proceeding
independently, privatization of the utilities (i.e. the monopoly undertakings)
themselves so that they become commercial undertakings on an equal footing
(except only for their market power) with their competitors.
Indeed, beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, the
telecommunications industry in almost all countries experienced privatisation -
i.e. the conversion of the incumbent operator from being a state-owned public
body to a privately-owned entity.
It should be stressed that privatization is often linked with the concept of
liberalisation. However, the nature of the relationship between privatization and
the process of liberalization has been far from straightforward. Indeed, even
further, the policy drivers behind privatization of the incumbent have tended to
be based around state revenue concerns rather than the objective of
liberalization.
This is illustrated when examining the relevant UK experience.
In the UK, after 1974, a new philosophy dominated Conservative party policy
as a consequence of the dissatisfaction with the performance of nationalized
industries. Under the new approach, public ownership was not deemed any
more to be the most appropriate form for dealing with natural monopolies. It
was thought that there was too much intervention in the market and a change
was needed in order to move towards management structures which were
commercially and market orientated. As Hutton put it, "the state was to be
rolled back; and the felicitous invisible hand of market forces was to be
ungloved".20 The practical expression of this idea was the adoption of the
privatization program by the Thatcher government.
Alongside the ideological antipathy of the Conservative party to public
enterprise, there was the influence of the Austrian School economists, who
saw the growing economic role of the state as a threat to liberty and
democracy. Sir Keith Joseph was clearly influenced by this notion when he
stated that "our conviction that a market economy with freedom to own
property and engage in production of goods and services is an essential
20
W. Hutton, The State We're In, London, 1996, at p. 11.
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condition of all other freedoms".21 Another motive which led towards the policy
of privatization was the growth of public spending as a proportion of the GDP.
So the intention of the Conservative party was to "allow State spending and
revenue a significantly smaller percentage slice of the nation's annual output
and income each year".22 The idea was that the commitment of the
Conservative party to controlling public expenditure could be more easily
achieved by selling public assets than by cutting public spending. There was
the belief that privatization would reduce the Public Sector Borrowing
Requirement. Moreover one of the most fundamental targets of the
privatization programme was the achievement of a successful flotation and the
promotion of wider share ownership. This would help towards the realization of
the concept of the "property-owning democracy".23 This target was related to
the fact that privatization could bring fast and, some times, substantial gains
which small investors have made on the shares. This could be (and so it
proved) a decisive factor helping the Conservative party to increase its political
benefits. Those political benefits are reflected by increased votes from grateful
taxpayers and shareholders who received their shares at a discount. Indeed,
this policy provided an opportunity to offer shares to the general public with
favourable terms.24 For instance, inter alia, shares were offered at a discount,
smaller investors could be helped by the phasing of payments in instalments,
and vouchers were offered as a substitute for future bonus shares.25 This
encouragement of wider share ownership was illustrate by Madsen Pirie who,
pointing out that the owners of shares and those who work in the private sector
are more likely to vote Conservative,26 concluded that "the golden rule about
privatizing is always to give people greater advantage than they previously
enjoyed. In Britain, we say the rule is: never cancel a benefit... however unjust
it is ... especially if you can buy it instead".27 He defended the Government's
decision to sell at a level which was well below the real value of the shares
21 Centre for Policy Studies, Why Britain Needs a Social Market Economy, London, 1975, at p.
4.
22
Angus Maude, The Right Approach to the Economy, Conservative Central Office, London,
1977.
23 See Dennis Swann, The Retreat of the State, 1988, at p. 235.
24 See Dennis Swann, The Retreat of the State, 1988, at p. 235.
25 For details, see R. Fraser (ed.), Privatisation: The UK Experience and International Trends,
1988, at Chapter 3. See also C.P. Mayer and S.A. Meadowcroft, "Selling Public Assets:
Techniques and Financial Implications", Fiscal Studies 6, 1985, 4, at pp. 50-52.
26 See M. Walker, Privatisation: Tactics and Techniques, 1988, at pp. 3-10.
27 See M. Walker, Privatisation: Tactics and Techniques, 1988, at p. 6.
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saying that "it's very important that the people who buy the shares should
perceive an immediate gain",28 and did not hesitate to admit that underpricing
was essential in order to attract new shareholders which means, according to
his view, more votes for the Conservative party.29 However, this policy has
been subject to major criticism.30
Indeed, the underpricing of the shares led to a substantial redistribution of
wealth to the successful applicants. This redistribution was considered
undesirable for several reasons, inter alia because of the huge transaction
costs involved, because there is no obvious social reason to justify those
benefits and because bankers, lawyers, share underwriters and generally all
who participated in the privatization process made substantial gains at the
expense of the taxpayer.31 As Vickers and Yarrow concluded, trying to evaluate
whether underpricing is the best way to promote the target of wider share
ownership,
"the principal stated objectives of the Government have been to maximize
sales proceeds and to widen share ownership. The underpricing of major
share issues has meant that the first of these aims has not been achieved at
all successfully, and the second has been met in a highly expensive and rather
distorted way ... It is hard to see how the methods of selling state assets can
be judged other than a failure in terms of the general public interest and in view
of the opportunities available. Their short-run success in political terms is
another matter".32
Finally, privatization was seen as a means of disciplining and reducing the
trade union power,33 as a commitment and obsession of the Conservative party
to cope with trade union pressure. This is illustrated in the Conservative
election manifesto for 1979, which pointed out that "Parliament and no other
28 See M. Walker, Privatisation: Tactics and Techniques, 1988, at p. 10.
29 See M. Pirie, Privatisation: Theory, Practice and Choice, 1988, at p. 10.
30 See Vickers and Yarrow, Privatisation: An Economic Analysis, 1988, at pp. 173-181; C.P.
Mayer and S.A. Meadowcroft, "Selling Public Assets: Techniques and Financial Implications",
Fiscal Studies 6, 1985, 4, at pp. 55 and onwards; M. Bishop and J.A. Kay, Does Privatisation
Work? Lessons from the UK, 1992, at p. 29.
31
See Vickers and Yarrow, Privatisation: An Economic Analysis, 1988, at p. 180. See also F.
Plawkings, "Selling British Telecom", 3 (1987) 7 Policy Studies 1 at p. 3.
32 See Vickers and Yarrow, Privatisation: An Economic Analysis, 1988, at pp. 192-193.
33 See M. Debek, "Privatisation as a Political Priority: The British Experience", 1993, 41 Pol.
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body stands at the centre of the nation's life and decisions".34
John Moore, criticizing the inefficiency of the public enterprises, underlined
the importance of privatization by connecting it with the objective of improving
efficiency. He concluded that privatization can be extended to those markets
where competition was considered to be impractical, as "privatization policies
have now been developed to such an extent that regulated private ownership
of natural monopolies is preferable to nationalization".35 However, is this correct
or not?
Generally, there is no evidence supporting the basic notion of this statement,
namely that public enterprises are inefficient and that privatization improves
(under all circumstances) efficiency.
Many studies have tried to compare the performance of public and private
enterprises and to establish an empirical justification and provide evidence in
favour of one or other type of ownership.
One major study concerning the relative efficiency of public and private
enterprise was carried out by Richard Pryke. He based his analysis on the
performance of private and public firms engaged in the same activity in three
different areas: nationalized British Airways compared with British Caledonian,
a private operator; nationalized Sealink UK which provides shipping services
versus privately owned European Ferries; and nationalized British Gas
Corporation and the Electricity Boards compared with Currys and Comet, the
two largest electrical groups in private ownership.36 His verdict was that "public
enterprise has performed relatively poorly in terms of its competitive position,
has used labor and capital inefficiently and has been less profitable".37 The
explanation which was given for the disappointing performance of the public
enterprise had nothing to do with good or bad management. What counted
was the ownership factor.38 So, he concluded,
34
"The Conservative Manifesto 1979", Conservative Central Office, London 1979, at p. 21.
35
John Moore, "The Success of Privatisation", in J. Kay, C. Mayer, and D. Thompson (ed.)
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36
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38 Richard Pryke, "The Comparative Performance of Public and Private Enterprise", in J. Kay, C.
Mayer, and D. Thompson ed. Privatisation and Regulation: the UK Experience, 1986, at p.
117.
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"what public ownership does is to eliminate the threat of take-over and
ultimately of bankruptcy and the need, which all private undertakings have
from time to time, to raise money from the market. Public ownership provides a
comfortable life and destroys the commercial ethics ... public ownership leads
to performance which is relatively poor by private enterprise standards".39
Pryke's study attracted wide attention in the UK and became very influential,
especially in those political circles that supported privatization. For instance,
John Moore - in order to give a picture of an overall poor performance of the
major nationalized industries - used Pryke's conclusions as he quoted him: "...
most of the industries display serious inefficiency because they do not use the
minimum quantities of labour and capital to produce the goods and services
that they provide. Furthermore, resources are being misallocated because of
the widespread failure to pursue the optimum policies for pricing and
production. Far too many of the nationalised industries produce at a loss,
engage in average cost pricing or practice cross-subsidisation".40 However,
there were two major problems with Pryke's study. First, his analysis
concerned only three areas of activity (which is obviously a small sample size)
and, therefore, his conclusions could not refer to other industries since
generalization is scientifically unacceptable. Second, he failed to recognize that
profit and economic efficiency were never the primary objective of nationalised
industries, as there were political and financial constraints on them.
Consequently, the comparison of the performance between private and public
enterprises in terms of productivity was unsuitable for giving the right picture.
This was identified by Robert Millward who, surveying a wide range of
studies, pointed out that, even where there is evidence that private enterprises
have lower unit costs in comparison with public enterprises, this does not
necessarily mean that their overall performance is better, as "low profitability is
not inconsistent with an efficient management".41 The reason is that there are
also other factors (e.g. quality of services) which must be taken into account as
39
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well as the fact that there are different objectives placed on and constraints
imposed on public firms. He found that there was no evidence to support the
belief that there is less managerial efficiency in public firms42 but, at the same
time, concluded that there is difference in performance (in favour of private
firms) when effective competition is present.43
There is a lot of support for Millward's conclusion that it is competition rather
than the ownership factor that enhances the economic performance of firms
(public or private). For instance, Caves and Christensen argued that the
association of public enterprises with inefficiency "stems from the isolation from
effective competition rather than public ownership per se"44 whereas Professor
Swann pointed out that "changes of ownership in the absence of competition
do not inevitably lead to improvements in performance".45 This point was taken
further by Kay and Thompson, who supported the notion that change of
ownership is not needed. Liberalisation is adequate to provide considerable
benefits.46 However, it was generally accepted that under competition private
enterprises perform more efficiently. This is the mainstream theoretical
argument,47 although Vickers and Yarrow retained some reservations when
they argued that "this does not mean that, in competitive markets, ... public
enterprise is always and everywhere the less efficient type of ownership". 48 In
the absence of competition, however, there can be no presumption in favour of
private firms. On the contrary, we can see the performance of public firms
outweighing the performance of their private counterparts, as "the regulation of
a private enterprise to prevent abuse of its monopoly power (in an
42
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uncompetitive environment) may introduce serious distortions which result in its
performance being worse than that of a corresponding public enterprise" and,
therefore, "denationalizing an enterprise into an uncompetitive environment is
likely to be positively harmful".49
Consequently, regardless of the comparison between private and public
sector performance - and the conclusion of that comparison will depend mainly
on political preferences - what has to be kept in mind is that privatization will
improve performance of an enterprise only when accompanied by the opening
of the market to competition.
Unfortunately, as described above, the policy drivers behind privatization of
the incumbent have tended to be based around state revenue concerns rather
than the objective of liberalization. Worries that a state-owned incumbent might
inhibit market entry was of less significance in comparison with such revenue-
raising concerns. Even more importantly, the process of privatization has,
itself, sometimes acted as a barrier to the process of liberalization. Again, the
UK experience provides us with an indicative example:
During the 1980s, entry into the UK telecommunications market was
characterized by the challenge of competing with a complete monopolist (BT)
which operated under massive economies of scale. This means that the new
entrant - who lacks economies of scale in the early years at least - will have to
accept low margins initially. A great deal of investment is needed as well as the
ability to bring unit costs down to a level which is competitive with the
incumbent. However, it takes a long time to expand financing and to increase
productivity, and therefore, in order to survive, some protection is needed. This
is a variant of the so-called 'infant industry' argument which is critical as to
whether and to what extent measures advocating free entry into the
telecommunications industry can promote effective competition. The infant
industry argument was the main justification offered for support of the
BT/Mercury duopoly policy, which is a version of restricting competition policy.
Indeed, the aim of the duopoly policy - which was announced by the UK
Government in November of 1983 - was to protect Mercury by providing it with
the time to become established without the threat of further entry.50 The
Government decided that the time during which Mercury would be freed from
49 J. Kay, C. Mayer, and D. Thompson ed Privatisation and Regulation: the UK Experience,
1986, at p. 16.
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further entry into the market would be a period of seven years. In return for this
comfort, Mercury took on certain service obligations concerning the
development of its network. As Bryan Carsberg put it in justifying the duopoly
policy,
"given the starting position in which BT was dominant, the licensing of two new
competitors instead of one might have resulted in a division between the two
new competitors of the business of customers who were prepared to move
away from British Telecom, with the result that each of the competitors would
have been weaker than a single competitor".51
The infant industry argument, however, proved to be a weak one. Indeed, the
protection of BT and Mercury from further entry favoured only them and did not
help towards the direction of a competitive marketplace. More interestingly,
while the duopoly attempted to allow Mercury some security in the early stages
of its development and to give BT time to adjust to competition in the private
sector, it could be safely argued that those targets were realized in a much
more extended period of time than normally required. Thus it is not an
exaggeration when it is argued that BT was the major beneficiary from the
duopoly policy. As Beesley and Laidlaw pointed out,
"the conclusion to be drawn from the competitive interchange between BT and
Mercury during the Duopoly era is that BT was able to accommodate itself to
the newcomer without difficulty, ... competition from Mercury has evidently not
been the external shock that could induce BT's managers to make exceptional
efforts to improve productivity'.52
The same conclusion was reached by Vickers and Yarrow who pointed out
that, instead of pursuing a policy of prohibiting further entry, "help should have
been targeted directly to Mercury. A ban on further entry gives vastly more
50 See B. Carsberg, "Regulation of British Telecom: A Reply to Beesley, Laidlaw and Gist",
(1987), 11(3) Telecommunications Policy 237, at p. 238.
51
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benefit to BT than to Mercury given the relative sizes of the new firms".53
In sum: the protection which was given to BT and Mercury against any third
entrant did not achieve the aim of developing Mercury into a substantial
competitor. On the contrary, BT was the major beneficiary of this policy as it
was given time to adjust to competition in the private sector and establish itself.
This policy not only failed to promote competition but also created a substantial
risk that the two firms would settle down into a cosy duopoly. The realization of
this hypothetical scenario could mean that new potential entrants would find it
almost impossible to enter and compete. The conclusion is that what the
duopoly policy accomplished was success in delaying effective competition for
a long period of time. Instead, a policy of free and efficient entry should have
been considered more seriously and introduced as soon as possible. Although
it is true that liberalization does not necessarily mean that effective competition
will emerge, at least it is the only way capable of imposing competitive
disciplines on the incumbent operator. It is only the efficient entry (or the threat
of it) and growth of new rivals that can increase the competitive challenge and
expand the productivity of the incumbent as it tries to respond.
However, the privatisation of these large, previously state-owned carriers,
accompanied by the subsequent liberalisation, involves serious problems of
remaining monopoly power or market failure due to the accrued advantages
conferred upon them by their history and position as compared with those of
potential competitors. Indeed, the newly privatised companies benefited from
having:
■ 100 per cent share of the market at the time of privatisation;
■ ownership and control of key physical assets, for instance ownership of
vital networks or privileged use of public rights of way to which
competitors must have access if they were to be able to compete;
■ possession and control of intangible assets such as radio frequencies,
and telephone numbers;
■ a vast customer base, bringing with it possibilities of cross-marketing of
non-basic products and services;
■ the accumulated assets and economies of scale and experience of the
telecommunications market;
■ being vertically integrated;
53 J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, Privatisation: An Economic Analysis, 1988, at p. 239.
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■ the 'information advantage', i.e. the database of information developed
over many years and enjoyed by the incumbent, which is not available to
its competitors or even perhaps to the regulator.
Given the extent of the accrued advantages conferred upon these carriers, it is
certain that there would be a difficult transition period before the privatised
company could become competitive, and during this time it could use its
substantial power to charge customers monopoly prices as well as engage in
strategic games to deter new entrants.
The unleashing of such power on the market has provoked the realization
that the market power which is enjoyed by the former State undertakings must
be circumscribed by effective regulation. Therefore, it is essential that
regulation of the incumbent be implemented so as to prevent monopolistic
abuse and anti-competitive behaviour.
The following list comprises the major principles of effective regulation:
■ Regulation should prevent a possible abuse of monopoly power. Such
abuse might arise if prices were very high in relation to costs so that
super-normal profits were earned. Super-normal profits relate to the
concept of monopoly profits. In a competitive situation, it is assumed that
there should not be an excess profit as this will be competed away.
■ Regulation should not distort business decisions. Only where there is a
demonstrable competitive or market failure is there a need for regulatory
intervention, as economic regulation will always be inferior to effective
competition.
■ Costs of regulation should be limited to what is essential.
■ Regulation should try to 'mimic' the likely operation of a competitive
market. If this can be achieved, it means that resources will be used as
efficiently and as well in one case as in the other.
■ Regulation should enable the regulated business to attract capital from
investors or to justify to shareholders the retention of capital for further
investments in the regulated business
■ Regulation should encourage management efficiency in operations and
investment
■ Regulation should minimise the scope of regulatory intervention in
management decision-making, subject to the need to specify
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commercial and public service objectives
■ Regulation should provide incentives for achieving efficient use of
resources.
For 'effective' regulation to occur, it is important that an appropriate model or
industry structure is developed so as to enable effective competition to
emerge. Effective competition can be considered as being in operation when a
customer can make a decision independent of any operator across the whole
telecommunications industry, or when a customer can choose from a multitude
of services and/or deal directly with a large number of service providers without
regard to the infrastructure that carries the chosen service from the service
provider to the customer. Oftel has attempted to specify the circumstances
under which effective competition is present in the telecommunications
markets. In particular, it points out that, for competition in telecom markets to
be considered effective, there must be clear evidence of:
■ vigorous rivalry between suppliers;
■ absence of persistent excessive profits;
■ absence of market power;
while from the consumer perspective it will mean:
* quality of service that meets requirements;
■ keen prices;
■ availability of innovative services;
■ wide choice;
■ availability of appropriate information on prices and quality;
■ efficiency in the provision of services;
■ value for money on a par with that in leading competitor countries.54
In addition, Oftel has laid down "effective competition indications", making
reference to three levels:
a) Structural:
■ A reasonable number of competitors with none dominant;
■ And/or none with market power;
* Limited entry barriers such that threat of entry is a competitive discipline;
54 Oftel strategy statement, "Achieving the best deal for telecoms consumers", January 2000, at
para 4.15.
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■ Absence of inefficient suppliers;
■ Sets of prices which broadly reflect underlying costs (ie absence of
persistent excessive profits).
■ Changes in market structure over time, especially a tendency to reduce
concentration.
b) Supplier behaviour:
■ Active competition in price and quality and innovation;
■ Absence of anti-competitive behaviour;
■ Absence of collusion;
■ Meeting consumer needs;
■ Efficient provision of services.
■ Recent entry.
c) Customer behaviour:
■ Information available to customers to help make effective choices;
■ Consumers confident/knowledgeable in using information and in taking
advantage of market opportunities;
■ International benchmarking against customer counterparts in equivalent
countries indicate achievement of 'best or near best deal1 for UK
customers.
■ Absence of barriers to switching.55
In addition, apart from the fact that an appropriate industry structure must be
developed in order for effective regulation to occur, and to enable effective
competition to emerge, it should be stressed that regulation is viewed as a tool
that can be decreasingly used as effective competition develops. In other
words, competition rather than regulation per se should be the main goal in
developing a regulatory framework.
This is exactly the major aim of this thesis. In particular, it will be shown that
the current EU regulatory regime cannot work satisfactorily in the future
converging environment since, in its current form, it is not flexible enough and
thus not capable of predicting and coping with rapid market developments. The
acceptance that the current framework is not sufficient to address the issues of
55 Oftel strategy statement, "Achieving the best deal for telecoms consumers", January 2000, at
Appendix 2.
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a fully converged market - especially the access issues - subsequently raises
the question of whether competition law alone can be an effective instrument
for the realisation of that target.
Taking account of the transitional nature of the sector-specific measures,
and of the overall objective that regulation should be kept to the minimum
where competition is self-sustaining, it will be argued that it is necessary to
develop mechanisms to ensure the gradual phasing-out of sector-specific
regulation. In the meantime, sector-specific regulation will continue to play a
fundamental role alongside the application of competition law. The role of
economic regulation in particular will be to provide the temporary measures in
order to guarantee equal and fair conditions to all market players until the
converged telecommunications, media, and IT markets have matured.
Finally, taking into account the need to dis-engage from detailed regulation
and achieve the desired flexibility in the new dynamic and fast-moving markets,
this thesis will attempt to assess whether the forthcoming regulation for
electronic communications networks and associated services is in line with the
main EU policy objectives and principles and can contribute towards a new
regime characterised by transparency, continuity, legal certainty and
predictability.
All the above demonstrate the different requirements that regulation has to
serve throughout the transition from a regime of a State-run monopoly to an
effectively competitive market. This process can be broadly divided into four
phases:
A) The first phase of this transition is associated with a policy aimed at
breaking down the monopolies and lifting of legal barriers (liberalisation
process). In addition, detailed provisions are put in place for regulating the
newly liberalised telecommunications market. These provisions must comply
with a number of basic principles and have as a main target the establishment
of a fair and even-handed regulatory regime.
This first phase is described in Part I of this thesis which traces the evolution
of EU telecommunications policy and presents an overview of and commentary
on the main provisions of the current EU telecommunications regulatory
framework. In particular, it discusses the main policy documents which set the
tone for the transition from a monopoly to a fully liberalised market and focuses
on both liberalisation and harmonisation legislative measures in the EU.
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B) The second phase of this transition - following the establishment of an ex
ante regulatory framework - consists of the application of the regulatory
regime and the complementary application of competition law which is equally
important in order to ensure that the already removed legal barriers will not be
replaced by a de facto monopolistic market structure.
Indeed, although the first target - i.e. lifting regulatory restrictions and
abolishing legal monopolies - has been achieved, this is not the end of the
process. On the contrary, it is only the beginning of the crucial and difficult
tasks which lie ahead for competition and regulatory authorities alike. This is
true since the introduction of effective competition implies much more than the
translation into national law of Directives abolishing legal monopolies in the
Member States; full liberalisation would be meaningless without the vigorous
enforcement of ex-ante regulation and competition law alike.
In the context of this second phase, the access issues are of major
significance due to the opportunity for new market players to enter the market
and, at the same time, the incumbents' desire to retain their key bottleneck
positions. This is discussed in Part II (Chapter 2) of this thesis which focuses
on specific abusive behaviour of the incumbents aimed at preserving their key
bottleneck positions against newcomers, and examines how competition law
can deal with such cases. In particular, it discusses the jurisprudence of the
ECJ involving cases of refusal to supply and the European Commission's
essential facilities cases, and attempts to define to what extent Article 82 (ex
86) of the Treaty is applicable to the control of bottlenecks. It also examines
whether the 1998 Access Notice succeeds in promoting the Commission's
objectives, namely a policy fostering both infrastructure-based and services-
based competition, encouragement of new entry, and promotion of innovation
as well as legal certainty and predictability.
In addition, competition law can address the serious anti-competitive
problems which might arise by the creation of strategic alliances and mergers
due to the accelerating change of markets with the technological and market-
led convergence of the telecommunications, media and IT sectors. This is
discussed in Part II (Chapter 3) of this thesis which analyses how companies
are positioning themselves in the move towards multi-media in order to take
advantage of the new opportunities. Thus EU competition policy - after its
success in liberalising the telecommunications markets - has a new challenge
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to confront: potential anti-competitive behaviour generated by this rapid
change, and the new opportunities and possibilities for horizontal and vertical
integration between market players who try to occupy the key positions and
control market developments.
C) A third phase can be identified due to the convergence of
telecommunications, media, and IT sectors and its challenges to current
regulatory approaches. Indeed, the nature of competition law which is
inherently flexible allows for the application of its rules and the effective
handling of the issues appearing in the converging markets. On the contrary,
for ex-ante regulation to deal with the convergence phaenomenon, in depth
and radical reconsideration of the current regulatory regime is required. This
third phase is dealt with in Part III of this thesis which examines how the
current EU telecommunications regulatory regime should be adapted to the
emerging multimedia environment. It raises the question whether market
forces and competition law should be the sole drivers for the development of
an effective communications market. It concludes that sector-specific
regulation will continue to be necessary. Of course, the long-term objective,
that competition law will take over and specific regulation will fall away, remains
valid. However, this will happen only with the realisation of an effectively
competitive market. In the meantime, during the transition phase, specific
regulation will play a fundamental role alongside the application of competition
law. Specific regulatory rules will still be required in order to promote and
establish effective competition and to guarantee equal and fair conditions to all
market players until the converged market has matured. Indeed, moving
directly to the application of competition rules alone could lead to new forms of
integrated dominance and to new multimedia market monopolies. Until the
market has matured, therefore, dominant players holding potentially bottleneck
positions must be prevented from strengthening their positions and controlling
market development; gates cannot be allowed to close before they have even
started to develop.
D) The fourth phase is associated with the fact that convergence compels
reconsideration of the present regulatory regime's basic principles and tools
and, therefore, the key question concerns the scope and nature of the new
infrastructure regulatory regime in the converging environment. It is submitted
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that, since convergence is an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process,
what is required is a regulatory regime which will draw on the basic principles
set out within the Open Network Provision (ONP) telecommunications
framework. These principles will be extended and applied equally to the
broadcasting sector in order to provide a common regulatory approach to
communications infrastructure in the European Union. However, this expansion
of ONP telecommunications rules to the other sectors will be counterbalanced
if a clear, light-touch and predictable regulatory framework - based on the new
commercial realities rather than on arbitrary and obsolete regulatory
distinctions - is established. This means that a large majority of the
prescriptive regulations currently in place will need to be replaced by a
harmonised framework of general principles and overall targets which can
identify and monitor barriers to competition within a converging market and can
ensure equal and fair conditions for market players. This is precisely the scope
of the fourth phase which is discussed in Part IV of this thesis and examines
critically some of the most significant Commission's proposals.
In particular, it identifies the most important issues found in the Proposed
Framework and Access/Interconnection Directives and attempts to assess
whether these Directives are in line with the main policy objectives and those
regulatory principles that underpin the current regulatory framework and whose
significance has been confirmed by the vast majority of the comments received
in the course of the public consultation. Moreover, it comments on the
forthcoming licensing framework for electronic communications networks and
services. Its aim is to examine whether the current situation requires
adaptation and, if so, what kind of changes are needed in order to ensure that
the Proposed Authorisation Directive can contribute to lighter and more
transparent national licensing regimes.
The overall aim of Part IV is to assess whether the Commission's goal of
having a regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
associated services characterised by legal certainty, predictability, flexibility,
continuity and transparency is achieved.
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PART I





The Transition from a Regime of a State-
run Monopoly to a Liberalised Market
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1. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, almost all the Member States traditionally treated
telecommunications as one of a number of sectors where special or exclusive
rights were reserved to the State or to firms which were State-sponsored in
some way. So, each of these organisations has enjoyed a monopoly in the
provision of networks, services and terminal equipment.
There were two reasons for such an approach. First, there was the fear that,
if special or exclusive rights were withdrawn, States would become dependent
on foreign enterprises and, therefore, for reasons of national security, these
rights should stay reserved to the States. Second, telecommunications, and
particularly voice telephony, have been regarded as a public service, fulfilling
the important social function of enabling people to communicate. So, public
telecommunications organisations (PTOs) fulfilled their public service duties in
exchange for these de facto or de jure exclusive rights to provide
telecommunications services.
This situation changed due to a combination of factors, including:
- Developments in technology, particularly digitalisation, and increasing use
of optic fibres and microelectronics. These technological advances led to
convergence of telecommunications and information technology, and
undermined the argument for the maintenance of national monopolies.
- The international character of the telecommunications sector, which led to
both external and internal pressure for liberalisation. Indeed, there were
demands for reciprocity by US firms and demands for liberalisation and market
opening within the Community by the European industry.
- The deregulation and liberalisation of telecommunications markets in the
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US increased the fears of the Commission of the European Communities
(hereafter the Commission) that European firms were at a competitive
disadvantage and that they would lose ground in the telecommunications
sector. After AT&T and IBM entered European markets through joint ventures
and other cooperation agreements, the danger of Europe's
telecommunications market being occupied was obvious. The Commission
realised that action should be taken if Europe was to remain competitive.
In order to increase the competitiveness of the European
telecommunications industry, the Commission proposed opening the internal
telecommunications market to competition by means of national liberalisation
and harmonisation measures. That part of the Commission's policy aimed at
breaking down the monopolies and lowering barriers to entry is called
'liberalisation', while the process with the objective of establishing equivalent
trading conditions and competition on equal terms is known as 'harmonisation'.
The aim of this Chapter is to follow the evolution of the EU telecommunications
policy as well as to present an overview of and to comment on the main
provisions of the current EU telecommunications regulatory framework. It
comprises three major sections. Section 2 introduces the main policy
documents which set the tone for the transition from a monopoly to a fully
liberalised market. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the liberalisation and
harmonisation legislative measures respectively.
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2. POLICY PAPERS
2.1. The 1987 Green Paper
The first step in a ten-year process of harmonisation and liberalisation - which
was completed with the full liberalisation of telecommunications in the majority
of the Member States on 1 January 19981 - was taken with the 1987 Green
Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications
services and equipment.2
While the document itself did not impose any particular measures, it was
intended to set forth a number of proposals in order to encourage public
comment and start a debate. The Green Paper specified its overriding aim as
providing the European user with a broad variety of telecommunications
services on the most favourable terms. This could be achieved only with the
introduction of more competition in the telecommunications market, combined
with a higher degree of harmonisation in order to maximise the opportunities
offered by a single EU market, e.g. through economies of scale.
In particular, the 1987 Green Paper established a series of principles based
on the consensus on the need for reform:
- Rapid full opening of the terminal equipment market to competition.
- Full mutual recognition of type-approval for terminal equipment.
- Reinforcement of the rapid development of standards and specifications at
national and European level.
- Full application of EC competition rules to the sector.
- While monopolies could be maintained over the basic telecommunications
network, the provision and operation of services not considered to be of social
meaning (generally value added services) should be open to competition. In
other words, progressive opening of telecommunications markets to
1
It should be noted that five Member States were permitted to defer the opening of their market
beyond that date. For two Member States (Luxembourg and Spain), their markets were fully
liberalised in the course of 1998. Three (Ireland, Portugal and Greece) were permitted to defer
full liberalisation until 1 January 2000 (in the case of Ireland and Portugal) and 31 December
2000 in the case of Greece.
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competition was contemplated.
- Establishment of open access conditions to networks and services through
the Open Network Provision (ONP) programme.
- At the time, both operational and regulatory functions were accumulated by
the PTOs. The Green Paper proposed a clear separation of regulatory and
operational activities in the Member States so that regulatory functions would
be entrusted to a body independent of the national telecommunications
organisations.
Acceptance of the aforementioned principles by the Member States was
based on a compromise regarding their scope. Indeed, the position taken by
the Commission in the 1987 Green Paper reflected the balance between
national public interest and the competition rules of the Treaty as required by
Article 86(2) EC [ex Article 90(2)]. In a few words, the key provisions of the
Green Paper, which essentially functions as the Community's policy outline for
opening the market for telecommunications services and equipment, aimed at
deregulation and increased competition. But the provision of network
infrastructures and basic services (especially voice) were to remain
unchallenged, under the exclusive control of the national PTOs. With regard to
enhanced services and terminal equipment, however, the Green Paper called
for essential liberalisation.
2.2. Satellite Communications
The 1987 Green Paper identified satellite communications as one of the areas
needing specific attention in order to set out common policy orientations in the
European Union. As a result, the Commission produced in November 1990 its
Green Paper on satellite communications.3
In a few words, the Satellite Green Paper proposed the extension of the
principles of EU's telecommunications policy to the satellite area. In particular,
the Green Paper suggested four important changes:
2
Towards a dynamic European economy: Green Paper on the development of the common
market for telecommunications services and equipment, COM(87) 290 final, 30.06.1987.
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- Full liberalisation of the earth segment, including both receive-only and
receive/transmit terminals, subject to appropriate type approval and licensing
procedures where justified to implement necessary regulatory safeguards;
- free (unrestricted) access to space segment capacity, subject to licensing
procedures in order to safeguard those exclusive or special rights and
regulatory provisions set up by Member States in conformity with Community
law and based on the consensus achieved in Community telecommunications
policy. Access should be on an equitable, non-discriminatory and cost-oriented
basis;
- full commercial freedom for space segment providers, including direct
marketing of satellite capacity to service providers and users, subject to
compliance with the licensing procedures mentioned above and in conformity
with Community law, in particular competition rules; and
- harmonisation measures as far as required to facilitate the provision of
Europe-wide services. This concerns in particular the mutual recognition of
licensing and type approval procedures, frequency co-ordination and co¬
ordination with regard to Third Country providers.
The objectives laid down in the Satellite Green Paper had the full political
support of the Council which adopted in December 1991 a resolution on the
development of the common market for satellite communications services and
equipment.4 In particular, the Council resolution set out four major objectives
for EC policy in the field, namely:
- Harmonisation and liberalisation for appropriate satellite earth stations
including, where applicable, the abolition of exclusive or special rights in this
area, subject in particular to conditions necessary for compliance with essential
requirements;
- harmonisation and liberalisation as far as required to facilitate the provision
and use of Europe-wide satellite telecommunications services subject, where
applicable, to conditions necessary for compliance with essential requirements
and special or exclusive rights;
3 Towards Europe-wide systems and services: Green Paper on a common approach in the field
of satellite communications in the European Community, COM(90) 490, 20.11.1990.
4 Council Resolution of 19 December 1991 on the development of the common market for
satellite communications services and equipment, 92/C 8/01, OJ C8/1, 14.01.1992. See also
the European Parliament Resolution of 19 January 1993 on a common approach in the field of
satellite communications in the European Community, A3-0424/92, OJ C42/30, 15.02.1993.
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- separation in all Member States of regulatory and operational functions in
the field of satellite communications;
- improved access to the space segment and access to the space capacity
of inter-governmental organisations operating satellite systems and effective
and accelerated procedures for the establishment of the access to separate
satellite systems.
On the basis of the Satellite Green Paper, several measures have been taken:
- On 29 October 1993 the Council adopted a Directive which introduced
mutual recognition for type approval of satellite earth-station equipment.5
- On 13 October 1994 the Commission adopted the Satellites Directive6
which amended the Terminal Equipment and Services Directives and abolished
special and exclusive rights for the provision of satellite services and
equipment.
- On 22 December 1994 the Council adopted a Resolution on provision of,
and access to, space segment capacity.7 This Resolution followed a
Communication8 of the Commission on the subject to ensure multiple signatory
and direct access arrangements with the intergovernmental satellite
organisations, in particular EUTELSAT, INTELSAT and INMARSAT.
Finally, in order to adopt a more dynamic and consistent approach in the field
of satellite communications and to deal with the fact that the US was taking the
lead in launching initiatives for the development of world-wide personal
communications systems (S-PCS) and broadband, multimedia satellite
infrastructures, the Commission presented in March 1997 an Action Plan9
which foresaw three main areas of activity:
- competition of the internal market, i.e. implementation of the necessary
5 Council Directive of 29 October 1993 supplementing Directive 91/263/EEC in respect of
satellite earth station equipment, 93/97/EEC, OJ L290/01, 24.11.1993.
6 Commission Directive of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, 94/46/EEC, OJ L268/15,
19.10.1994.
7
Council Resolution of 22 December 1994 on further development of the Community's satellite
communications policy, especially with regard to the provision of, and access to, space
segment capacity, 94/C 379/04, OJ C 379/5, 31.12.1994.
8 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on satellite
communications: the provision of - and access to - space segment capacity, COM (94) 210
final, 10.06.1994.
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regulatory framework with regard to satellites;
- a coherent approach of the European Union in discussions at an
international level in the relevant fora to defend European interests; and
- reinforcement of European research and development in this area.
The Satellite Action Plan was endorsed by Council10 and by the European
Parliament,11 and gave rise to the creation of industry working groups, both on
research and development and on regulatory matters.12
2.3. The Creation of a Framework for Full Competition in
Telecommunications Services
2.3.1. The 1992 Review and the Council Resolution of 22 July 1993
At the time of adoption of the Services13 and ONP Framework14 Directives in
1990, the Commission recognised that, given the boom of technological
change, further liberalisation was required and it promised that in 1992 it would
review the situation of the telecommunications sector. So, the compromise on
limited liberalisation (a position taken by the Commission in the 1987 Green
Paper which reflected the balance between national public interest and the
competition rules of the Treaty) was not permanent.
More specifically, the Services Directive called for an overall assessment of
9 Communication from the Commission: "European Union Action Plan: Satellite Communications
in the Information Society", COM(97) 91 final, 05.03.1997.
10
2021st Council meeting, Luxembourg, 27 June 1997, 9310/97, Presse 218 - G.
11 Resolution A4-0279/97, 21 October 1997.
12 See for instance the Report of the Satellite Action Plan (SAP) Regulatory Working Group
(RWG), "Market access: Problems and Solutions", February 1998.
http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/saprep13.doc.
13 Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications
services (hereafter the Services Directive), 90/388/EEC, OJ L192/10, 24.07.1990.
14 Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision (hereafter
the 1990 ONP Framework Directive), 90/387/EEC, OJ L192/1, 24.7.1990.
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the situation in the telecommunications sector and formed the Commission's
cornerstone for reviewing the justification of the Article 90(2) exception for the
monopolies on voice telephony by 1992. As it was stated:
"In 1992, the Commission will carry out an overall assessment of the situation
in the telecommunications sector in relation to the aims of this Directive. In
1994, the Commission shall assess the effects of the measures referred to in
Article 3 in order to see whether any amendments need to be made to the
provisions of that Article, particularly in the light of technological evolution and
the development of trade within the Community".15
So, the 1992 Review16 and the subsequent Communication on the consultation
on this document17 formed an effort to lift the exception which had previously
been made for public voice telephony and to move towards full services
liberalisation. In the 1992 Review, the Commission stressed the competitive
disadvantage of European users due to limited national markets, and the
remaining monopoly on voice services, which caused distortions in prices and
tariff structures, and delayed investment and innovation.
The reforms proposed in the 1992 Review were fully supported by the
Council as expressed in its Resolution of 22 July 1993.18 In this Resolution it
was accepted that liberalisation of telecommunications service markets was
the inevitable result of technological and market developments and, therefore,
full liberalisation of public voice telephony services was set for January 1,
1998, in order to allow time for structural adjustment.
In general, the Council Resolution set out an overall timetable for the future
development of telecommunications up to the end of the decade. It also set out
six short-term and four long-term goals for the Community's
telecommunications policy. In particular, it was agreed that a realistic approach
to further liberalization should be followed, taking into account the need for
adjustment in peripheral regions with less developed networks. Furthermore, it
15 Article 10 of the Services Directive.
16 Commission Communication on the 1992 Review of the situation in the telecommunications
services sector, SEC(92) 1048 final, 21.10.1992.
17 Communication of 28 April 1993 to the Council and European Parliament on the consultation
on the review of the situation in the telecommunications services sector, COM(93) 159 final,
28.4.1993.
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was decided that there was a need for rapid and effective implementation of
the current regulatory environment, in particular the Services Directive.
Moreover, the Council Resolution supported an adaptation of ONP principles in
respect of the entities covered and definition of universal service principles,
interconnection rules and principles for access charges. Finally, a broad
consensus was achieved for the development of a Community policy in the
field of mobile and personal communications as well as in the field of
telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV networks.
In sum, the Council gave its political support for the following objectives:
- to liberalise the provision of all public voice telephony services by 1
January 1998;
-to publish a Green Paper on mobile and personal communications; and
- to publish, before 1 January 1995, a Green Paper on the future policy for
telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV networks.
The aforementioned objectives were also endorsed by the European
Parliament in its Resolution of 31 May 1993.19
2.3.2. Bangemann "Information Society" High Level Group and the
1994 Action Plan
In December 1993, the Commission's White Paper on Growth Competitiveness
and Employment,20 with the full political support of the Council, made clear that
the Union's telecommunications policy should be at the heart of the Union's
general policy. Indeed, the White Paper highlighted the role of
telecommunications as an essential information backbone supporting growth
and competitiveness in the Union and assisting the transition towards the
18 Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the review of the situation in the telecommunications
sector and the need for further development in that market, 93/C 213/01; OJ C213/1,
06.08.1993.
19
European Parliament Resolution of 20 April 1993 on the Commission's 1992 review of the
situation in the telecommunications services sector, A3-0113/93; OJ C150/39, 31.05.1993.
20
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - The challenges and ways forward
into the 21st century, COM(93) 700, 05.12.1993.
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information society.
In order to identify specific measures to be adopted, the Delors White Paper
requested reports to be drawn up by a committee of experts. So, the
Bangemann group was set up in December 1993 to advise the Council on the
measures that would be necessary to address the infrastructure needs of the
developing information society. Its aim was to create a new incentive for
examining the Community's response to new developments in multimedia,
digital and broadband technologies.
The Report21 of the Bangemann Group was adopted at the European
Council in Corfu on 24-25 June 1994. It dealt with the impact that the Global
Information Society might have on European business, society and the quality
of life. According to the Report, public administrations could not afford to retain
the high levels of investment required to ensure that their national
telecommunications industry remained competitive. It was therefore critical to
liberalise the market to allow for private investment. This was why it requested
the Member States to
"accelerate the on-going process of liberalisation of the telecoms sector by:
opening up to competition infrastructures and services still in the monopoly
area; removing non-commercial political burdens and budgetary constraints on
telecommunications operators; and setting clear time-tables and deadlines for
the implementation of practical measures to achieve these goals".22
It also emphasised that provision of the networks and the new services should
be left to the private sector and that the role of government is to "safeguard
competitive forces and ensure a strong and lasting political welcome for the
information society, so that demand-pull can finance growth .,.".23
In addition, the Report recommended the establishment of a single
regulatory authority in order to coordinate interconnection, radio frequency
allocation, licensing and, generally, measures aimed at facilitating the
information society.24
Moreover, the Report recommended that interconnection of networks and
21









interoperability of services and applications should be primary objectives of the
European Union. To this end, it referred to the need for a review of the
European standardisation process in order to accelerate the definition of
standards which the market requires.25
Another important issue was that high tariffs for long distance and
international calls in the past had delayed the widespread development of high
speed corporate networks in Europe. In order to encourage investment,
therefore, it was proposed that price caps on such services need to be
removed and tariffs must be rebalanced so that charges are more in line with
costs. This can have the advantage of introducing transparency in cost
structures - a substantial issue for interconnection arrangements. Thus, the
Bangemann Report proposed that international long distance and leased line
tariffs should be adjusted as a matter of urgency to bring these into line with
rates prevailing in other advanced industrialised regions and there should be
fair sharing of public service obligations among operators.26
Furthermore, it suggested that issues of intellectual property, privacy and
security of information, electronic and legal protection, as well as common
rules on cross-media ownership, should be addressed in the context of
furthering European competitiveness. It justified its view by pointing out that
without appropriate levels of protection, lack of consumer confidence would
undermine the development of the information society.27
Finally, the Report made another significant contribution, especially for those
who attempt to analyze certain important legal and regulatory issues as well as
major developments in EU telecommunications policy. It showed clearly that
the concerns of European telecommunications policy were changing: starting
with the aim to reduce government intervention and to deregulate, we have
passed to the next stage where re-regulation and control of private parties are
the main concerns.
The first Commission document in response to the Bangemann report was
its Action Plan on the Information Society in Europe.28 This Communication







28 Commission Communication, "Europe's Way to the Information Society: An Action Plan",
COM(94) 347 final, 17.07.1994. An updated Action Plan was adopted by the Commission in
November 1996.
45
one of the main initiatives to be taken to open the way for the development of
the network and applications on which the information society relies. The action
plan covered four areas. Generally speaking, it covered the regulatory and
legal aspects of Europe-wide communications (trying to follow the suggestions
of the Bangemann report for infrastructure liberalisation and for the
establishment of a European authority, as well as to address matters
concerning standardisation, tariffs, external trade and a number of issues
introduced by multimedia convergence ), steps towards the realization of TENs
(Trans-European Networks) and related services and applications, along with a
consideration of social and cultural issues.
2.4. Extending Competition from Services to Network
Infrastructure
2.4.1. Infrastructure Green Paper (part I)
As already mentioned, by Council Resolution of 22 July 1993, the Council gave
its support to the Commission's intention to publish a Green Paper before 1
January 1995 on telecommunications infrastructure and cable television
networks.
Infrastructure liberalisation was a sensitive issue for the PTOs and their
Member States. Indeed, the PTOs had traditionally sought to maintain their
monopolies in order to protect their financial stability and to retain the massive
economies of scale and scope needed to deal with their universal service
obligations. Furthermore, studies29 showed that high tariffs and lack of
availability of basic infrastructure were hampering innovation and the
development of liberalised services, and that alternative infrastructure - such
as the networks owned by cable TV companies - could become competitive
alternatives to the telecommunications organisations by providing more
transmission capacity. The Commission hoped that alternative infrastructure
29 "The impact of liberalisation of Alternative Terrestrial Infrastructure for Non-reserved
Services", Coopers and Lybrand, 1994; and "The Effects of Liberalisation of Satellite
Infrastructure on the Corporate and Closed User Group Market", Analysys, 1994.
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will bring down the cost of leased lines for the provision of value-added
telecommunications services, will play an important role in promoting
competition, and will increase availability and choice.
So, on 25 October 1994, the Commission published its Green Paper on the
liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television
networks.30 This Communication was the first part of the Commission's Green
Paper and set out the principle and timetable for liberalising the
telecommunications infrastructure. The aim of the Commission was to enable
operators of infrastructure authorised for certain purposes, such as cable TV,
to make their infrastructure available for the provision of telecommunication
services which have already been liberalised. In order to achieve its target, the
Green Paper proposed a general principle that the providers of
telecommunications services which are open to competition should have a free
choice of the underlying infrastructure with the delivery of such services,
provided that the necessary safeguards are in place.
On the basis of this principle, the first part of the Green Paper stated that
immediate action was necessary to remove restrictions on the use of own or
third-party infrastructure in the following areas:
- for the delivery of satellite communication services;
- for the provision of all terrestrial telecommunication services already
liberalised including the use of cable television. This affects voice and data
services for corporate networks and closer user groups, as well as all other
telecommunication services, other than the provision of voice telephony
services to the general public;
- to provide links, including microwave links, within the mobile network for
the provision of mobile communication services.
The Green Paper stated that action in the above areas would remove
substantial barriers to the provision of services open to competition and, in that
case, would make the liberalisation measures fully effective.
30 Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, Green Paper on the
Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks - Part I:
Principle and Timetable, COM(94) 440 final, 25.10.1994.
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2.4.2. Infrastructure Green Paper (part II) and the Communication of 3
May 1995
On 22 December 1994, the Council adopted a Resolution on the principles and
timetable for the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure.31 The
Council adopted the principle of parallel liberalisation of telecommunications
services and the underlying infrastructure and, consequently, stated that the
provision of telecommunications infrastructure should be liberalised by 1
January 1998. In the same Resolution, a broad consensus was achieved on
the key objectives of the future regulatory framework for a fully liberalised
telecommunications sector. The Council requested that the regulatory
framework should include safeguards necessary to guarantee universal
service, establish interconnection rules and common licensing conditions and
procedures, and to provide for comparable and effective market access
(including in third countries) and for fair competition.
On 25 January 1995 the Commission published the second part of its Green
Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable
television networks.32 Part II set out the details of how the general principles
set out in Part I will be implemented within the timetable envisaged in Part I.
The topics discussed in the second part of the Green Paper were the main
themes of the Resolution of 22 December 1994. Generally, it contained an in-
depth discussion of the major issues involved in future network regulation.
In particular, and with regard to universal service, three basic issues were
raised: the scope of universal service, a common approach to costing universal
service and the means of financing uneconomic aspects of universal provision
in a competitive environment. In the first point, a clear policy position was taken
to the effect that, in the short to medium term, only telecommunications-related
public service obligations should be treated as universal service obligations. In
the longer term, the scope of universal service obligations might be extended
in accordance with expanding consumer needs and technological progress
(e.g. multimedia services). Secondly, the Green Paper recommended that the
cost of universal service should be based on calculations of long run avoidable
31 Council Resolution of 22 December 1994 on the principles and timetable for the liberalisation
of telecommunications infrastructures, 94/C 379/03, OJ C379/4, 31.12.1994.
32 Green Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV networks
- Part II: A common approach to the provision of infrastructure for telecommunications in the
European Union, COM(94) 682, 25.01.1995.
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cost, or incremental costs. Finally, on the financing, the Green Paper indicated
a preference for using universal service funds rather than access charges.
Moreover, the Green Paper pointed out that the EU approach to
interconnection should take the form of detailed and specific legislation under
ONP. In particular, it stated that there should be a Directive on interconnection
which would harmonise conditions for public network access, covering: a) the
rights and obligations on public communications infrastructure providers with
regard to interconnection requests, b) charging principles for interconnection of
public telecommunications networks and services, c) common rules for fair
competition, and d) dispute resolution mechanisms.
The Green Paper also recognised that licensing of telecommunications
infrastructures and services should remain a matter for national regulatory
authorities. At the same time, an overall framework was required which would
set the selection criteria for the award of licences and authorisations, the
conditions attached to communications infrastructure licences and the
provision of telecommunication services.
Part II of the Green Paper was subject to widespread consultation and
discussion which formed the basis for a Communication to the Council and the
European Parliament of 3 May 1995.33 This Communication summarised the
results of the consultation and listed a catalogue of the legal measures
required, covering both the liberalisation and harmonisation steps.
As regards liberalisation, the Communication proposed the following
measures:
- a Directive concerning cable television networks;
- a Directive concerning mobile and personal communications; and
- a Directive concerning the full liberalisation of telecommunications
infrastructures and services as of 1 January 1998.
With regard to the harmonisation measures accompanying the liberalisation
process, a package of measures was proposed, including:
- a Directive on open network provision for voice telephony;
- a Directive on the application of the principle of open network provision to
33 Commission Communication on the consultation on the Green Paper on the liberalisation of




- a Directive for the adaptation of both the ONP Framework Directive and
the ONP Directive for leased lines to a fully competitive environment; and
- a Directive regarding the grant of telecommunications licences.
It is extremely important to emphasise the significance of the aforementioned
proposals because they extended beyond the issue of infrastructure
liberalisation. Indeed, the Infrastructure Green Paper and the consequent
consultation process - having a broad political support and commitment34 -
established the legal foundations of the overall regulatory regime to achieve
the full liberalisation of telecommunications services and networks by 1
January 1998.
2.5. The Mobile Green Paper: The Development Towards a
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
As called for by the Council and the European Parliament in their Resolutions
on the 1992 Review, the Commission adopted in April 1994 a Green Paper
setting out the policy for the development of mobile and personal
communications.35
According to the Mobile Green Paper, mobile communications was the
fastest growing area within the telecommunications sector, driven by rapid
advances in technology, by a growth of commercial opportunities and falling
prices. Even at that time, the EU had more than 11 million subscribers to
mobile cellular telephony systems and a further eight million users of other
mobile systems such as paging and Private Mobile Radio (PMR) Systems.
Forecasts suggested that by the year 2000 there could be nearly 40 million
users in the EC and that with the growing expansion into personal
34 Council Resolution of 18 September 1995 on the implementation of the future regulatory
framework for telecommunications (OJ 1995 C 258/1); European Parliament Resolution of 7
April 1995 (OJ 1995 C 109/310); and European Parliament Resolution of 19 May 1995 (OJ
1995 C 151/479).
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communication sen/ices this could reach a figure of 80 million users by 2010.
Also, it was obvious that the growth of mobile telecommunications will have a
significant impact on the whole of the telecommunications industry, especially
regarding massive private and public investment in telecommunications
networks and services. The above reasons, therefore, led the Commission to
realise that building the right regulatory environment for the development of
mobile communications into a mass market should be a priority.
The Mobile Green Paper identified basic principles for discussion, the
ultimate objectives of which were:
- to permit the development of a Union-wide market for mobile services,
equipment and terminals;
- to identify common principles where required for achieving this target;
- to help the evolution of the mobile communications market into pan-
European personal communications services; and
- to facilitate and promote trans-European networks and services in the
sector.
According to the Mobile Green Paper, a number of Member States still
maintained exclusive or special rights for certain mobile services, in apparent
conflict with the Treaty competition rules. In challenging special and exclusive
rights, the Mobile Green Paper wanted to ensure that only objective factors
could be used to limit market entry. Radio frequencies are the central resource
of the mobile communications market and for this reason many Member States
tried to use the lack of available frequencies as an excuse for their refusal to
issue mobile licences. So it seems that a predictable and clear environment for
frequency allocations is a vital precondition and incentive in order to encourage
investment. Hence it is significant to ensure that the allocation of frequencies
must be subject to objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. The
Mobile Green Paper also suggested that licences should not contain any other
restrictions other than those justified on the grounds of the essential
requirements. Therefore, reasons for restrictions on the issue of new licences
will be a lack of available frequencies or security of network operation and data
protection. Furthermore, restrictions will be justified when they are vital to
35 Towards the personal communications environment: Green Paper on a common approach in
the field of mobile and personal communications in the European Union, COM(94) 145 final,
27.04.1994.
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protect the public service requirements, namely permanence, availability and
quality of service.
Amongst the most important barriers to the development of mobile
communications is the prohibition or restriction, imposed on mobile network
operators, to use their own transmission infrastructure or sharing infrastructure
with another party. Indeed, mobile operators in many Member States are
obliged to use leased line capacity of telecommunications organisations for
both internal network connections and for the routing of long distance portions
of calls. Charges for leased lines can be high with consequent impact on the
pricing of mobile services, particularly for international interconnection. This
eventually leads to distortion of market structure and acts as a obstacle to the
provision of advanced services.
Therefore, the issue of interconnection between mobile and fixed networks,
between mobile networks of the same or different technologies and between
mobile operators and service providers is particularly important. This is the
reason why, according to the Mobile Green Paper, interconnection conditions
at the aforementioned interfaces must be based on objective criteria. They also
must be transparent, non-discriminatory, cost-oriented and compatible with the
principle of proportionality. Furthermore, interconnection conditions must cover
basic tariff principles and dispute resolution procedures and must respect the
essential requirements. So the Mobile Green Paper supported the idea of
granting the right for mobile operators to use their own, each other's or third-
party infrastructure for the provision of their licensed activities with the further
right to interconnect their networks.
In order to remove the barriers to further development of the sector, the
Mobile Green Paper made five major proposals, namely:
- abolition of special and exclusive rights over mobile communications,
subject where required to appropriate licensing conditions;
- removal of all restrictions on the provision of mobile services by
independent service providers and through direct service provision by mobile
network operators;
- full freedom to develop infrastructure should be permitted to mobile
network operators;
- unrestricted combined offering of services via the fixed and mobile
networks;
- further development of standardisation and licensing procedures in order
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to facilitate pan-European operation and service provision.
After extensive consultation following the Mobile Green Paper, the Commission
adopted in November 1994 a Communication on mobile and personal
communications.36 The Communication contained a comprehensive
programme for action, including:
- full application of the competition rules;
- the development of a Code of Conduct for service providers;
- full access of service providers to the market;
- agreement on procedures for licensing of satellite-based personal
communications;
- promotion of the availability of frequencies and numbers; and
- promotion of targeted programmes to support market entry of emerging
mobile technologies.
The objectives laid down in the Mobile Green Paper and the consequent
Communication had the full political support of the European Parliament37 and
the Council38 and prepared the ground for the Mobile Directive39 which was
adopted by the Commission in January 1996.40
36
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on the
consultation on the Green Paper on mobile and personal communications, COM(94) 492 final,
23.11.1994.
37 See the European Parliament Resolution of 19 May 1995 on the Commission Communication
to the European Parliament and the Council "Towards the personal communications
environment: Green Paper on a common approach in the field of mobile and personal
communications in the European Union" (COM(94)0145 - C4-0061/94) and on the
Commission communications to the European Parliament and the Council on the consultation
on the Green Paper on mobile and personal communications (COM(94)0492 - C4-0046/95)
(A4-0097/95; OJ C151/473, 19.06.1995).
38
See the Council Resolution of 29 June 1995 on the further development of the mobile and
personal communications sector in the European Union, 95/C 188/02; OJ C188/3,
22.07.1995.
39 Commission Directive of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to
mobile and personal communications, 96/2/EC, OJ L20/59, 26.01.1996.
40 For other harmonisation measures taken in the mobile communications sector, see the
analysis in the Chapter "EU Radio Spectrum Policy in the Converging Environment".
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2.6. The Rulings of the European Court of Justice on the
Commission's Use of Article 86 (ex 90) of the EC
Treaty
Directives are usually issued by the Council of Ministers of the European Union
under Article 95 (ex Article 100a) of the Treaty.
Nevertheless, Directives may also be issued by the Commission of the
European Communities under Article 86(3) (ex Article 90(3)) of the Treaty
which entitles the Commission to take measures in order to ensure that the
special rights granted to certain national companies or administrations by their
governments do not obstruct the full completion of the European Common
Market.
However, several Member States would have preferred to liberalise the
European terminal equipment market on the basis of a Council Directive under
Article 95 of the Treaty because there was the impression that the
Commission, by issuing its own Directives, was establishing a regulatory power
far exceeding its traditional supervisory competencies. Indeed, a number of
Member States were not very enthusiastic about this procedure being used in a
way that prevented their involvement and ability to influence the content of the
Terminal Equipment Directive41 through the Council. It was considered to be an
attempt to create a new law rather than merely enforcement of existing Treaty
obligations.
This was therefore the basic reason why the Terminal Equipment Directive -
although based on the Green Paper recommendations and approved by the
Council - was challenged by an appeal to the European Court of Justice by
France (supported by Germany, Italy, Greece and Belgium), contesting the
capacity of the Commission to issue its own Directives.42 France's appeal was
especially remarkable, as it was considered to be one of the most liberal
markets for telecommunications equipment. The apparent eagerness of an
individual Member State to challenge the Commission at this early stage is an
indication of the controversial environment surrounding the Commission's
ultimate goal in this area. In the Commission's view, however, the market for
telecommunications equipment is an ordinary market for goods in which free
41 Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in telecommunications
equipment (hereafter the Terminal Equipment Directive), 88/301/EEC, OJ L131/73,
27.05.1988.
42 Case C-202/88 France v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-1223.
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competition has been impeded by monopolies. This means, the argument
goes, that Article 86(3) is a sufficient basis for imposing the Directive.
In sum, the Court upheld the Commission's power to require that all
exclusive rights should be withdrawn, but held that the provision requiring the
abolition of special rights was invalid as the Commission had failed to define
what such rights consisted of. In addition, the inclusion in the Terminal
Equipment Directive of an obligation on telecommunications authorities to
finish leasing or maintenance contracts on no more than one year's notice was
held to fall outside the powers of the Commission. This provision was annulled
by the Court of Justice on the ground that Article 86(3) is only an appropriate
legal base when addressed to State measures, whereas this provision
concerned the independent commercial behaviour of the telecommunications
authorities themselves.
The basic point, nevertheless, is that the substantial content of the Directive
remained intact. The fact that the Commission's Directive was not dismissed by
the ECJ decision in March 1991 strengthened the position of the Commission
to a significant degree and broadened the way in which the Commission could
avoid the inter-governmental level in forming the European telecommunications
policy.
As in the case of the Equipment Directive, the Services Directive43 was
challenged by Spain, Belgium and Italy, with France intervening.44 In the light
of the judgment in Case C-202/88, the Spanish and Italian challenges were
adjusted to focus on the Commission's application of Article 90 to special rights
and undertakings, and succeeded. Indeed, confirming its reasoning in Case C-
202/88 Terminal Directive, the Court ruled that the provisions relating to special
rights were annulled. Again, this was based on the grounds that the
Commission had not explained what special rights were nor in what respect the
existence of such rights was contrary to the Treaty. Similarly, however, the
Court of Justice confirmed the power of the Commission under Article 86(3) to
issue Directives specifying obligations resulting from the Treaty, and that the
Commission's authority is consequently not restricted to inspecting existing
Community regulations.
The basic point of the story is that the Commission, having passed the most
43 Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications
services (hereafter the Services Directive), 90/388/EEC, OJ L192/10, 24.07.1990.
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important issues, namely the principles of services liberalisation and separation
of operating and regulatory functions, was without any doubt the winner.
The Decisions of the Court of Justice in the "Terminal Equipment and Services
Directives" cases cleared the way for the already mentioned reforms which
were proposed in the 1992 Review.
3. OPENING UP OF THE MARKETS: LEGISLATIVE
MEASURES
3.1. Opening the Market for Radio Equipment and
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment
3.1.1. The Terminal Equipment Directive
It should be remembered that, in the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission had
declared its intention to open the market for telecommunications terminal
equipment to full competition. So, a double approach was adopted with the
objective, first, to loosen the grip of national incumbents on the market for
telecommunications terminal equipment and, second, to ensure the adoption of
measures concerning the mutual recognition of type approval procedures and
the harmonisation of technical standards.
The first part of this approach, the abolition of national monopolies, was
covered by the 1988 Commission's Terminal Equipment Directive.45 The
44 Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90 Spain, Belgium and Italy v. Commission
[1992] ECR I-5833.
45 Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in telecommunications
equipment (hereafter the Terminal Equipment Directive), 88/301/EEC, OJ L131/73,
27.05.1988.
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Directive applied to "terminal equipment", which includes, inter alia, telephone
sets, telex terminals, mobile telephones, receive-only satellite stations not
reconnected to the public network, data-transmission terminals, PABXs and
modems.46 The Directive defined terminal equipment as
"equipment directly or indirectly connected to the termination of a public
telecommunications network to send, process or receive information. A
connection is indirect if equipment is placed between the terminal and the
termination of the network. In either case (direct or indirect) the connection
may be made by wire, optical fibre or electromagnetically".47
The Directive identified the fact that in most Member States only the national
TOs had the right to supply equipment to the user and to connect it to the
network. Moreover, the common tactics of these monopoly organizations was
to order all their equipment from national suppliers. However, these monopoly
rights held by network operators to import, market, connect or service terminal
equipment "often go beyond the provision of network utilisation services and
extend to the supply of user terminal equipment for connection to the
network".48 Also, the increase of types of terminal equipment and the
expectation of the various use of terminals "means that users must be allowed
a free choice between the various types of equipment available if they are to
benefit fully from the technological advances made in the sector".49
Therefore, in order to open up the market for terminal equipment to
competition and to abolish the monopoly positions of national TOs, the
Directive required the Member States:
- to remove special and exclusive rights in relation to the supply, marketing,
connection, bringing into service, and maintenance of telecommunications
terminal equipment existing at that time in the Member States;50
- to ensure that private suppliers have the right to import, market, connect,
46 PABXs are Private Automatic Branch Exchanges which permit a customer to interconnect
terminals at his own premises, for example, switchboard systems on business premises.
Modems allow the connection of data terminals, including computers, to the telephone
network.
47 Terminal Equipment Directive, Article 1.
48
ibid., at Recital 1.
49




bring into service and maintain terminal equipment;51 and
- to ensure that users have access to new public network termination
points.52
Also, the Directive required that the type approval rules and procedures are
written by a body independent of the public operators. Indeed, the Directive
obliged the Member States to assign, by July 1989, the responsibility for
drawing up technical specifications, monitoring their application and granting
type-approval, to bodies "independent of the public or private undertakings,
offering goods and/or services in the telecommunications sector".53 This
measure attempted to obstruct the existing national monopolies from
defending their controlling positions by imposing technical requirements which
prefer their own equipment or prohibit competitors' equipment.
3.1.2. The internal market for radio and telecommunications terminal
equipment
For companies operating in the late 1980s, the removal of monopolies over the
supply of equipment was not enough, given the need to have equipment
approved and tested in order to place it onto the market in other Member
States. Liberalisation measures therefore had to be accompanied by
harmonisation measures in order to ensure the adoption of common technical
standards and that the results of testing and type approval carried out in each
Member State will be recognised throughout the Community.
Council Directive 86/361/EEC on the initial stage of the mutual recognition of
type approval for telecommunications terminal equipment54 was the first step in
this process of establishing the principle of mutual recognition of test results
concerning terminal equipment. This Directive requested CEPT (European







54 Council Directive of 24 July 1986 on the initial stage of the mutual recognition of type approval
for telecommunications terminal equipment, 86/361/EEC, OJ L217/21, 05.08.1986.
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those type approval specifications which are used in all of the Member States;
and required Member States to accept test results from any other Member
State on those common issues in the approval process.
However, because only a limited number of common specifications had been
identified, the Directive had little direct impact upon harmonising the type
approval process itself. Also, although the results of testing in a Member State
could be recognised when applying a national procedure of type approval in
another Member State, the actual administrative procedure of type approval
should still take place in every Member State where the manufacturer wished
to commercialise his product. Thus, because of the fact that the national
standards varied between Member States, a product would have to undergo
testing in each country where it is to be commercialised to the extent that those
standards vary.
As already mentioned, Directive 86/361 was only the first stage for the
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition for terminal equipment.
Indeed, it was repealed on 6 November 1992, which was the implementation
date for Council Directive 91/263 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States concerning telecommunications terminal equipment, including
the mutual recognition of their conformity.55
Directive 91/263 applied the single market concept in that it harmonised only
the essential rules and provides for the mutual recognition of national licensing
and supervisory procedures which ensure that those rules are complied with. It
canceled the obligation for multiple testing and provided that terminal
equipment which is authorised in one Member State may be sold and utilised
throughout the Community, without having to undergo additional testing and
approval procedures.
The mutual recognition procedure starts where the terminal equipment in
question fulfills a number of so-called "essential requirements" specified in
Article 4 of the Directive. The Directive defines the "essential requirements"
(which differ in some respects from the essential requirements in the Terminal
Equipment Directive) which must be satisfied before terminal equipment can
be placed on the market, such as user safety, the safety of telecom network
employees, electromagnetic compatibility, protection of the public network from
55 Council Directive of 29 April 1991 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
concerning telecommunications terminal equipment, including the mutual recognition of their
conformity, 91/263/EEC, OJ L128/1, 23.05.1991.
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harm, and inter-working of the terminal equipment with the public network.
So, once the terminal equipment product has been certified as complying
with the relevant essential requirements, the manufacturer may fasten the EC
mark to it which will allow the product to travel throughout the Community
without any limitations, namely without being subject to additional scrutiny.
Where terminal equipment has been produced in accordance with harmonised
E.C. standards, there is a presupposition of obedience to the above essential
requirements.
A producer has the option of selecting between one of two conformity
procedures which will have as a result the designation of a CE label for the
equipment. Firstly, he can choose to proceed by way of an approved system of
full quality guaranty for design, manufacture and final product examination.
The system will be subject to inspection by a notified body, which has the
authorization to perform unexpected visits. The alternative to this examination
proceeding is the EC "declaration of conformity procedure" under which a
sample of the terminal equipment concerned is tested and approved, and an
EC type examination certificate is issued to the manufacturer.
Directive 91/263 was supplemented by another Council Directive which was
adopted in October 1993 and introduced mutual recognition for type approval
of satellite earth-station equipment.56 In the framework of that Directive,
appropriate type-approval arrangements were put in place for television
receive-only equipment, Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT), and satellite
personal communications services. Since 1998, Directive 91/263/EEC has
been consolidated with Directive 93/97/EEC in Directive 98/13/EC.57
On 9 March 1999 the Council and the European Parliament adopted the
Radio Equipment & Telecommunications Terminal Equipment (R&TTE)
Directive.58 This new Directive replaced Directive 98/13/EC as well as
hundreds of national approval regulations in this field. The R&TTE Directive
came into force in 8 April 2000.
The new Directive will complete the internal market for R&TTE. Indeed, its
56
Council Directive of 29 October 1993 supplementing Directive 91/263/EEC in respect of
satellite earth station equipment, 93/97/EEC, OJ L290/01, 24.11.1993.
57 Directive 98/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 1998
relating to telecommunications terminal equipment and satellite earth station equipment,
including the mutual recognition of their conformity, OJ L 074, 12.03.1998.
58 Directive 99/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 1999 on radio
equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their
conformity (hereafter R&TTE Directive), OJ L91/10, 07.04.1999.
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scope is substantially enlarged to cover not just telecommunications terminal
equipment but also (for the first time) radio equipment. The Directive will
substantially deregulate approval procedures, reduce the regulatory
requirements on equipment, and no longer permit co-existing national approval
regulations. In particular, the Directive removes the requirement for conformity
with a harmonised standard as the condition of free movement. Moreover, it
replaces the current system (which relied on mutual recognition of approvals
based on third party testing and certification) with a more liberal system which
will require only a declaration by the manufacturer that the product met the
requirements in Community legislation. Finally, it will put more emphasis on
market surveillance and manufacturers liability.
3.2. The Liberalisation of Telecommunications Services
and Infrastructure
3.2.1. Services other than public voice telephony
The Commission's attempt to open the telecommunications services market to
competition started with the so-called Services Directive adopted in 1990.59
The Services Directive required the abolition of special and exclusive rights
granted by Member States to Telecommunications Organisations (TOs) for the
supply of value-added services by the end of 1990 and data services by 1
January 1993. The Directive did not apply to voice telephony, telex, mobile
radiotelephony, paging and satellite services.60 However, by defining very
narrowly the scope of the monopoly over voice telephony, the Directive
liberalised voice telephony services other than those provided for the general
public, e.g. voice service for corporate communications or so-called closed
user groups.
The fact that basic voice telephony was left as a reserved service was a very
significant concession, bearing in mind that voice telephony accounted for
59 Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications
services (hereafter the Services Directive), 90/388/EEC, OJ L192/10, 24.07.1990.
60 Services Directive, Articles 1.2 and 2.
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some 90 per cent of the EC telecommunications market. The Services
Directive defined voice telephony as
"the commercial provision for the public of the direct transport and switching of
speech in real-time between public switched network termination points,
enabling any user to use equipment connected to such a network termination
point in order to communicate with another termination point".61
The fact that the Directive did not require the abolition of the national
monopolies over voice telephony was justified as the only way to secure the
provision of a telecommunications network on a universal basis. The Directive
noted that opening voice services to competition would threaten the financial
stability of the incumbent TOs, given their infrastructural duties.62
In view of the introduction of competition, and given the fact that at the time
both operational and regulatory functions were accumulated by the TOs, the
Services Directive required the Member States to ensure that regulatory
functions are entrusted to a body independent of the national
telecommunications organisations.63 Supplemented by the committee
procedures of the open network provision legislation, this created a network of
national regulators and, in effect, a new regulatory regime for the sector.
As will be seen below, subsequent liberalisation has been introduced by
amending the Services Directive to expand the scope of the activities in the
liberalised area.
3.2.2. The Satellites Directive
On 13 October 1994 the Commission adopted the Satellites Directive64 which
abolished special and exclusive rights for the provision of satellite services and
equipment by the end of 1994. The Directive amended the Services and
Terminal Equipment Directives and extended them in order to require Member
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communications services (save voice telephony). In addition to being required
to abolish such special and exclusive rights, Member States had also to take
the necessary measures to ensure that any operator is entitled to supply any
• 65
telecommunication service except voice telephony.
It is important to note that the Satellites Directive reinserted a full definition
of 'special rights' into Directives 88/301 and 90/388. This step was taken
following two already mentioned judgments of the European Court of Justice,66
which annulled the provisions of Directives 88/301 and 90/388 insofar as they
required the withdrawal of special rights, on the grounds that the Commission
had not explained what special rights were nor in what respect the existence of
such rights was contrary to the Treaty. The result of those judgments was that,
although Member States were required to abolish exclusive (namely,
monopoly) rights granted to telecommunications operators, Member States
could limit the number of telecommunications operators authorised to provide a
service or could grant special privileges to selected telecommunications
operators, giving them an unfair advantage over others.
In order to circumvent the effects of those judgments, and to give the
broadest possible scope to the liberalisation of the telecommunications
services sector, the Satellites Directive gave a very broad definition to 'special
rights'. Indeed, the concept of special rights turned effectively on the
discretionary nature of the procedure by which they are granted. Thus an
undertaking is to be considered to have special rights if it is designated as one
of a limited number authorised to undertake a particular activity or is given a
legal or regulatory advantage over its competitors, otherwise than in
accordance with objective, proportional and non-discriminatory criteria.67
In addition, the failure of the Terminal Equipment and Services Directives to
indicate in what respect the existence of special rights was contrary to the
Treaty was remedied. Indeed, the preamble to the Satellites Directive stated
that when the number of undertakings authorised to provide satellite
telecommunications services is limited by a Member State through special
rights, this constitutes a restriction that could be incompatible with Article 59
64 Commission Directive of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications (hereafter the Satellites
Directive), 94/46/EEC, OJ L268/15, 19.10.1994.
65 See Article 2 of the Services Directive as replaced by Article 2.2(a) of the Satellites Directive.
66 Case C-202/88 France v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-1223, Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90
and C-289/90 Spain and Others v. Commission [1992] ECR I-5833.
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[now Article 49] of the Treaty (free circulation of services).68 This is the case
whenever such a limitation is not justified by essential requirements because
these rights prevent other undertakings from supplying (or obtaining) the
services concerned to (or from) other Member States. Such requirements
could be the effective use of the frequency spectrum and the avoidance of
harmful interference. Consequently, provided that a satellite service satisfies
the essential requirements applicable to satellite communications, any
undertaking should be authorised to provide such a service and Member
States cannot limit the number of operators authorised to provide satellite
services.
3.2.3. Cable Television Networks
On 18 October 1995 the Commission took the first step to liberalise networks
and adopted a Directive concerning the opening of cable television networks
for the provision of telecommunications services.69 The Cable-TV Directive
amended the Services Directive so as to require Member States to withdraw
restrictions on the supply of transmission capacity via cable TV networks and
to allow operators to offer all telecommunications services (save voice
telephony which will not be liberalised until 1998) over cable TV networks from
1 January 1996.
The recitals of the Directive were lengthy and comprehensive, trying to
explain how the Commission hoped the Cable TV Directive was going to work
in practice as well as the role of alternative networks in promoting competition.
It was pointed out that Member States were placing regulatory restrictions on
use of alternative infrastructure for the provision of liberalised services. These
restrictions were considered to be the main cause of a continuing bottleneck.
This meant that in every Member State there was one telecommunications
organisation holding a dominant position and, therefore, competitive service
67 Article 2.1 (a)(ii) of the Satellites Directive, inserted in Article 1 of the Services Directive.
68 See Recital 12 of the Satellites Directive.
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operators were dependent on the facilities of these dominant
telecommunications organisations. The results of these barriers were high
prices (both for leased lines and ultimately to the consumer) and
discouragement of investment for the establishment of hybrid multimedia
networks.
The Cable-TV Directive tackled the aforementioned problem by opening up
an alternative transmission media in competition with the traditional TO
networks. This aimed to bring down the cost of leased lines for the provision of
value-added telecommunications services as operators would no longer have
to rely solely on the TO's networks. It would also enable cable TV companies
to compete directly with the TOs and strengthen their position on the future
converging multi-media/telecommunications markets. Moreover, the Directive
hoped to provide incentives for the accelerated development and distribution of
multimedia telecommunications services, such as video on demand, home-
shopping, home-banking and interactive video games.
The Directive was structured as an amendment to the Services Directive and
its operative part started by replacing the definition of 'telecommunications
services' with "services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the
transmission and/or routing of signals on a telecommunications network".70
This change was necessitated by the possible confusion resulting from the
original Services Directive definition as excluding radio-broadcasting. If radio¬
broadcasting was excluded then it could be possibly argued that cable TV
networks carrying such services might likewise not qualify as
telecommunications networks. There was also a new definition of 'cable TV
networks' as consisting of "any wire-based infrastructure approved by a
Member State for the delivery or distribution of radio or television signals to the
public".71
The focal point of the Directive was its amendment of Article 4 of the
Services Directive by obliging Member States to "abolish all restrictions on the
supply of transmission capacity by cable TV networks and allow the use of
cable networks for the provision of telecommunications services, other than
69 Commission Directive of 18 October 1995 amending Directive 90/388/EC with regard to the
abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already
liberalised telecommunications services (hereafter the Cable TV Directive), 95/51/EC, OJ L
256/49, 26.10.1995.
70 Article 1.1(a) of the Cable TV Directive, inserted in Article 1 of the Services Directive.
71
Article 1 1(b) of the Cable TV Directive, inserted in Article 1 of the Services Directive.
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voice telephony".72 This clarified that the Directive was not to be used to
liberalise voice telephony prior to 1998.
The Directive also required Member States to ensure that interconnection of
cable TV networks with the public telecommunications network, leased lines
and other cable TV networks is made possible.73
Furthermore, there was an obligation for Member States to take the
necessary measures to "ensure accounting transparency and to prevent
discriminatory behaviour", by undertakings having exclusive rights in
telecommunications also providing cable TV infrastructure. Separation of
financial accounts of the activities was required. Reciprocally, in cases where
cable TV companies were owned by TOs, the Directive required accounting
transparency and separation between the two businesses where the turnover
of the TOs exceeds 50 million ECU.74
Finally, it was stated that the Commission would review the situation in the
light of the Directive's objectives before 1 January 1998, in order to assess
whether accounting separation (between TOs and their cable TV businesses)
was sufficient to avoid abuse of dominant position.75
The results of this review were contained in a Commission Communication
adopted on 17 December 199776 The Communication concluded that
ownership of both telecommunications and cable TV networks could be a
major brake on the future development of multimedia markets. The
Commission expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations of accounting
separation - characterised as "an insufficient measure"77 - and concluded that
the legal separation of cable interests and the incumbents' telephone networks
where there is cross-ownership had a "walling off effect between the two
operations"78 and, therefore, should be implemented.79
As a result of the Communication on the Cable Review, the Commission
72




Article 2 of the Cable TV Directive.
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ibid. See also Article 9 of the Services Directive as inserted by Article 1.9 of the Full
Competition Directive.
76 Commission Communication concerning the review under competition rules of the joint
provision of telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator and the abolition
of restrictions on the provision of cable TV capacity over telecommunications networks,
98/C71/EC, OJ C 71/4, 7.3.1998.
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ibid., at para. 55.
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ibid., at para. 77.
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ibid., at para. 56.
66
adopted on 23 June 1999 a Directive80 which required the legal separation (but
not divestiture) of telephone and cable interests. As the Cable Ownership
Directive stated:
"Each Member State shall ensure that no telecommunications organisation
operates its cable TV network using the same legal entity as it uses for its
public telecommunications network, when such organisation: (a) is controlled
by that Member State or benefits from special rights; and (b) is dominant in a
substantial part of the common market in the provision of public
telecommunications networks and public voice telephony services; and (c)
operates a cable TV network established under special or exclusive right in the
same geographic area".81
3.2.4. The Mobile Directive
In January 1996 the Commission adopted a Directive to liberalise the mobile
and personal communications market. The Mobile Directive82 amended further
the Services Directive to include mobile communications which had so far been
specifically excluded from its scope.
The objective of the Directive was to help level the competitive playing field
between the incumbent fixed-line providers and wireless operators. The
Commission also believed that the Directive would result in greater numbers of
providers and a variety of services offered. Thus the Mobile Directive required
the removal of any remaining special and exclusive rights in the mobile sector
by February 1996.
The Commission regarded the restrictions on use of and access to
infrastructure as one of the most important constraints on the provision of
mobile telephony. Indeed, incumbents can effectively control the availability
80 Commission Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC in order
to ensure that telecommunications networks and cable TV networks owned by a single
operator are separate legal entities, (hereafter the Cable Ownership Directive), OJ L 175/39,
10/07/1999.
81 Cable Ownership Directive, at Article 1.
82 Commission Directive of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to
mobile and personal communication (hereafter the Mobile Directive), 96/2/EC, OJ L20/59,
26.01.1996.
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and price of wireless service if the mobile providers must lease lines from the
incumbent. This happens not only because a mobile network may include fixed
links but also because the mobile network must be connected to the national
fixed network to allow calls from the mobile network to be routed to the fixed
network (and vice versa). Since infrastructure in Member States was provided
under an exclusive privilege granted by national legislation to one national
operator, that operator had had vital control over the cost structure of the
mobile operator.
The Mobile Directive dealt with this issue by requiring Member States to lift
all restrictions on wireless operators providing their own infrastructure,
obtaining infrastructure from other sources, or sharing infrastructure, facilities,
and sites.83 So, mobile operators were allowed (within the framework of their
licences) to build and use their own infrastructure or microwave links or to turn
to existing alternative network providers, rather than relying on the networks
provided by the national fixed network operator. Furthermore, the Mobile
Directive required Member States to lift any restrictions on interconnection.84
This means that mobile operators could have the right to interconnect directly
with mobile or fixed networks in other Member States, rather than having to
interconnect via the incumbent operator in their home State. Interconnection
conditions had to follow the standard Community principles of objectivity,
transparency, non-discrimination, and proportionality.
Moreover, the Directive noted that frequencies are a crucial bottleneck
resource and that Member States have used the lack of available frequencies
as an excuse for their refusal to issue mobile licences. It required, therefore,
the licence allocation process to be based on objective, transparent, and non¬
discriminatory criteria, and made clear that technical restrictions are not to be
used as an excuse to prevent operators from combining licensed services or
frequencies. The number of licences may be limited only on the basis of
essential requirements, on lack of radio spectrum, and if the measure is
proportionally justified. 'Essential requirements' include availability of
frequency, security of the network and maintenance of its integrity and inter¬
operability, protection of data, including private personal data, as well as
85
environmental and town planning considerations.
83 Article 1.3 of the Mobile Directive, inserted as Article 3c in the Services Directive.
84 Article 1.3 of the Mobile Directive, inserted as Article 3d in the Services Directive.
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Article 1.1(b) of the Mobile Directive, inserted in Article 1 of the Services Directive.
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Finally, the Mobile Directive required Member States to issue licences for
DCS 1800 service (nowadays called GSM-1800) when the European
Radiocommunications Committee adopts a decision on allocation of DCS 1800
frequencies or at the latest by 1 January 1998.86
3.2.5. The Full Competition Directive
Following the political agreement amongst Member States to liberalise all
telecommunications services (including voice telephony) and
telecommunications infrastructure by 1 January 1998 (with transition periods
for certain Member States with less developed or very small networks), the
Commission adopted in February 1996 the Full Competition Directive.87
The Directive provided for the early liberalisation of alternative
telecommunications networks from July 1996,88 and set the deadline of 1
January 1998 for full liberalisation89 as well as a mechanism for requesting
additional transitional periods.90 In addition, it set out a range of provisions
addressing licensing, universal service, interconnection, and numbering, which
established basic regulatory principles. These principles have now been
complemented by the detailed harmonised framework.
In particular, the Directive required interconnection to the voice telephony
service and public switched telecommunications networks to be granted on
non-disciminatory, proportional and transparent terms, and based on objective
criteria. It provided that the parties should first attempt to negotiate
commercially terms of interconnection agreements, but if they are unable to
reach agreement, the Member States are to adopt a decision setting the
individual terms of interconnection. And it required Member States to publish,
by 1 July 1997, the terms and conditions for interconnection to the basic
86 Article 2.1 of the Mobile Directive.
87 Commission Directive of 13 March 1996 amending Commission Directive 90/388/EEC with
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets (hereafter the
Full Competition Directive), 96/19/EC, OJ L74/13, 22.03.1996.





As far as the licensing regime is concerned, it was underlined that licensing
conditions must be in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In
particular, the number of licences issued may only be limited on the basis of a
restricted number of essential requirements. The Directive required Member
States to notify the relevant licensing procedures to the Commission by
January 1997, and to publish the licensing conditions and declaration
procedures by July 1997.92 Any telecommunications services falling outside of
the definition of voice service, public networks or networks using radio
frequencies must only be subject to a general authorisation or declaration
process instead of individual licences.93 There was nothing in the Directive
setting up a one-stop shop for Community telecommunications licensing. The
Commission was satisfied at that stage merely to set the broad outlines of what
an acceptable Member State licensing regime might look like. Harmonisation
aspects of licensing were covered by the Licensing Directive.94
With regard to universal service, instead of continuing the subsidy system of
high prices for business service and low prices for residential service, the
Commission envisaged its replacement by one of two methods. A type of
subsidy could be continued through the rates of the dominant providers, with a
supplementary charge being paid by all telecommunications providers in
proportion to markets share. A universal service fund could also be
established, presumably directly to subsidise low-income or rural telephone
customers. Whichever universal service scheme was selected by the Member
States, it would have to be notified to the Commission so that it could be
reviewed for compatibility with Treaty principles. As a part of universal service
provision, the existing telecommunications organisations were to be allowed to
rebalance their tariffs to reflect more accurately the cost of providing the
service. In doing so, they should take account of specific market conditions
and the need to ensure the affordability of universal service. As the
Commission stated, Member States must allow TOs to
91 Article 1.6 of the Full Competition Directive, inserted as Article 4a in the Services Directive.
92 Article 1.3 of the Full Competition Directive, replacing Article 3 of the Services Directive.
93 Article 1.2 of the Full Competition Directive, inserted as Article 2.3 in the Services Directive.
94 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a
common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of
telecommunications services (hereafter the Licensing Directive), OJ L117/15, 7.5.1997.
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"adapt current rates which are not in line with costs and which increase the
burden of universal service provision, in order to achieve tariffs based on real
costs. Where such rebalancing cannot be completed before 1 January 1998
the Member States concerned shall report to the Commission on the future
phasing out of the remaining tariff imbalances. This shall include a detailed
timetable for implementation".95
The purpose of the Directive was to create early certainty with regard to
national legislation and the rights and obligations of market players in the
liberalised telecommunications environment. Although the Directive did not call
for immediate competition in basic voice telephone services, the Commission
was convinced that other actions such as the allowance of use of alternative
infrastructure would reduce telecommunications prices and smooth the
transition to complete telecommunications competition in 1998.
4. THE FRAMEWORK FOR HARMONISED REGULATORY
PRINCIPLES: LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
4.1.1. The ONP Framework Directive
Alongside the Article 86 Directives, a series of Council and European
Parliament Directives, adopted under Articles 95 (internal market) and 47 and
55 (freedom to provide services), have put in place detailed harmonised
regulation to ensure that the aims and principles set out in the Article 86
Directives are upheld.
The main principle behind these harmonisation Directives is the concept of
Open Network Provision (ONP). This concept - introduced with the 1990 ONP
Framework Directive96 - seeks to promote the single market in
95 Article 1.6 of the Full Competition Directive, inserted as Article 4c in the Services Directive.
96 Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision (hereafter
the 1990 ONP Framework Directive), 90/387/EEC, OJ L192/1, 24.7.1990.
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telecommunications by harmonising the conditions for access to and use of
publicly available networks and services. The aim of these ONP conditions is to
ensure a minimum set of services, to secure access and interconnection, to
harmonise standards for technical interfaces of networks, and to ensure
universal service. The harmonised ONP conditions must comply with a number
of basic principles, namely that they must be based on objective criteria, be
transparent and published adequately, must guarantee equality of access and
be non-discriminatory. These principles apply to the actions of both regulators
and market players and set the basis for fair and even-handed regulation and
commercial conduct in a liberalised telecommunications market.
Being a Framework Directive, the 1990 ONP Directive provided the general
basis for the adoption of further Directives dealing specifically with different
types of services. Thus Annex I of the Directive listed a number of the areas for
which ONP conditions will be developed, and set a timetable for the
Commission's future proposals and legislative action. The areas listed were:
leased lines, packet switched data services, integrated services digital network
(ISDN), voice telephony, telex, and mobile services.
The revised version of the ONP Framework Directive97 took account of the
fact that the initial programme has been achieved. It adapted the ONP concept
to address the issues of open access to publicly available telecommunications
networks and services in a competitive environment. It recognised that a
voluntary approach to harmonisation is in general appropriate in a competitive
context, whilst emphasising the key importance of maintaining and developing
universal service and the need for mandatory requirements in those areas
where market forces alone are not sufficient to meet European policy goals.
In particular, the revised Directive established the independence of the NRAs
in those cases where a Member State continues to retain ownership or a
significant degree of control of organisations providing telecommunications
networks and/or services. This is achieved by requiring effective structural
separation between NRAs and activities associated with ownership or control
of organisations providing telecommunications networks, equipment or
services.
ONP measures apply to organisations providing public telecommunications
97 Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997
amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a
competitive environment in telecommunications, OJ L295/23, 29.10.1997.
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networks and/or services in a way that reflects an organisation's position in the
relevant market. The entities covered are set in the specific ONP Directives
(Leased Lines, Voice Telephony, and Interconnection). The revised ONP
framework laid down sector-specific ex ante rules which provide predictability
for market players and complement the more general competition rules of the
T reaty.
4.1.2. The Leased Lines Directive
The ONP Framework Directive provided the basis for Directive 92/44/EEC,98
which extended the principles of objectivity, transparency and non¬
discrimination to leased lines. The provision of high capacity leased lines is
particularly significant for the progress of technically advanced competitive
services.
The leased lines Directive aimed to ensure the availability throughout the
Union of a minimum set of analogue and digital leased lines up to 2 Mbit/s with
harmonised technical characteristics. It also aimed at eliminating technical
restrictions for the interconnection between leased lines and public
telecommunications networks.
Further measures concerned the establishment of "one-stop" procedures for
ordering and billing. Under those procedures, a user who wants to use leased-
lines which cover more than one Member State will have to deal only with one
telecommunications authority. In addition, it required the availability of
information on technical characteristics, tariffs, supply and usage conditions,
licensing and declaration requirements, and conditions for the attachment of
terminal equipment. Moreover, there was a requirement for implementation of
cost accounting systems by TOs in order to assess compliance with the basic
principle of cost orientation of tariffs. Finally, Article 8 of the Directive required
Member States to set up a dispute settlement procedure by a working group of
the ONP committee. It provided for non-binding arbitration for those disputes
which cannot be resolved at the national level or involve operators in more than
98
Council Directive of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased lines,
92/44/EEC, OJ L165/27, 19.6.1992.
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one Member State.
In 1997 the leased lines Directive was revised" to ensure that, in a
competitive market, at least one operator is responsible for offering a minimum
set of leased lines at any particular location within a Member State, and that
leased lines (whether within the minimum set or not) are supplied on the basis
of certain defined conditions. In order to avoid over-regulation, this obligation-
to-provide was placed only on organisations with significant market power,
unless there was no SMP organisation in the area concerned. Moreover, the
revised Directive provided for tariff regulation to be set aside by NRAs once no
organisation has significant market power in a specific market. The Directive
had to be transposed into national law by 1 January 1998.
4.1.3. The Voice Telephony Directive
The original Directive on the application of ONP to voice telephony services
was adopted by the European Parliament and Council in December 1995.100 A
new Directive101 on Voice Telephony was adopted on 26 February 1998 and
has replaced the 1995 Directive.
In the revised Voice Telephony Directive universal service was defined as a
"minimum set of services of specified quality which is available to all users
independent of their geographical location and, in the light of specific national
conditions, at an affordable price".102
The Directive required Member States to ensure that at least one
organisation is responsible for meeting all reasonable requests for connection
to the fixed public telephone network at a fixed location and access to fixed
99
Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997
amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purposes of adaptation to a
competitive environment in telecommunications, OJ L295/23, 29.10.1997.
100
European Parliament and Council Directive of 13 December 1995 on the application of open
network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, 95/62/EC, OJ L321/6, 30/12/1995.
101
Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on
the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service
for telecommunications in a competitive environment (replacing European Parliament and
Council Directive 95/62/EC) (hereafter the Revised Voice Telephony Directive), OJ L101/24,
01.04.1998.
102
The Revised Voice Telephony Directive, Article 2.2(f).
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public telephone services. However, Member States were entitled, if
necessary, to designate one or more operators so that the universal service is
delivered throughout the national territory.103
The Directive contained the precise elements to be included in the universal
service. In particular, designated providers must provide a connection to the
public fixed telephone network that is capable of allowing users to make and
receive national and international calls and supporting voice telephony,
facsimile and data transmission via modems.104 Member States must also
ensure the provision of public pay telephones105 and may, where appropriate,
take specific measures for customers with disabilities or with special social
needs.106
In addition to the package of universal services to be provided to consumers,
the Directive specified a range of obligations which fall on different categories
of operators. In particular, the Directive distinguished between fixed and mobile
operators and placed on the latter only five obligations. Thus mobile operators
are required to provide: directory and enquiry services;107 access to operator
assistance and enquiry services;108 free access to emergency services;109 a
contract which specifies the service to be provided;110 and publication of
adequate and up-to-date information on standard terms and conditions.111
Designated universal service providers and fixed operators with significant
market power are subject to additional obligations. These include: keeping and
publishing records of their performance levels (performance is measured
against the quality parameters set out in Annex III of the Directive);112 itemised
billing, tone dialling and selective call barring;113 the provision of additional


























oriented pricing and unbundling of services;115 and cost-accounting
principles.116 It should be noted that the Directive categorises the fixed
operators in such a way that only providers of voice telephony services, who
either have significant market power or have been designated universal service
providers with significant market power, are required to provide the additional
facilities set out in Article 15 of the Directive.
The Directive did not attempt to specify in detail what is meant by 'affordable'
in the universal service definition. Instead, due to the different economic and
social conditions which apply across the EU, it was decided that it should be a
matter of national competence in order to ensure that specific local policy and
priorities are efficiently addressed. But NRAs are required to publish the rules
and criteria for ensuring affordability,117 and the Commission examines the
evolution of universal service, in terms of scope, level, quality and affordability,
by publishing regular reports.118
In order to ensure affordability, the Directive required Member States to have
special regard to prices in rural or high cost areas119 and to allow the offer of
special price schemes120 (e.g. packages which can offer security and
alternatives to customers without a phone and to those on low incomes who
are careful at budgeting). However, where such schemes are offered, they
must be in accordance with the principles of transparency and non-
121
discrimination.
Finally, the Directive adopted a flexible approach by moving to a policy of no
disconnections for customers with temporary payment difficulties.122 As an
alternative to a fully disconnected service, it required Member States to
introduce packages which, for instance, will offer an outgoing calls barred
service with an agreed repayment plan. The scheme will remain in place until
any outstanding debt has been paid back over an agreed reasonable period.
After the debt has been repaid, the customer can revert to the full service
package. Operators will be entitled to proceed with complete disconnection
115




ibid., Article 3(1 )(d).
118 See for instance the 1st Monitoring Report on Universal Service in Telecommunications in
the European Union, COM(98) 101, 25.2.1998.
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only in specific cases (e.g. fraud) and only after due warning is given to the
subscriber beforehand.123
4.1.4. The Interconnection Directive
Interconnection is essential to a competitive market and the terms on which is
granted are key to the economics of a TO's operation. In addition,
interconnection allows new market entrants access to existing end-users on a
basis which will encourage increased investment and market growth in the
telecommunications services sector.
The Interconnection Directive124 was adopted in 30 June 1997 with the aim
to ensure 'any-to-any communication' and to strike an appropriate balance
between the rights and obligations of players in accordance with their relative
positions in the market. For this reason, it provides that certain operators
(Annex II operators) have rights and obligations to negotiate interconnection
with each other.125 Those operators who fall into Annex I, i.e. operators with
significant market power (SMP) having basically 25 % or more of a relevant
market, must offer interconnection to a licensed operator when requested to do
126
so.
Member States are obliged to impose specific obligations on those TOs who
are notified as having SMP, requiring them to comply with the principles of
non-discrimination, transparency and cost-orientation. Such TOs must apply,
for example, similar interconnection conditions in similar circumstances to all
organisations providing similar services127 and to publish all necessary
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facilitate conclusion of an interconnection agreement.128 In addition, they must
publish a Reference Interconnection Offer (RIO) setting out the operator's
interconnection services and respective tariffs.129 Charges for interconnection
must also respect the principles of transparency and cost orientation, which
means, inter alia, that interconnection tariffs have to be "sufficiently unbundled,
so that the applicant is not required to pay for anything not strictly related to the
service requested".130
When telecommunications operators have a vertically integrated character -
e.g. when they are dominant in the supply of network services and at the same
time they are enhanced services providers - regulation is needed to deliver the
requisite checks and balances. One of those regulatory controls is the
obligation for accounting separation.131 This requirement refers to the
preparation of separate accounts for the company's different units so that the
costs and revenues associated with each business (and transfers between
them) can be separately identified and properly allocated, so ensuring that
there are no unfair cross subsidies.
Moreover, the Directive stipulates that NRAs have certain powers and duties
in relation to interconnection and may, where justified:
- impose changes to the reference interconnection offer (these may be
retrospective in effect);
- set conditions for interconnection;
- intervene in negotiations about interconnection on their own initiative at
any time, and must do so if requested by either party, in order to specify issues
which must be covered in an interconnection agreement; and
- set time limits for negotiations on interconnection.132
In the event of a dispute in which a party requests NRA intervention, the NRA
133
must take steps to resolve the dispute within six months of the request.
NRAs exercising their responsibilities must, amongst other things, take into
















competitive market and ensuring satisfactory end-to-end communications for
end-users.
In addition to the Directive, the Commission has adopted a Recommendation
on Interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market. Part 1 of the
Recommendation, dealing with Interconnection pricing, was adopted on 8
January 1998.134 It recommended the use of forward-looking long run
incremental costs as the most appropriate model for interconnection pricing in
a newly liberalised market and for meeting the requirement in the
Interconnection Directive for cost oriented interconnection charges. The
Recommendation was updated in 29 July 1998135 to provide the latest figures
on interconnection charges throughout the European Union.
4.1.5. The Licensing Directive
The licensing regime in the telecommunications sector is covered by the
Licensing Directive136 which provides the legal basis for supervising access to
the market and for monitoring compliance with the requirements imposed on
operators.
The most important issues of the Directive are three in number. First, the
prohibition of any constraint in the number of new entrants. The only justifying
restrictions are limited, inter alia, to security of network operations,
maintenance of network integrity, interoperability, protection of data, and
scarce resources - the last linked mainly with the efficient use of the frequency
spectrum.137 However, the reasons for these restrictions must be made public,
be objectively justified, and based on non-discriminatory, proportionate and
transparent criteria. Second, there is clearly a preference for moving away from
individual licences and detailed licence provisions - "the introduction of
134 Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on Interconnection in a liberalised market -
Part I: Interconnection Pricing, 98/195/EC.
135 Commission Recommendation 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998 amending Commission
Recommendation 98/195/EC. OJ L228/30, 15.08.1998.
136 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a
common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of
telecommunications services (hereafter the Licensing Directive), OJ L117/15, 7.5.1997.
137
Licensing Directive, at Article 2(1 )(d).
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individual licensing systems should be restricted to limited, pre-defined
situations"138 - and heading instead towards general authorisations (which are
associated with the absence of an explicit decision and a prior approval by the
national regulatory authority).139 Third, the Directive provides security for new
entrants by setting up time limits and other procedural demands and by
establishing harmonised principles which Member States have to implement
through their national regulatory authorities. So, for instance, the Directive
refers to the conditions which are allowed to be attached to general
authorisations and individual licences,140 it requires that those conditions are
objectively justified and based on the principles of non-discrimination,
proportionality and transparency,141 and it states that licence fees should cover
only the administrative costs, be published and proportionate to the work
entailed.142
5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter dealt with the first phase of the transition from a regime of a
State-run monopoly to an effectively competitive market. This phase was
associated with an attempt to introduce competition in the telecommunications
market (namely the opportunity granted to new market players to compete
against the incumbent operators), combined with a higher degree of
harmonisation in order to maximise the opportunities offered by a single EU
market. Thus, the first target, i.e. lifting regulatory restrictions and abolishing
legal monopolies, has been achieved. In 1 January 1998, most of the EU
countries have liberalised their telecommunications markets and opened the
gates for new companies to enter the playing field and challenge the
incumbents.
138
ibid., at Recital 13.
139
ibid., at Article 2(1 )(a).
140
ibid., at Articles 3(2), 8(1), and Annex.
141
ibid., at Articles 3, 4 and 8.
142
ibid., at Articles 6 and 11.
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The first phase, therefore, was completed: a network of national regulators
and, in effect, a new regulatory regime for the sector was created. At the same
time, however, it was realised that the market power which is enjoyed by the
former State undertakings must be circumscribed by regulation. Therefore, this
is not the end of the process. On the contrary, it is the beginning of crucial and
difficult tasks which lie ahead for competition and regulatory authorities alike. It
would be naive to argue that competition will automatically emerge following
liberalisation. Indeed, liberalisation should not be equated with competition; it is
in fact a necessary but not a sufficient condition for competition.
The introduction of real competition implies much more than the translation
into national law of Directives abolishing legal monopolies in the Member
States. Full liberalisation would be meaningless without the vigorous
enforcement of the rules of competition. Alongside the measures taken by the
national regulatory authorities, therefore, the application of competition law
comes to the forefront in order to ensure that, once removed, the legal barriers
will not be replaced by new anti-competitive market structures and de facto
monopolies.
This is exactly the aim of Part II of this thesis. In particular, Chapter 2
focuses on specific abusive behaviour of the incumbents aimed at preserving
their position against newcomers, and examines how competition law can deal
with such cases. Chapter 3 analyses the EU competition policy on the strategic
alliances and mergers which are spurred on by the accelerating change of
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Access is becoming the central issue in the telecommunications, media and
information technology market and the way in which competition law applies to
the players within it. This is why, in August 1998, the Commission published a
Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector.1
This Chapter is concerned with the competition issues which can emerge in
the telecommunications sector due to the incumbents' desire to retain their key
bottleneck positions. It is divided into three sections. The introductory section
tries to identify and outline the Commission's objectives in the
telecommunications sector. The second and third sections discuss the
jurisprudence of the ECJ involving cases of refusal to supply and the
Commission's essential facilities cases respectively and attempt to define to
what extent Article 82 (ex 86) of the Treaty is applicable to the control of
bottlenecks.
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine whether or not the 1998 Access
Notice reflects the Commission's policy in the telecommunications sector and
in particular whether it succeeds in promoting the Commission's objectives,
namely a policy fostering both infrastructure-based and services-based
competition, encouragement of new entry and promotion of innovation as well
as legal certainty and predictability.
1 Commission's Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in




The Services Directive2 (which provided for the removal of special and
exclusive rights granted by Member States to TOs for the supply of value-
added and data services), the Satellite Directive3 (which abolished special and
exclusive rights for the provision of satellite services and equipment), the Cable
Directive4 (which lifted restrictions on cable TV network usage and allowed new
multi-media telecommunications services to be offered over cable TV
networks), the Mobile Directive5 (which abolished special and exclusive rights
in the mobile sector) and the Full Competition Directive 6 (which asked the
Member States to take the necessary steps in order to make sure that markets
are fully open by 1 January 1998) clearly show the Commission's
determination to promote services competition in the EU telecommunications
industry.
At the same time, the recognition of the significance of infrastructure
liberalisation - which equates with a policy favouring the promotion of
alternative infrastructure - is a common theme in Part II of the Infrastructure
Green Paper of 1995.7 For instance, the Commission does not leave any doubt
when it emphasises that "liberalisation of communications infrastructure is the
single most important step to be taken in the context of European
Telecommunications policy".8 Moreover it argues that a restrictive regulatory
approach on infrastructure could "hold back the cost effective development of
2
Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications
services, 90/388/EEC; OJ L 192/10, 24.07.1990.
3 Commission Directive of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, 94/46/EEC; OJ L 268/15,
19.10.1994.
4
Commission Directive of 18 October 1995 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the
abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already
liberalised telecommunications services, 95/51/EC; OJ L 256/49, 26.10.1995.
5 Commission Directive of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to
mobile and personal communications, 96/2/EC; OJ L 20/59, 26.01.1996.
6 Commission Directive of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the
implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, 96/19/EC; OJ L 74/13,
22.03.1996.
7 Green Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV networks
- Part II: A common approach to the provision of infrastructure for telecommunications in the
European Union, COM(94) 682, 25.01.1995.
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panEuropean networks and services in Europe" and "impede the development
and distribution of multimedia products and services".9
Therefore one could safely argue that one of the Commission's central
objectives is to follow a balanced approach fostering both infrastructure-based
and services-based competition.
The Commission wants to ensure that, after the liberalisation process has
been concluded, the legal monopolies will not be replaced by de-facto ones.
Indeed, there is the danger that a small number of powerful TOs retain
bottleneck positions which give them the chance to control market
developments. So the Commission is determined to fight the abusive
behaviour of the incumbents against newcomers and to ensure that market
foreclosure is avoided.
One of the major reasons why the Commission favours a policy which
encourages new entry is that much of the growth in the telecommunications
industry is due to the expansion of value-added (or enhanced) services (such
as Internet access, electronic mail, voice mail and on-line databases) offered
by the so-called independent service providers. However, the Commission
must be cautious in drawing the right balance: to encourage new entry and
promote the rapid dissemination of technology and innovation while, at the
same time, ensuring that the incentive to invest in alternative infrastructure is
not affected.
The Commission has repeatedly underlined the vital role of the competition
rules for driving the industry forward and ensuring effective and sustainable
competition at all levels of the market. For example, in Part II of the
Infrastructure Green Paper, it is stated that
"In a market which will be for many years characterised by the presence of
dominant operators controlling bottleneck facilities, a level playing field will only
be possible by reinforced scrutiny of compliance with the competition rules.
Otherwise the emergence of competition will be stifled".10
The Commission also aims to reduce the uncertainties for firms considering
investing in new infrastructure and services. Legal certainty and predictability is
indispensable in order to allow a sound basis for long term planning in the
9
ibid., at section III.4.
10
ibid., at section VII.8.
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industry and set the environment for massive investment. As the Commission
stresses,
"the Commission will take into account the calls for more predictability, in
particular as regards access and interconnection. In this respect, the
appropriate measures to give further effect to the principles set out in Articles
85 and 86 [now 81 and 82] will have to be assessed, in order to establish a
more predictable environment if required".11
The Commission's aforementioned objectives of ensuring the full application of
the competition rules and creating a clear and stable policy are restated in the
Commission's Access Notice when it is pointed out that one of the purposes of
the Notice is
"to set out access principles stemming from EU competition law as shown in a
large number of Commission decisions in order to create greater market
certainty and more stable conditions for investment and commercial initiative in
the telecoms and multimedia sectors".12
2. ARTICLE 82 AND REFUSAL TO DEAL — THE CASE
LAW OF THE ECJ
2.1. DESCRIPTION OF CASES
2.1.1. Commercial Solvents v. Commission13
Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC) had a world monopoly position for the
production and sale of certain raw materials to manufacturers of processed
goods. As regards Italy, until 1970 this raw material (aminobutanol) had been
supplied through Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano (Instituto) - acting as a
11
Communication to the Council and European Parliament on the consultation on the Green
Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks,
COM(95) 158 final, 03.05.1995, at section V.5.
12 Access Notice, at the preface.
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reseller of the raw material produced by CSC in the US - to Laboratorio
Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja (Zoja) for the manufacture of ethambutol.
The CSC, no longer wishing to be confined to the manufacture of raw
materials, decided to start producing the downstream product itself. At the
same time, it refused to supply Zoja with aminobutanol. So, since this raw
material was necessary for the production of ethambutol, the CSC's refusal to
supply would have as a result the elimination of competition in the downstream
market.
The Court held that when an undertaking uses its dominant position in order
to extend its activity to a derivative market and, at the same time, it refuses to
supply a raw material to a competitor in that downstream market with the aim
of facilitating its own access and thus eliminating competition in the market on
which the derivatives of the raw material are sold, such a refusal to supply
would amount to an abuse of dominant position under the meaning of Article
82. As the Court stated:
"An undertaking being in a dominant position as regards the production of raw
material and therefore able to control the supply to manufacturers of
derivatives, cannot, just because it decides to start manufacturing these
derivatives (in competition with its former customers), act in such a way as to
eliminate their competition which, in the case in question, would amount to
eliminating one of the principal manufacturers of ethambutol in the Common
Market. Since such conduct is contrary to the objectives expressed in Article
3(f) of the Treaty and set out in greater detail in Articles 85 and 86 [now 81 and
82], it follows that an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market
in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for
manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself
a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all
competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position within
the meaning of Article 86".14
It must be noted that, by stating that a dominant undertaking cannot - just
because it took the decision to start producing the downstream product itself -
act in such a way that restricts competition, the Court made a clear reference
to an unjustified refusal to supply.





United Brands Company (UBC) refused to continue supplying Chiquita
bananas (from October of 1973 to February of 1975) to Olesen, one of UBC's
distributors in Denmark. It must be noted that in 1969 Olesen became the
exclusive Danish distributor of the "Dole" brand, supplied by the Standard Fruit
Company, a UBC competitor, and in 1973 Olesen took part in an advertising
campaign for Dole bananas. It should be also stressed that a clause
incorporated in the contracts of the UBC's distributors/ripeners prevented
them, amongst other things, from selling bananas other than those supplied by
UBC while they were distributors of UBC's bananas.
UBC argued that Olesen was deliberately pushing Dole bananas while was
selling fewer and fewer Chiquita bananas and claimed that the ECJ should set
aside the Commission's decision which held that UBC's refusal to supply
Olesen infringed Article 82.
The ECJ upheld the Commission's decision and made clear that the refusal
to supply an existing customer who decides to market a competing product
amounts to an abuse of a dominant position when the refusal is not objectively
justified. In particular, the ECJ stated that
"... it is advisable to assert positively from the outset that an undertaking in a
dominant position for the purpose of marketing a product - which cashes in on
the reputation of a brand name known to and valued by the consumers -
cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular
commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of
the ordinary".16
The Court went on to point out that such conduct is not consistent with
objectives laid down in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 82, "since the refusal
to sell would limit markets to the prejudice of consumers and would amount to
discrimination which might in the end eliminate a trading party from the
15




relevant market".17 It should be underlined that, although the Court
acknowledged the right of a dominant undertaking to protect its own
commercial interests (when under attack) and to take measures which are
necessary in order to protect those interests,18 it also held that a refusal to
supply, in order to be justified, must be "proportionate to the threat taking into
account the economic strength of the undertakings confronting each other".19
The Court ruled that this was not the case because UBC's conduct would have
serious anti-competitive effects on its competitors and on the structure of the
bananas market in general. In particular, this could happen because "by acting
in this way, it [UBC] would discourage its other ripener/distributors from
supporting the advertising of other brand names and that the deterrent effect of
the sanction imposed upon one of them would make its position of strength on
the relevant market that much more effective".20 UBC's behaviour could have
exclusionary effects on competition since only undertakings dependent upon
the dominant firm would be allowed to stay in business.21
2.1.3. Telemarketing22
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion SA (CLT) is the owner of RTL
television station. Information Publicite Benelux SA (IPB) is its subsidiary and
RTL's exclusive agent for television advertising aimed at the Benelux countries.
An agreement reached between Centre Beige d'Etudes de Marche -
Telemarketing SA (Centre Beige) and IPB gave Centre Beige the right to
conduct telemarketing activities, which are mainly carried out by advertising
products on television and showing a telephone number which viewers can call
in order to obtain more information or to buy the product offered. On the expiry
of that agreement, CLT refused any longer to provide Telemarketing with the
right to conduct telemarketing operations on the RTL station. In addition, it













Telemarketing v. CLT, Case 311/84, [1985] ECR 3261.
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CLT and IPB were found to be dominant due to the fact that in Belgium there
was no commercial advertising on national television stations, while other
French-language television broadcasters were only rarely aiming at Belgian
viewers. So the case involved the monopoly position of an undertaking in one
market (television broadcasting) which was attempting to use its power in order
to eliminate competition in a separate market (telemarketing) "which is
extremely open and ... competition is possible".23 Centre Beige considered that
such a conduct constituted an abuse of dominant position within the meaning
of Article 82.
The ECJ, after making a reference to the judgment in Commercial Solvents
(and thus indicating that it was following that decision)24 and underling the fact
that the refusal to supply the services to Telemarketing was not justified,25 held
that
"an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 [now 82] is committed where,
without any objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on
a particular market reserves to itself or to an undertaking belonging to the
same group an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another
undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate market, with
the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking".26
2.1.4. RTT v. GB-lnno-BM27
Under Belgian law, RTT (the Belgian public telecommunications operator) was
given a monopoly for the establishment and operation of the public
telecommunications network. At the same time, RTT was entrusted by the
Belgian legislation with the task of determining specifications for terminal
equipment and assessing whether those standards had been met by other
economic operators. The case was complicated still further by the fact that
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So there was a situation where the only equipment allowed to be connected
to the network was produced and supplied by the RTT or approved by it. The
problem became clear when RTT brought an action against GB-lnno-BM (GB)
- an RTT competitor in the market of selling telephone equipment - on the
grounds that GB did not inform the customers that the telephones it was selling
were not approved, something which could have effected the integrity of the
network.
In the end, the Court found that RTT had abused its dominant position. In
particular, after reproducing a paragraph from the judgment in the
Telemarketing case28 and using it as a general rule,29 it held that
"the fact that an undertaking holding a monopoly in the market for the
establishment and operation of the network, without any objective necessity,
reserves to itself a neighbouring but separate market, in this case the market
for the importation, marketing, connection, commissioning and maintenance of
equipment for connection to the said network, thereby eliminating all
competition from other undertakings, constitutes an infringement of Article 86
[now 82] of the Treaty".30
And further below, in another part of the judgment, it stressed the point that "it
is the extension of the monopoly in the establishment and operation of the
telephone network to the market in telephone equipment, without any objective
justification, which is prohibited as such by Article 86 [now Article 82]".31
2.1.5. Magill32
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and
Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) - a subsidiary of ITV - published
guides containing exclusively their own weekly schedule of programmes. In
28
Telemarketing, ground 27.






Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eiremann and Independent
Television Publications Limited v. Commission, (Magill) [1995] ECR I-743.
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general, those enterprises did not grant licences for the publication of their
respective weekly listings; their television guides were protected under United
Kingdom and Irish copyright law. So, although daily and periodical newspapers
were given licences free of charge to reproduce details of the day's
programmes, none was allowed to publish a combination of those
programming listings on a weekly basis. Magill TV Guide Ltd (Magill) sought to
fill the gap in the market by attempting to publish a comprehensive weekly
television guide (comprising the programme listings of all television stations)
but this was prevented by these television companies when they refused to
grant it a licence.
Magill lodged a complaint with the Commission, which found that the TV
companies had abused their dominant position within the meaning of Article 82
by refusing to supply Magill with listings of their weekly schedules. Thus the
Commission ordered the broadcasters to stop breaching Article 82, in
particular "by supplying ... third parties on request and on a non-discriminatory
basis with their individual advance weekly programme listings and by
permitting reproduction of those listings by such parties" in return for a
reasonable royalty.33
The broadcasters challenged the Commission decision in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) which dismissed their applications and upheld the Commission
decision on all grounds.
Specifically, the CFI held that the applicants had prevented the emergence
of a new product for which there existed a potential consumer demand34 and
they did so by "using their copyright in the programme listings ... in order to
secure a monopoly in the derivative market of weekly television guides".35 The
court concluded that this kind of conduct "clearly went beyond what was
necessary to fulfil the essential function of the copyright as permitted in
Community law"36 and that the applicants had exercised their copyright "in such
ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the
objectives of Article 86 [now 82]".37
Two of the parties (RTE and ITP) appealed to the Court of Justice, which










confirmed the findings of both the Commission and the CFI. More analytically,
although it referred to the judgment in the earlier case of Volvo38 by stating that
a refusal to grant a licence cannot in itself amount to abuse of a dominant
position,39 it went on to identify three circumstances (underlined in the findings
of the CFI) under which such a refusal can constitute abuse of a dominant
position. First, there was a lack of substitutes for a weekly comprehensive
television guide despite a "specific, constant and regular" consumer demand.40
Second, there was no justification for such refusal.41 And third, referring to the
Commercial Solvents case, and thus being in line with the case law on
monopoly leveraging, that by their conduct the broadcasters "reserved to
themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all
competition on that market since they denied access to the basic information
which is the raw material indispensable for the compilation of such a guide".42
It should be pointed out that the key fact in the case is that the broadcasters
were found to have a monopoly over program information - "the appellants
were the only sources of the basic information on programme scheduling"43-
and that this information was considered to be an "indispensable raw material
for compiling a weekly television guide".44 Of the same importance was the fact
that the broadcasters' refusal to provide this indispensable information
prevented the emergence of a new product (which was not offered by the
broadcasters although consumer demand existed) and thus the Court
concluded that such a refusal amounted to a finding of abuse of dominant
position under Article 82(b) of the Treaty.45 This must be kept in mind as it will





















In the Commercial Solvents, United Brands and Telemarketing cases, the ECJ
made clear that the refusal to supply an already existing customer who decides
to market a competing product amounts to an abuse of a dominant position
when the refusal is not objectively justified.46 Another common point in these
cases is that they involve practices by which a dominant company in one
market is using its power in such a way in order to strengthen its position and,
at the same time, to eliminate competition in a related market47 - a practice
which is known as monopoly leverage.
Following this line of case law, the Magill and GB-lnno-BM cases concern a
refusal to supply and deal with the monopoly leverage practice48 as well as
referring to the notion of an objectively justified refusal to supply.49 However,
their difference from the cases which dealt with the termination of supplies to
an existing customer is that they addressed a dispute which involved a form of
refusal to supply a new customer and prevented the emergence on the market
of a new product.
So, based on well-established case law of the Court, a number of principles
have been introduced which provide us with reliable and adequate guidance.
Those principles are fully recognised and followed by the Commission when it
states that
"a refusal to supply a new customer in circumstances where a dominant
facilities owner is already supplying one or more customers operating in the
same downstream market would constitute discriminatory treatment which, if it
would restrict competition on that downstream market, would be an abuse ...
There may, of course, be justifications for such refusal ... In the absence of
any objective justifications, a refusal would usually be an abuse of the
dominant position on the access market".50
46
See Commercial Solvents at ground 25, United Brands at 182 and 190, Telemarketing at 25
and 26.
47
See Commercial Solvents at ground 25, United Brands at 183, Telemarketing at 27.
48 See Magill at grounds 54 and 56, GB-lnno-BM at 18 and 19.
49 See Magill at ground 55, GB-lnno-BM at 19 and 24.
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It must be noted from the above statement in the 1998 Access Notice that such
a form of discrimination will constitute an abuse under Article 82 only if, as a
consequence, competition on the downstream market is being restricted.
However, the precise meaning of this condition appears to be vague and the
Access Notice does not provide us with a reliable and clear explanation
regarding its scope. Of course, there would be no difficulty if the existing case
law of the Court could provide adequate answers to these problems. So the
question is what kind of practices can lead to a suppression of competition and
thus be regarded as an infringement of Article 82.
Originally it was believed that the only purpose of Article 82 was to prohibit
the exploitation of market power by monopolies in order to protect
consumers.51 This limited concept of abuse, criticised as being contrary to the
liberal spirit of the EC Treaty,52 was rejected by the Court's judgment in
Continental Can53 In that case the Court criticised the Commission for
absence of any reasoning on the question of supply substitutability.54
Accordingly, it became clear that Article 82 could be concerned not only with
performance but also with conduct that affects the market structure. Thus the
role of Article 82 is to protect competition by condemning anti-competitive
abuses alongside exploitative ones.55 As the Court stated, the purpose of
Article 82
"is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers
directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on
an effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in Article 3(f) of the
Treaty. Abuse may therefore occur if an undertaking in a dominant position
strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached
51 See Rene Joliet, "Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: A Comparative Study of
the American and European Approaches to the Control of Economic Power", 1970.
52 Valentine Korah, "EC Competition Law and Practice", Fifth Edition, 1994, at p. 5.
53
Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973]
ECR 215.
54
ibid., at ground 33: "In order to be regarded as constituting a distinct market, the products in
question must be individualised, not only by the mere fact that they are used for packing
certain products, but by particular characteristics of production which make them specificialy
suitable for this purpose. Consequently, a dominant position on the market for light metal
containers for meat and fish cannot be decisive, as long as it has not been proved that
competitors from other sectors of the market for light metal containers are not in a position to
enter this market, by a simple adaptation, with sufficient strength to create a serious
counterweight."
55 See John Temple Lang, "Monopolisation and the Definition of Abuse of a Dominant Position
under Article 86 EEC Treaty", [1979] 16 C.M.L.Rev. 345, at pp. 345-357.
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substantially fetters competition, i.e. that only undertakings remain in the
market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one".56
In Hoffmann-La Roche57 abuse was defined as
"an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant
position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a
result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of
competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different
from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the
basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the
growth of that competition".58
Moreover the Court held that
"since the course of conduct under consideration is that of an undertaking
occupying a dominant position on a market where for this reason the structure
of competition has already been weakened, within the field of application of
Article 86 [now Article 82] any further weakening of the structure of competition
may constitute an abuse of a dominant position".59
Thus contrary to the judgment in Continental Can - where it was decided that
Article 82 prohibits conduct which leads to a substantial reduction of
competition only when it is detrimental to consumers - the Court found in
Hoffmann-La Roche that even a minimal reduction of competition can be
caught within the net of Article 82. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, in
all cases dealing with a refusal to supply, no consideration of consumer welfare
was taken into account. On the contrary, the Court rested primarily on
considerations of fairness and the preservation of small and medium-sized
56 Continental Can, at ground 26.
57 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission (Vitamins), Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461.
58
ibid., at ground 91. An identical definition was given in Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81,
[1983] ECR 3461, at ground 70.
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enterprises. Such a view implies that every suppression of competitors per se
is unlawful under Article 82 whatever its economic repercussions on the market
and the strength of the remaining competition. As Professor Kauper points out
"these decisions come very close to condemning the use of a particular means
without regard to its ends... The Court of Justice comes close to holding it
prima facie unlawful because it was a refusal to deal".60
It should be stressed that the competition which Article 82 protects is not
necessarily synonymous with the freedom of action of the potential or current
competitors. This means that it is possible to conceive conduct (e.g. a refusal
to supply) which is likely to eliminate a competitor and which nevertheless
cannot be regarded as producing a significant reduction of competition, at least
from the point of view of consumers, or having a significant anti-competitive
effect on the market. This is for example the case in Hugin-Liptons6A where it
appears that the conduct had promoted rather than suppressed competition in
efficiency terms.62
Therefore the main criticism is that "the Court of Justice concludes too
quickly that refusals to deal harm consumers",63 as "it is far from clear that it is
generally contrary to the public interest for a monopolist to cut off supplies in
order to eliminate a competitor downstream".64 Moreover it is true that those
cases reflect concerns - like fairness and preservation of small and medium-
sized enterprises - which were common to American antitrust theory in the past
but have now given way to economic efficiency in the consumer welfare
sense.65 It is interesting to underline the fact that Professor Korah - who by no
means can be regarded as a proponent of the Chicago School theory -
59 Hoffmann-La Roche, at ground 123.
60
Thomas E. Kauper, "Whither Article 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refusals to
Deal", in the Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute - 1992 and
EEC/U.S. Competition and Trade Law, 1989, at pp. 675 and 676.
61
Hugin v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] ECR 1869.
62 Thomas E. Kauper, "Whither Article 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refusals to
Deal", in the Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute - 1992 and
EEC/U.S. Competition and Trade Law, 1989, at p. 673.
63 Eleonor M. Fox, "Abuse of a Dominant Position under the Treaty of Rome - A Comparison
with U.S. Law", in the Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute - Antitrust
and Trade Policies of the European Economic Community, 1983, at p. 404.
64 Valentine Korah, "Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.P.A. and Commercial Solvents
Corporation v. Commission of the European Communities", [1974] 11 C.M.L.Rev. 248, at p.
271.
65 Thomas E. Kauper, "Whither Article 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refusals to
Deal", in the Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute - 1992 and
EEC/U.S. Competition and Trade Law, 1989, at p. 686.
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reaches the same conclusion. Indeed, she is concerned that
"the competition rules are not being used to enable efficient firms to expand at
the expense of the less efficient, but to protect smaller and medium sized firms
at the expense of efficient or larger firms... The interests of consumers, and
the economy as a whole, in the encouragement of efficiency by firms of any
size is being subordinated to the interests of smaller traders".66
2.3. CONCLUSIONS
What therefore is needed is, not decisions on restraint of competition in the
abstract (per se), but only on a case-by-case analysis after taking into account
the economic repercussions on the market. Unfortunately, the Access Notice
echoes faithfully the considerations on which the Court rule about refusal to
deal has been developed and hence fails to provide sufficient guidelines in
order to limit the areas of legal uncertainty. Thus the precondition, "if it would
restrict competition on that downstream market",67 appears to have no
substantial role at all, since it is simply stated that a refusal to give access will
generally affect competition68 and therefore will usually constitute an abuse of
the dominant position on the access market under the meaning of Article 82.69
Insisting on a per se assumption that a refusal to supply amounts to an abuse
is disappointing, and the remark that "the precise scope of this condition [i.e.
what and when constitutes a restriction of competition] is not entirely clear"70 -
coming from someone who influenced the construction of the Access Notice71-
66 Valentine Korah, "EC Competition Law and Practice", Fifth Edition, 1994, at p. 106.





70 Dirk Van Liedekerke, "European Commission's Draft Notice on Access in the
Telecommunications Sector", I.B.L. 25 (7), July/August 1997, at p. 325.
71
He is co-author of the "Competition Aspects of Interconnection Agreements in the
Telecommunications Sector", 1995, a study conducted for the Commission and mentioned as




The fact that the Access Notice chooses to identify an unjustified refusal to
supply with an extreme form of discrimination72 gives the Commission a
powerful tool which can be used as an aid to market liberalisation. However, an
over-zealous and uncritical application of the above approach can undermine
the incentive to innovate and invest and thus be detrimental to consumers in
the long-term.
So if, contrary to Advocate General Warner's statement in Commercial
Solvents, we support the notion that the Court case law does not suggest that
a refusal to supply constitutes an extreme example of discrimination,73 the fact
that the Commission equates an unjustifiable refusal to supply with
discriminatory treatment and, therefore, with an abuse of dominant position,
represents an arbitrary extension of the existing case law. This is regardless of
the fact that the Court and the Commission reach the same conclusion, namely
that a refusal to supply constitutes an abuse per se.
It must also not be forgotten that all those cases handled by the Court are
associated with a refusal to supply an existing customer, i.e. with a refusal to
continue to supply. None of these cases dealt with companies seeking to enter
the market. So, if Magill is regarded as an essential facility case and not as a
duty to supply case, the Commission extends the application of the case law of
the Court into cases which involve a refusal to supply an entirely new
customer. It is obvious that this extension of the scope of Article 82 beyond its
meaning - as it was interpreted by the Court - contradicts the Treaty, since an
additional burden is placed on undertakings, namely that dominant
undertakings are required to provide access to a new customer when one or
more customers have already been given access. Imposing additional
obligations on undertakings equates with extending the use of the competition
rules, something which is not allowed by Article 83 (formerly Article 87) of the
Treaty. Indeed, Article 83 enables the Council to "define the scope of the
competition rules". However, it appears that Article 83 allows the Council and
the Commission to set aside or to limit the application of the competition rules
72
Access Notice, para. 85.
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but not to extend their scope.74
What differentiates paragraph 85 of the Access Notice from paragraph 86 is
that, in the latter, the problem of whether or not to treat a refusal to grant
access as discrimination does not arise at all, simply because access has
already been granted. The aim of this provision is to prevent the dominant
operator-provider from discriminating between the parties on the terms their
access is given.75 The application of the principle of the text of paragraph 86 -
the principle of non-discrimination and in particular the dominant operator's
duty not to favour its own operations - is linked with the first scenario listed in
the Access Notice76 where access is refused to the requesting party while it
has already been given to one or more operators.
Moreover it has been accepted77 that the case where the dominant operator
has only given access to its own downstream operations, and not to any other
operator, is classified under the second scenario, according to which a refusal
to provide access takes place while no other operator has been granted
access by the access provider.78
Thus there can be a situation according to which the dominant network
operator is active on a neighbouring market (retail services), by granting
access to its own downstream operations, but has refused to give access to
other service providers in that downstream market. In other words, access is
refused to the dominant operator's competitors but is made available to its own
service business. In a situation like this, the immediate question is whether the
principle laid down in paragraph 86, namely the dominant operator's duty not to
favour its own operations, is also applicable in cases where the dominant
operator decides to grant access not only to its own service business but also
73 "Until this case [Commercial Solvents] it was thought that paragraph (c) of Article 86 was of
comparatively narrow application, it restraints a dominant firm from making different charges
to different customers, who compete with one another at another level of trade, where these
are not cost justified, rather than from refusing to supply at all", see Valentine Korah, "Instituto
Chemioterapico Italiano S.P.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission of the
European Communities", [1974] 11 C.M.L.Rev. 248, at p. 258.
74
See the opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Verband der Sachversicher v. Commission,
Case 45/85, [1987] ECR 405.
75
Paragraph 86 of the Access Notice reflects the principles derived from ERT (ERT., Case C-
260/89, [1991], ECR I-2925, at ground 38) and GB-lnno-BM (RTT v. GB-inno-BM, Case
18/88, [1991 ] ECR 5941, at ground 25).
76
Access Notice, para. 84(a).
77
See for example Dirk Van Liedekerke, "European Commission's Draft Notice on Access in
the Telecommunications Sector", I.B.L. 25 (7), July/August 1997, at p. 325.
78
Access Notice, para. 84(b).
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to another service provider.
Unfortunately, the answer is no. This appears to be a logical conclusion,
since it derives from the structure of the Access Notice. Indeed, as already
mentioned, paragraph 86 is set out under the first scenario and nothing in its
wording indicates that the Access Notice attempts to extend the application of
the paragraph into the second scenario. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a
problematic situation. Indeed, one can expect that the dominant operator,
instead of granting access, would have the incentive and would prefer to
provide access to no other operator (except to its own downstream
operations). In that case, the essential facilities test will apply and the dominant
operator will escape completely from the duty to provide access if he proves
that the facility to which access is refused is not regarded as essential.
However, the striking point is that, even if the facility in question is found to be
essential, the dominant operator will be entitled to treat its own downstream
services operations more favourably than other operators who were given
access. The principle of non-discrimination (concerning the terms on which
access is given) will not apply.
Since the problem could be easily solved - by the insertion of a statement
that the meaning of the term "another operator" in paragraph 84(a) includes
the dominant network operator's own downstream services - it is difficult to
accept that the Commission made such an obvious mistake. Moreover, it is
strange that the Commission gave incumbents the chance to exploit this
lacuna, especially if we bear in mind the fact that most (if not all)
telecommunications operators are vertically integrated, and the potential anti¬
competitive effect such a structure could have on the market.
However, I believe that this is clearly a mistake, or an omission regarding the
way the Access Notice was constructed. Otherwise it is impossible to explain
the fact that, at this particular point, the Access Notice is not only inconsistent
but contradicts completely the principles introduced in the Commission's
decisions in the essential facilities cases (as will be seen below), particularly
the requirement that the essential facilities owner cannot treat the activities of
other undertakings less favourably than those given to its own operations.
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3. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN EU LAW
Some of the aforementioned Court judgments regarding refusal to supply can
also be associated with the essential facilities doctrine. Indeed, despite the fact
that those judgments do not introduce in clear words and do not refer explicitly
to the term "essential facilities", one could safely argue that, by implication,
they involve traces of the doctrine. In Telemarketing, for instance, the Court
held that that case's finding will also apply "to the case of an undertaking
holding a dominant position on the market in a service which is indispensable
for the activities of another undertaking on another market".79 Furthermore, in
the Port of Genoa case,80 the Court implicitly applied the essential facilities
doctrine and qualified the port of Genoa as an essential facility.81 And in Magill
- so far the clearest example of an essential facility case in the Court
jurisprudence - information on programme scheduling was considered to be an
"indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly television guide".82
However, it is a line of cases decided by the Commission under Article 82
which makes explicit reference to the essential facilities doctrine and illustrates
its introduction and evolution.
79 See Telemarketing, ground 26.
80
Port of Genoa, Case C-179/90, [1991] ECR I-5889.
81
ibid., at ground 15. The Court relied on the volume of traffic and the significance of that port
regarding maritime import and export operations in order to decide that the port constituted a




3.1. DISCUSSION OF THE COMMISSION'S ESSENTIAL
FACILITIES CASES
3.1.1. B&l Line pic v. Sealink83
B&l is an Irish ferry operator and the Stena Sealink group is both the owner
and operator of the port of Holyhead in Wales (through its Stena Sealink Ports
company) and a ferry operator (through its Stena Sealink Line company).
Sealink, acting as the port authority, introduced changes to its own ferry sailing
times which operated to the favour of Sealink's own services but had harmful
effects on B&l's operations. In particular, every time a Sealink vessel was
passing a berthed B&l vessel it was causing significant movements of the latter
- due to channel depth limitations - and, therefore, B&l was forced to interrupt
its loading and unloading of vehicles and passengers.
The B & I Line v. Sealink case is the first case in which the Commission
expressly made reference to the notion of "essential facilities". In particular, an
essential facility was described as "a facility or infrastructure without access to
84 •
which competitors cannot provide services to their customers". Moreover, in
this case the Commission introduced the requirement that a dominant
company which both owns or controls and uses an essential facility should not
"refuse its competitors access to that facility or grant access to competitors
only on terms less favourable than those which it gives its own services".85
Acting contrary to that requirement would amount to an infringement of Article
82.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Commission, although
recognising that the port of Holyhead did not constitute a substantial part of the
common market, regarded a port, an airport or any other facility as such (i.e.
as a substantial part of the common market) "in so far as reasonable access to
the facility is indispensable for the exploitation of a transport route which is
substantial for the purposes of the application of Article 86 [now 82] of the EEC
Treaty".86 Based on that statement one could safely argue that the essential





86 See at XXII Report on Competition Policy - 1992, at point 219.
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facilities doctrine is a strong weapon used by the Commission in its attempt to
move on to market liberalisation. Besides, this is admitted by the Commission
when it stresses that "this consequence of Article 82 [i.e. the requirement
introduced by the Commission at paragraph 41 of the B & I Line v. Sealink] is
of essential importance in the context of deregulation, which regularly raises
the problem of market access for new entrants".87
3.1.2. Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink88
Among its activities, Sea Containers Ltd operates passenger, car and freight
ferry services. The Stena Sealink group, as already mentioned, is both the
owner and operator of the port of Holyhead in Wales (through its Stena Sealink
Ports company) and a ferry operator (through its Stena Sealink Line company).
Sea Containers argued that it was refused access to an essential facility (i.e.
the port of Holyhead) and that Stena Sealink, by not granting access under
reasonable conditions and without objective justification, had abused its
dominant position as the port authority at Holyhead in an attempt to protect its
own ferry services from competition.
The Commission found Stena Sealink to occupy a dominant position on the
grounds that the relevant market - i.e. the market for the provision of maritime
transport services for passengers and vehicle ferries - was the central corridor
route which accounted for between 50 and 60% of the traffic between the
United Kingdom and Ireland;89 that Holyhead is the only available British port
since the Liverpool port cannot be regarded as a substitutable and viable
alternative (the journey from Dublin to Liverpool is twice the length of that from
Dublin to Holyhead);90 and that it would be seriously uneconomic or physically
unrealistic for Sea Containers to build its own port.91
After defining an essential facility as "a facility or infrastructure without
87 ibid.
88 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, Commission Decision of 21 December 1993, IV/34.689,
94/19/EC, OJ 1994 L 15/8.
89




access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers"92 - a
definition identical with that given in the B & I Line v. Sealink case93 - and after
making a reference to the principle of monopoly leverage,94 the Commission
held that Sealink had committed an abuse within the meaning of Article 82. In
particular, the Commission stated that the situation where a company is both
the owner and operator of an essential facility (in this case the port of
Holyhead) and refuses the requesting companies access to that facility without
objective justification, or provides access on terms less favourable than those
given to its own operations, amounts to an abuse of a dominant position.95
3.1.3. Port of Roedby96
DCB is a Danish public undertaking to which the State granted an exclusive
right associated with the management and organisation of the port of Roedby.
It also operates ferry services - jointly with Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB), a
German public undertaking - on the Roedby-Puttgarden route.
The Commission noticed the importance of the Roedby-Puttgarden route
and the difficulty of having it substituted by the other existing forms of transport
and by the other passenger sea routes between Sweden and Germany.97
Based on the methodology followed in the Port of Genoa case - where the
Court relied on the volume of traffic and the significance of that port regarding
maritime import and export operations98 - the Commission found that the port
of Roedby constituted a substantial part of the common market.99 Since DCB
and DB were the only ferry companies operating on this route, they were found
91




93 B & I Line v. Sealink, para. 41.
94 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, para. 66.
95 ibid.
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Port of Roedby, Commission Decision of 21 December 1993, 94/119/EC, OJ 1994 L 55/52.
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ibid., para. 5.
98 Port of Genoa, ground 15.
99 Port of Roedby, para. 8.
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to hold a joint dominant position.100
In 1990 the Danish Transport Minister refused to permit Stena, a Swedish
shipping group, to build a new private commercial port in the immediate vicinity
of the port of Roedby and to operate ferry services from Roedby. The
Commission found that the double refusal by the Danish Transport Minister
had strengthened DCB's and DB's joint dominant position. Thus subsequent to
espousing an identical definition of the concept of essential facilities with that
found in a number of previous decisions - i.e. that an essential facility is "a
facility or infrastructure without which its competitors are unable to offer their
services to customers"101- the Commission stated that
"an undertaking that owns or manages an essential port facility from which it
provides a maritime transport service may not, without objective justification,
refuse to grant a shipowner wishing to operate on the same maritime route
access to that facility without infringing Article 86 [now 82]".102
However, the refusal to grant access to Stena resulted from a State measure
and not from DCB's own initiative. Since only Article 86 (formerly 90) of the
Treaty applies to measures adopted by States, the Commission, wishing to
ensure the application of Article 82 on the DCB, rested on the judgment of the
Court of Justice in the RTT/GB-lnno-BM case103 and concluded that the State
measure in question constituted an infringement of Article 86(1) read in






In that case the Court stated that "where the extension of the dominant position of a public
undertaking or undertaking to which the State has granted special or exclusive rights results
from a State measure, such a measure constitutes an infringement of Article 90 in conjunction
with Article 86 of the Treaty", RTT/GB-lnno-BM, at ground 21.
104 Port of Roedby, para. 13.
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3.1.4. London European v. Sabena105
London European Airways is a private British airline company which operates -
among others - a service between Luton and Brussels. Sabena is an airline
company whose activities, apart from providing air transport services, include
the aircraft ground handling service and the Saphir computerised reservation
service. What the Saphir system does is to provide up-dated information,
immediate reservation and issue of tickets without the need for travel agents to
contact the company concerned for each booking. The significance of the
system was illustrated by a Sabena representative when he stated that "in
order to penetrate the Belgian market, it is virtually essential that they [London
European] be included in Saphir".106 The Commission recognised the truth of
that statement by pointing out that "the ability to offer customers a
computerised reservation service is an important feature of a marketing
policy",107 and that "the success of the Brussels-Luton flights depend on
London European having access to the Saphir system".108 Moreover, the
Commission was clear that computer reservation systems are essential
facilities since they are indispensable for new entrants wishing to compete
effectively.109 This notion is facilitated by the fact that, although other non¬
computerised reservation services still exist, they cannot be regarded as
substitutable and viable alternatives to computerised systems.110
Sabena refused to grant London European access to its Saphir computer
reservation system on the grounds that London European's tariff on the
Brussels-Luton route was too low and that London European did not agree to
give the ground handling contract to Sabena.111 After finding that Sabena held
a dominant position in the Belgian market for the provision of computerised
reservation services,112 the Commission concluded that Sabena's refusal to
grant London European access to its Saphir computer reservation system
105
London European v. Sabena, Commission Decision of 4 November 1988, 88/589/EEC,














amounted to an abuse of dominant position.113
It is interesting to note that the Commission interpreted Sabena's refusal of
access as being contrary to Article 82(b), i.e. that it intended to limit production,
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers.114 In
particular, the Commission stated that Sabena intended to "deter it [London
European] from operating on a given route, to impede its actual operation and
marketing of the service and to dissuade it from thus introducing an element of
competition".115 Once again, this is a clear indication of the role that the
essential facilities doctrine can play in the context of the Commission's
determination to move towards liberalisation of the markets.
3.1.5. British Midland v. Aer Lingus116
"Interlining" is a co-operation agreement according to which airlines are
authorised to sell each other's services. This practice allows passengers to buy
a single ticket which comprises segments to be performed by different airlines;
for instance, they can change flights on to the other airline's services or use a
ticket issued by one airline for a return journey on another which serves the
same route. The significance of interlining can be demonstrated from the fact
that business travellers - who are lucrative business for airline companies
since they generate approximately 60% of an airline's revenue - travel to
several destinations and use different airlines and it would be convenient and
helpful for them if they are offered a single "interlinable" ticket which would
save them valuable time.117
When British Midland announced its intention to commence services on the
Doublin-London route, Air Lingus - the national airline of Ireland - refused to
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dominant on the Dublin-London route118 and held that its refusal to interline
with British Midland constituted an infringement of Article 82.
It is interesting to note that the Commission makes a clear reference to an
unjustified refusal to supply when it states that a refusal to interline for reasons
such as doubts about the creditworthiness of the beneficiary airline can be
considered acceptable and justifiable.119 However Aer Lingus refused to
interline on the grounds that this would lead to a loss of revenue and a fall in its
share of the market.120 Those arguments cited by Aer Lingus were rejected by
the Commission as not sufficient to justify the refusal121 - besides, interlining is
a widely accepted industry practice.
One could find a great similarity between this approach and the Court's
judgment in United Brands, which shows that the Commission applies the
already established principles of the Court. Indeed, one would remember that,
although the Court in that case acknowledged the right of a dominant
undertaking to protect its own commercial interests (when under attack) and to
122
take measures which are necessary in order to protect those interests, it
held that a refusal to supply, in order to be justified, must be "proportionate to
the threat taking into account the economic strength of the undertakings
confronting each other".123
The Commission follows suit when it implies that the Aer Lingus refusal is
not proportionate since it "would impose a significant handicap on British
Midland".124 New entrants will always face difficulties and they will be glad to
receive low margins initially - normally they have to accept losses. This
happens because a great deal of investment is needed as well as the ability to
bring costs down to a level which is competitive to the already established
companies. However, it takes a long time to expand their financing and to
increase their efficiency and the Commission shows clearly its aim to intervene
by artificially protecting new entrants (in this case British Midland) and














the Commission points out that the aforementioned difficulties faced by new
entrants due to denying interline facilities are likely to be severe:125 it wants to
emphasise that it is committed to opening the market to competition. This is
illustrated in the XXII Report on Competition Policy - 1992 where it is stated
that
"this decision [British Midtand/Aer Lingus] is evidence of the Commission's
determination to act against airlines holding dominant positions, if they attempt
to prevent the development or maintenance of competition. At a time when the
European air transport industry is being liberalized, airlines making use of the
new opportunities for competition should be given a fair chance to develop and
sustain their challenge to established carriers".126
However, this protectionist intervention of the Commission - i.e. providing new
entrants with the means (essential facilities doctrine) and the time to become
established - cannot go on indefinitely. Moreover the Commission
acknowledges that undertakings in dominant positions cannot be always
obliged to share essential facilities - there is no such general duty to share.
This is recognised by the Commission because, although it stated that "if
British Midland wants to obtain a comparable position to Aer Lingus ... it would
need sufficient time to built up commercial strength and an adequate
schedule", it held that "new entrants should not be able to rely forever on their
competitors' frequencies and networks".127 Thus it decided that the duty to
interline should be limited to a two-year period, which was regarded as
sufficient enough for British Midland "to develop its service without suffering
from an undue handicap imposed by its dominant competitor".128
Finally, it is interesting to note that, according to John Temple Lang, the key
point of the case was that interlining is a common industry arrangement and,
therefore, he believes that temporary duties to provide access to an essential
facility - i.e. duties similar to that imposed on Aer Lingus - could be expected
to apply only when a dominant company has selectively denied an active
124 British Midland v. Aer Lingus, para. 25. For the reasons brought forward by the Commission
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competitor a normal and widely accepted industry practice with the aim to
handicap or discourage him.129 The significant role that the notion of the
common industry practice can play in determining whether or not there is an
obligation on a dominant company to co-operate is well illustrated by Lang
when he states that "normal industry practice may make what would otherwise
be a mere competitive handicap into a serious and even insuperable barrier to
entry for a normal competitor".130 And he concludes:
"If normal industry practice is to deal, a dominant company cannot refuse to
deal merely on the grounds that if there were no such practice it would have no
duty to help its competitor overcome the disadvantage of, e.g., small size,
which the industry practice in fact offsets".131
3.2. SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES EMANATING FROM
THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES
It is obvious that a number of principles have been introduced by the
aforementioned essential facilities cases. In particular, it should be noted that
those cases share the same definition of essential facilities, since an essential
facility is described as "a facility or infrastructure without access to which
competitors cannot provide services to their customers".132 Alongside the
essential facilities definition, a general prohibition has been introduced,
according to which the owner of an essential facility cannot refuse the
requesting companies access to that facility without objective justification.
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132 See B&l Line pic v. Sealink at para. 41, Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink at 66, Port of
Roedby at 12. In London European i/. Sabena, the Commission was clear that computer
reservation systems are essential facilities since they are indispensable for new entrants
wishing to compete effectively and since other non-computerised reservation services
cannot be regarded as substitutable and viable alternatives (at para. 14).
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Acting contrary to that prohibition would amount to an infringement of Article
82. This prohibition is accompanied by the requirement that the essential
facilities owner cannot treat the activities of other undertakings less favourably
than those given to its own operations.133
3.3. THE RATIONALE FOR AN ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
DOCTRINE
Despite the progress which has been made during the liberalisation process in
the telecommunications market, the Commission admits in the Access Notice
that "the development of effective competition from alternative network
providers with adequate capacity and geographic reach will take time",134 and
that these parallel networks cannot be regarded as "satisfactory alternatives to
the facilities of the incumbent operator".135 One of the most important reasons
for this is that lots of capital is required in order to build a network which can
provide the same extensive geographic coverage as that of the TO's network.
As Dr Herbert Lingerer, a Commission official in the Directorate General for
Competition (DG IV) involved in telecommunications competition law, has
pointed out,
"in the fixed network field the new entrants are faced with a situation where the
incumbents hold fixed network assets built over one hundred years of
monopoly. None of the new entrants can, in the short term, build parallel
networks in the local loop which could rival these assets worth 200 - 300
billions of EUROs of investment".136
133 See B&l Line pic v. Sea/ink at para. 41, Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink at 66, Port of
Roedby at 12, London European v. Sabena at 34, British Midland v. Aer Lingus at 25.
134
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136 H. Lingerer, "The arrival of competition in European telecommunications", at pp. 7-8, 3rd
European Forum on the Law of Telecommunications, Information Technologies and
Multimedia: Towards a Common Framework, Luxembourg, 19th June 1998.
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It is therefore a fact that the TOs' network cannot be feasibly and economically
substituted, at least in the short term. As a result, service providers who want
to enter the market do not have any choice but to interconnect with the TOs
since the latter are the only ones who can reach the entire population of each
country. So it is clear that a TO's network is indispensable for all those
companies willing to develop viable economic operations, since they will not be
able to operate on the service market if they are refused access. There is
therefore a situation in which the TOs hold "gatekeeper" positions (the
telecommunications networks) while new entrants depend on gaining access to
bottleneck facilities. So the central problem is that, if the TOs are allowed not
to grant access, they will be able to control market developments by closing
the gates and re-erecting the barriers which had been removed by the
liberalisation process. Hence access to the incumbents' networks is a conditio
sine qua non for efficient market entry of competitors, and one can realise the
enormous impact that granting or refusing access can have on the future
competitive structures of the EU telecommunications sector.
3.4. DEFINITION OF ESSENTIAL FACILITIES IN THE
ACCESS NOTICE
This inability of new entrants to compete against the TOs if they are refused
access, and the massive investment needed in order to build alternative
networks, are two factors which fall into the scope of the definition of the
essential facilities concept and the interpretation of that definition. Indeed,
according to the Commission, the term "essential facilities" describes "a facility
or infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling
competitors to carry on their business, and which cannot be replicated by any
reasonable means".137 A facility will be considered essential if a refusal of
access to the facility in question leads to the proposed services being made
137 Access Notice, para. 68.
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either "impossible" or "seriously and unavoidably uneconomic"138 - which
clearly shows that the Access Notice followed the decisions in the transport
cases. Therefore the Commission is right when it states that the essential
facility doctrine - found in the aforementioned transport cases - can also apply
139
in the telecommunications sector.
3.5. ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL FACILITIES - OBJECTIVE
JUSTIFICATION FOR REFUSING ACCESS
The Access Notice presupposes that, in order to determine whether the
network operator (the access provider in general) should be obliged under the
competition rules to allow access, four other conditions, alongside the
recognition of a facility as essential, must be taken cumulatively into account.
These conditions are the following:
- availability of sufficient capacity to provide access;
- the facility owner fails to satisfy demand on an existing service or product
market, blocks the emergence of a potential new service or product, or
impedes competition on an existing or potential service or product market;
- the requesting party is prepared to pay a reasonable and non¬
discriminatory price for the access;
- there is no objective justification for refusing access.140
Clearly there is the danger that an unconstrained use of the "objective
justification" argument by the TOs could lead the essential facilities doctrine to
wither into insignificance. Thus guidelines are needed to clarify the situations
where refusals to give access can be justified and, therefore, to provide a clear
interpretation of the general and abstract concept of "objective justification".
It has already been seen that in all the cases decided under Article 82 the
Court and the Commission referred to the notion of an objectively justified
138
ibid., para. 91(a).
139 Access Notice, para. 88.
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refusal to supply. Following this line of cases, the Access Notice uses the term
"objective justification" as one of those conditions under which an operator is
able to escape from the obligation to grant access and, since the existing case
law does not provide a clear meaning of the term, it attempts to clarify its
scope. Thus non-exhaustive examples are laid down in order to determine
when a justification can be regarded as objective. One example of such an
objectively justified refusal to provide access is "an overriding difficulty of
providing access to the requesting company".141
It is a safe assumption that the term "overriding difficulty" includes the
essential requirements142 which are laid down in the Interconnection Directive,
i.e. security of network operations, maintenance of network integrity,
interoperability of services and protection of data.143 Besides, the Access
Notice's reference to "technical feasibility"144 as a potential objective
justification strengthens this argument.
Continuous technical innovation, which presupposes massive investment, in
conjunction with the short life span of new products145 create the necessity of
providing companies with the chance to recoup their production costs and with
the time to launch a new product. This is recognised by the Commission when
it cites as an example of a possible justification "the need for a facility owner
which has undertaken investment aimed at the introduction of a new product or
service to have sufficient time and opportunity to use the facility in order to
place that new product or service on the market".146
The Commission clearly shows that, although its main target is to prevent
foreclosure of the market by facilitating the entry of new competitors, it does
not forget that it is also important for industry and consumers not to undermine
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indication of the Commission's attempt to confine the application of the
essential facility doctrine to the minimum. However, the Commission implies
that it prefers a narrow interpretation of the notion of objective justification, and
it therefore adopts an over-liberal application of the essential facilities doctrine.
By this I mean that there will be acceptance of a justification as objective only
under exceptional circumstances. This argument finds support from the fact
that, although it is admitted that the question of objective justification will
require close scrutiny on a case-by-case basis, it is stated that
"it is particularly important in the telecommunications sector that the benefits to
end-users which will arise from a competitive environment are not undermined
by the actions of the former state monopolists in preventing competition from
emerging and developing".147
Finally, it is interesting to note that the principle of proportionality - found in
many judgments of the Court148 - can be used as a safety net in order to
ensure that the justifications offered have not been uncritically accepted and
are not excessive in relation to the target pursued, namely the maintenance
and promotion of competition. This is recognised by the Commission when it
states that
"in addition to determining whether difficulties cited in any particular case are
serious enough to justify the refusal to grant access, the relevant authorities
must also decide whether these difficulties are sufficient to outweigh the
damage done to competition if access is refused or made more difficult and
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3.6. THE DUAL-ROLE SITUATION AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF A COMPETITIVE MARKET DOWNSTREAM OF THE
ESSENTIAL FACILITY
In Alaska Airlines,150 it was held that, even if an airline was dominant in the
computerised reservation systems (CRS) market, it would be obliged to
provide access to its CRS under the essential facility doctrine only if its refusal
to supply would lead that airline to create or hold a dominant position in a
downstream market (i.e. the market for airline services). Thus it seems that the
essential facility doctrine, as it emerged in U.S. law, applies only if the
downstream market cannot be considered competitive.
James Venit and John Kallaugher argue that the essential facilities cases
entail a "dual-role" situation, under which the essential facility is owned or
controlled by a company which has market power on the market downstream
of the facility. As they put it, in that kind of situation the company in question
has a "dual role as both an administrator of an infrastructure and an operator
on a market utilizing that infrastructure".151 It is interesting to note that Venit
and Kallaugher perceive the essential facility doctrine, as developed in the
United States, as not associated with a real relevant market for provision of the
152
essential facility, i.e. that infrastructure may not constitute a market.
However, this is not the case as the Access Notice identifies at least two types
of product markets relevant to access agreements, namely services markets
and access to facilities markets.153 Interconnection to the public
telecommunications network constitutes a typical example of access to
facilities markets, while the provision of public voice telephony services is
linked with the services market.154
On the other hand, it should be stressed that the Venit and Kallaugher idea
(i.e. that the essential facilities doctrine is associated with the fact that the
operator of the essential facility is also dominant on the market downstream of
the facility) could prove helpful in distinguishing the essential facilities cases
150 Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 5.Ct. 1603
(1992).
151 James S. Venit and John J. Kallaugher, "Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach",
in the Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute - International Antitrust








from monopoly leveraging cases. Indeed, the first cases deal with a company
which is already dominant in the market downstream of the facility while the
second ones involve a company in a dominant position in one market which
attempts to extend its dominance into a related market. As Venit and
Kallaugher have put it, "in contrast to the monopoly leveraging cases, the
essential facility rule comes into play only where denial of access to the facility
has its effects in a market where the defendant has market power".155
Temple Lang agrees with the Venit and Kallaugher notion that the essential
facilities cases entail a "dual-role" situation, something that he calls "a conflict
of interests" situation.156 However, contrary to the idea that the essential facility
cannot be regarded as a market, he argues that the essential facilities cases
concern enterprises which are dominant in the upstream market and which are
also active in the downstream market.157 But what greatly differentiates Venit
and Kallaugher from Temple Lang is that, according to the latter, it is not
necessary to prove that the owner or operator of the essential facility is also
dominant on the market downstream of the facility. It is sufficient that "there is
little significant competition in the downstream market".158
Arguably the fact that a company will usually enjoy its dominant position
because it controls the essential facility,159 in conjunction with the finding in
Tetra Pa/f160- where due to the extremely high market share on the dominated
market and the close links between the dominated and non-dominated market
Tetra Pak was found "in a situation comparable to that of holding a dominant
position on the markets in question as a whole"161 - is sufficient to convince
about the validity of the above argument. Besides, the Access Notice seems to
agree with this view. Indeed, it points out that in most cases in the
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telecommunications industry "a particular operator has an extremely strong
position on infrastructure markets and on markets downstream of that
infrastructure"162 and, based on the judgment of the Court in Tetra Pak, it
indicates that, even if an operator has significant market power in only one of
those closely related markets,163 the particular operator will be found "in a
situation comparable to that of holding a dominant position on the markets in
question as a whole".164 And its analysis is concluded by making clear that
dominance originates from control of facilities. As it states characteristically, "a
company controlling the access to an essential facility enjoys a dominant
position within the meaning of Article 86 [now Article 82]".165
Thus it is not a precondition for the application of the essential facilities
doctrine that the company in question is also dominant in the downstream
market. It is enough that it is dominant in the upstream market (i.e. when it
controls the essential facility) and, at the same time, there is no effective
competition on the market downstream of the facility. Of course, if it is also
dominant in the downstream market it will be harder to justify the refusal to
provide access to the essential facility.166
It is obvious that the above argument reflects primarily considerations of
economic efficiency in the consumer welfare sense - as against concerns such
as fairness. So Professor Fox argues that the application of the essential
facility doctrine is linked with the efficiency principle "from the point of view of
whether the consumer is going to be better off or not", and emphasises that a
company should be obliged to provide access only if that would lead to "a
better deal for the consumers".167
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3.7. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW ENTRANTS AND NEW
PRODUCTS OR SERVICES
So we reach the conclusion that there is a duty to provide access to essential
facilities only if there is no effective competition in the downstream market (or if
the refusal to provide access will significantly affect competition in the
downstream market). As a result one could safely argue that there is no
obligation to grant a competitor access to an essential facility (e.g. to the public
telecommunications network) if there is a number of already established
companies which compete effectively with the incumbent in the downstream
market (i.e. in the telecommunications services market). It is interesting to note
that this should be the case even if there is sufficient capacity available - which
normally makes it harder to justify the refusal. However the situation changes if
the potential entrant proves that he is willing and able to provide a new product
168
or launch a service not provided by any of the existing competitors.
Moreover, there will be a duty to provide access to a new entrant who
intends to provide a new product or commence a new service even if there is
not sufficient capacity available and even if the downstream market is
effectively competitive.169 In that case, the fact that the new product or service
offered by the new entrant could be regarded as contributing to the growth of
competition - and thus not being contrary to the principle of proportionality -
can justify an equal and non-discriminatory reduction of the operations of the
existing competitors in order to facilitate the entrance of the new competitor
and the emergence of the new product or service.170
The Access Notice demonstrates the importance the Commission attaches
to new market entrants who can introduce new products and services when it
uses as an example of abuse of dominant position the attempt by a dominant
company to prevent the emergence of a new product or service.171 Moreover, it
should be remembered that one of the cumulative conditions which must be
taken into account in order to determine whether the access provider is obliged
to allow access is that "the facility owner... blocks the emergence of a potential
168 John Temple Lang, "Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply
Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities", in the Annual Proceedings of the Fordham
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new service or product".172
It is worth stressing the argument that the assessment of whether or not
access should be given to a new competitor will need to take account of how
significantly new a product or service is.173 This kind of precondition is clearly
problematic since it is not possible to specify in detail the meaning of the term
"significantly new" - especially in the dynamic and fast-moving
telecommunications sector. Moreover, it should be stressed that the
Commission should proceed with extreme caution and treat frequent usage of
that term with scepticism. Otherwise, an extensive application could create
uncertainties for firms considering investing in new infrastructure and services
and jeopardise the efficient development of new services over the network.
Of course it is understandable that whilst the Commission wants to
encourage new entrants who can provide new products or services to compete
in as many services as possible, it does not wish this to lead to inefficiencies
which would be harmful to the market in the long term. By this I mean that the
Commission is careful not to encourage services competition at the expense of
infrastructure-based competition. On the other hand, however, it is obvious that
the opportunity to remove the obligation to provide access, if a new product or
service is not regarded as significantly new, could be used as a means to
exclude from the market those who can make a valuable contribution to the
telecommunications industry, in terms of the innovation and imaginative
applications which are vital for meeting the needs of a rapidly evolving market.
3.8. SPECIAL DUTIES IMPOSED ON THE OPERATORS OF
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
It should be remembered that the Court has acknowledged the right of a
dominant undertaking to protect its own commercial interests (when under
attack) and to take reasonable measures which are necessary in order to
protect those interests.174 So a principle has been developed according to
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which firms which refuse to deal with competitors are not liable if they have
legitimate business reasons for refusing such co-operation.
However, the essential facilities cases appear to differ from the approach
taken in the refusal to supply cases. First, the Commission has adopted a test
which consists of imposing an obligation on the facility owner to act as if it was
an independent company, i.e. a company which is not active on the
downstream market.175 And second, it seems that the Commission has placed
an additional burden on the owners and operators of the essential facility
compared with the obligation to deal imposed on dominant firms in cases
associated with a refusal to supply under Article 82. Indeed, in the essential
facilities cases the Commission does not pay any attention at all to the fact that
a refusal to provide access to an essential facility could be justified if it can be
proved that it was protecting the legitimate commercial interests of the facility
owners. This approach represents an extension of the existing case law of the
Court, since the only legitimate justification for a refusal to grant access to an
essential facility appears to be the lack of sufficient capacity.176 Of course, as
already pointed out, even the lack of sufficient capacity cannot be regarded as
an objective justification if the potential entrant can offer a new product or
service.
From the above it could be submitted that the strict test of the independent
company and the additional obligation imposed on the operator of the facility -
in terms of not having the chance to refuse access on the grounds of
protecting its legitimate commercial interests - are linked with the so-called
dual role or conflict of interest situation, i.e. when the dominant operator of the
facility is also active and has significant market power in the downstream
market.
175 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, para. 75.
176 At it is stated in the Access Notice, "where capacity constraints are not an issue and where
the company refusing to provide access to its facility has not provided access to that facility
..., then it is not clear what other objective justification there could be", para. 87.
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3.9. CONCLUSIONS
It must be mentioned that, after privatisation, BT remained intact as an
integrated nation-wide firm, despite the fact that a vertically integrated
dominant firm can use its dominance to deter entry into other sectors of the
business. However, despite the chance of watching how the British model has
worked - which in general terms did not succeed in restraining the exercise of
BT's monopoly power - the Commission followed the same approach. For
instance, the Commission has stated that "effective competition in the markets
for telecommunications equipment and services has evolved without rigid
structural safeguards, such as those developed in the mid-eighties in North
American markets".177 And also that "the sector can evolve without a priori
structural separation, but subject to the application of Community law, in
particular, the competition rules".178
The problem is that such an approach would leave national operators
completely free to engage in abusive behaviour aimed at maintaining their
position. This could result in situations where the opportunities for their
competitors would be seriously damaged and thus effective competition would
be distorted.
So the introduction of the essential facilities doctrine is particularly important
in the run-up to the complete liberalisation of the telecommunications sector. In
particular, it has a significant role to play since it has been asked to deal with
the problems created after the Commission's decision not to separate
operation of the infrastructure from downstream use. Thus the doctrine
demonstrates the Commission's concern to prevent national operators from
gaining a competitive advantage over new market entrants. However, the
Commission seems to recognise that its practice ofproviding new entrants with
the means (essential facilities doctrine) and the time to become established -
cannot go on indefinitely. The compromise reached in the British Midland v.
Aer Lingus case179 - i.e. the obligation of an essential facilities owner to grant
access on the one hand but for only a limited period of time on the other - is a
177 Green Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV
networks - Part II: A common approach to the provision of infrastructure for
telecommunications in the European Union, COM(94) 682, 25.01.1995, at section VIII. V.5.
178 Communication to the Council and European Parliament on the consultation on the Green
Paper on the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks,
COM(95) 158 final, 03.05.1995, at section V.9.2.
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clear indication of the Commission's attempt to draw the balance needed in
order to facilitate the entry of new competitors while not seriously undermining
the incentive for firms to invest and innovate.
The doctrine also illustrates the importance the Commission attaches to the
introduction of new products and services and to the rapid dissemination of
technology and innovation. Thus the Commission rightly attempts to ensure
that the application of the essential facilities doctrine will lead to competitive
and growth-oriented market structures. Yet its efforts to fight the abusive
behaviour of the incumbents against newcomers and to ensure that market
foreclosure is avoided would serve little purpose if an uncritical and over-
interventionist approach was chosen. Indeed, the application of the doctrine is
vital to facilitate the transition to complete liberalisation, but it must be
accompanied by certain conditions designed to reduce or minimise the
negative effects on the essential facilities operators. The Access Notice
succeeds in that by identifying those situations where companies which control
essential facilities can be ordered under the competition rules to provide
180
access.
Despite the significance of preventing national operators from gaining a
competitive advantage over new market entrants, the Commission recognises
that an over-liberal application of the essential facilities doctrine could
undermine the incentive to invest in alternative infrastructure. The Access
Notice reflects the Commission's approach in balancing these two important
considerations and so it attempts to take a step towards the creation of a legal
environment that will facilitate entry and will promote technical innovation while,
at the same time, ensuring that the incentive to invest in alternative networks is
not affected.
Arguably, however, the assessment of whether or not the aforementioned
balance has been drawn successfully must be made in the light of the extent to
which competition is safeguarded in the downstream market. By this I mean
that it is imperative that the doctrine applies only in circumstances where there
is no effective competition in the downstream market since, in that case, the
refusal to provide access will have a significantly negative effect on the
downstream competition - provided, of course, that the operator of the facility
is also active (and possibly dominant) on the market downstream of that
179 See British Midland i/. Aer Lingus, para. 44.
180 Access Notice, paras 91(a) - 91(e).
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facility. It is submitted that the above point should be used as a strict rule
alongside the qualified criteria identified by the Access Notice in paragraph 91.
It is unfortunate that nothing in the Access Notice under the title "essential
facilities" indicates or even implies that the Commission is willing to take into
account, in order to determine whether or not the doctrine should apply, how
competitive the downstream market is and what restrictive effect on the
downstream competition a refusal to provide access would cause. The
aforementioned argument could also find support in the Commission's
decisions in London European Airways v. Sabena and in Sea Containers v.
Stena Sealink. In both cases there was no consideration of whether the
essential facilities owners had a dominant position in the downstream markets
(i.e. in the airline market and the high-speed ferry services market
respectively). It was enough in the Commission's analysis that the companies
in question held dominant positions due to their control over the essential
facilities (i.e. the computerised reservation systems and the harbour
respectively). If that is the case, the Access Notice expresses a Commission
view that favours an over-zealous and over-interventionist approach
concerning the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the
telecommunications sector. The enormous damage that such a policy can
cause in terms of undermining the incentive to invest in alternative
infrastructure has already been illustrated.
Despite the inadequacies found in the Commission's analysis, the Access
Notice is a welcome approach since it is the first focused attempt in examining
and analysing competition problems, actual and potential, in the
telecommunications sector.
It should not be forgotten that the case law of the Court of Justice has not
yet developed well-established principles and practices regarding access
issues in the telecommunications sector - mainly because there are no clear
precedents in the case law of the Court in the field of telecommunications.
So we are still in the process of trying to clarify the scope of competition
rules in the sector, and this is exactly the role that the Access Notice has to
play. Indeed, the Access Notice attempts to establish a framework which is
transparent and which avoids uncertainty while, at the same time, also being
flexible and without jeopardising its effectiveness. However, as has already
been underlined, the Commission must be careful about the scope of its
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powers under the competition rules to limit foreclosure effects by ensuring
access to facilities. This means primarily that it must be cautious not to impose
additional obligations on undertakings. Yet the Commission's approach in the
application of the essential facilities doctrine does not help towards that
direction; a less interventionist role is needed. Furthermore the fact that the
Access Notice is a non-binding legal instrument does not help in decreasing
legal uncertainty. However it is believed that, due to the liberalisation and the
economic and technical developments in the telecommunications markets, a
number of competition issues will arise concerning access and thus a more
extensive case law will be developed. Meanwhile, in the months following
publication of the Access Notice, comments will be received from industry
players, European and national organisations as well as individuals active in
the telecommunications and related sectors.
The responses to the Access Notice and subsequent discussions will
generate calls for change (where that is needed) and will help to pull together
all the issues. This will give the Commission the chance to proceed to
modifications in order to take its next step - possibly a legally binding
Regulation adopted under Article 83 of the Treaty.
It is expected that the Commission will consider the changes which will best
contribute to the achievement of a greater legal and market certainty while not
forgetting its objective of encouraging both infrastructure-based and services-
based competition.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER 2
This chapter examined the second phase of the transition from a regime of a
State-run monopoly to an effectively competitive market.
It has already been illustrated that, given the extent of the accrued
advantages conferred upon the incumbent operators, it is certain that there
would be a difficult transition period before these privatised companies could
become competitive, and during this time they could use their substantial
power to charge customers monopoly prices as well as engage in strategic
games to deter new entrants.
It was realised therefore that, in the context of this second phase, the access
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issues are of major significance due to the opportunity for new market players
to enter the market and, at the same time, the incumbents' desire to retain their
key bottleneck positions. For this reason - following the establishment of an ex
ante regulatory framework - the application of the regulatory regime and the
complementary application of competition law are equally important in order to
ensure that the already removed legal barriers will not be replaced by a de
facto monopolistic market structure.
Thus the jurisprudence of the ECJ (involving cases of refusal to supply) and
the European Commission's essential facilities cases, alongside the European
Commission's Notice on the application of the competition rules to access
agreements in the telecommunications sector, can play a vital role for driving
the industry forward, ensuring a level playing field, and reducing the
uncertainties for firms considering investing in new infrastructure and services.
Indeed, creating a clear and stable policy and rules in relation to access and
interconnection is indispensable in order to allow a sound basis for long term
planning in the industry and set the environment for massive investment.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Alliances and Mergers in the
Converging Environment
The Commission's objective to prevent market foreclosure
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SECTION A: HORIZONTAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
1. INTRODUCTION
Big multinational enterprises are the main users of long-distance and
international services and they are increasingly demanding high-quality and
reliable services on a worldwide basis. This is a basic precondition for them, if
they want to have a successful involvement in international financial
transactions. Therefore, due to the growing use of multimedia, the idea of a
'one-stop-shop' - that is the ability to access the full range of
telecommunications services through a single group of operators - has built up
very rapidly.
However, as already illustrated, telecommunications operators (TOs) had
been almost entirely national and, hence, they could not respond to the
requirements asked by multinational enterprises. It is therefore clear to TOs
that, due to the lack of know-how and sometimes the necessary technical
capabilities as well as because of the opportunities created by liberalisation
and deregulation processes, they should go global and link up their networks in
order to create dedicated worldwide superhighways. In addition, the fact that
the required investments are so large that they cannot be met by national
suppliers on an individual basis is another factor which makes the
telecommunications companies realise that the best way to respond to the
'new age' and to protect future profitability is to form new worldwide strategic
alliances and mergers.
This section focuses on some of the most important telecommunications
cases to emerge over the last years and attempts to illustrate the
Commission's policy in the sector.
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2. DISCUSSION OF CASES
2.1. BT-MCI1
British Telecommunications pic (BT) and MCI of the United States launched a
strategic alliance, Concert Communications Company, in June 1994. The
strength of Concert stems from the fact that it owns its network - it plans to
have a single backbone network linking 55 countries - through which it should
be able to offer a wider range and better quality of services to its customers
(especially to multinational and large regional companies).2 In addition to virtual
private network (VPN) services, Concert provides global managed data
services, messaging, videoconferencing, network managed services and
global calling card services for traveling employees. The advantage of such
services is that multinational corporations will be able to use a single phone
system world-wide, having one-stop shopping and one-stop billing facilities. BT
and MCI contributed to Concert their existing non-correspondent international
network facilities, including Syncordia, BT's existing outsourcing business. BT
will hold 75.1% of Concert's capital and MCI will hold 24.9%; however, all
major decisions require the agreement of both parties.
The creation of Concert was held to infringe Article 81(1) because it
eliminated the potential competition between the parties as BT and MCI were
at least potential competitors of the joint venture and of each other. Indeed,
although neither BT nor MCI could offer such global services as Concert could,
it was considered that, given their size and resources, they had the ability and
chance to enter this market individually.
However, an exemption was granted for seven years for the following
1 Case IV/34.857 - BT/MCI [1994] O.J. L223/36.
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reasons:
- The joint venture was found to improve telecommunications services and
economic progress in the EU as it would offer new networks and technological
superior services "more quickly, cheaply and of a more advanced nature than
either BT or MCI would have been capable of providing alone".3
- Consumers would benefit from these new services and cost savings.4
- It was also pointed out that Concert would create an alternative to the
already established alliances as well as to the new alliances which were to be
concluded in the short future (such as AT&T's Worldsource, Unisource, IPSP,
Atlas etc). Therefore competition could not be hindered.5
2.2. Atlas6 and GlobalOne7 cases
In 16 December 1994 Deutsche Telecom (DT) and France Telecom (FT)
notified the preliminary Atlas agreement to the Commission. The purpose of
this European telecommunications alliance was the provision of data and other
value-added corporate communications services.
The Atlas agreement raised a number of concerns from a competition point
of view. In particular, the Commission was concerned that the dominant
position of DT and FT in their domestic markets could allow them to exclude
new competitors. Indeed, the German and French markets were not liberalised
as those of U.K. and U.S. (this was one of the reasons why no conditions were
2
Another factor which indicates the strength of the Concert is that "BT and MCI are the fourth
and fifth largest telecommunications companies in the world in terms of traffic. BT, as the
former monopolist in the United Kingdom, still keeps a very substantial amount of market
power in that Member State as reflected by BT's overall market share (around 90% of the UK
market). MCI is the second largest long-distance carrier in the United States of America,
although significantly behind AT&T", see para. 41 of the decision.
3
ibid., at para. 53.
4
In particular, "the incorporation of Newco will mean that consumers in general will benefit
more rapidly from a set of new advanced services than Newco's parent companies would
have been capable of providing separately. In addition, consumers, big companies in this
case, will benefit directly through the provision of: i) a greater product portfolio of developed
and new services allowing them to operate more effectively on a global scale and to better
compete with their global as well as with their Community and EEA competitors; and ii) lower
pricing resulting from the cost savings to be made by Newco as a result of operational
efficiencies or pressure on local Tos", see para. 55 of the decision.
5
ibid., at para. 56.
6 Case No IV/35.337 - Atlas [1996] O.J. L239/23.
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attached to the exemption granted to the BT/MCI alliance). Moreover, the Atlas
project provided for the elimination of a competitor of DT in Germany, namely
FT's local subsidiary, Info AG. The size of the parties is also relevant as these
dominant undertakings are amongst the world's largest telecommunications
carriers and are owned by the EU's largest nation states. Moreover, the
Commission was concerned that Atlas could not offer satisfactory results since
it was not able to have enough capacity to carry expected international traffic
and, therefore, could not provide truly global services.
So the Commission demanded various modifications and only agreed to
begin the formal exemption procedure in 17 October 1995 when FT and DT as
well as the French and German Governments agreed to a number of changes
and offered a number of undertakings in order to address the aforementioned
concerns.
Two of the most important commitments made by the French and German
Governments and the Atlas parties were as follows:
- France and Germany were to grant the first two alternative infrastructure
licences before Atlas' European services were allowed to begin. This was
probably the most important point of the negotiations as the two countries had
to liberalise the so-called alternative infrastructure networks by 1 July 1996.
This political commitment would permit owners of alternative networks, such as
those operated by railways, utility companies or cable TV companies, to offer
liberalised telecommunications services, such as data services, value added
voice services and services to corporate networks and closed under groups.
- Transpac and Datex P, the public switched data networks in France and
Germany respectively, were to remain outside the Atlas joint venture until 1
January 1998. In other words, FT and DT would include Transpac and Datex P
networks within the Atlas venture only when France and Germany fully
liberalised all telecommunications services, including public voice, and all
network infrastructure. Moreover, even after their integration into Atlas, FT and
DT were required to grant open access to these networks, - on a non¬
discriminatory and transparent basis — for competing service providers offering
low level data services, and to provide a standardised interconnection protocol.
- Finally, FT undertook to sell Info AG.
Case No IV/35.617 — Phoenix/GlobalOne [1996] O.J. L239/57.
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The above clearance procedure and the conditions attached to Atlas covered
also the Phoenix alliance, a global telecommunications alliance between Atlas
and US Sprint Corporation. This alliance, which was renamed Global One,
addressed the same markets (as Atlas) for value-added telecommunications
network services and also the market for traveller services and the market for
so-called carrier's carrier services. The final Atlas and Global One agreements
were signed on 22 January 1996 and notified to the Commission on 28
February 1996. They were finally approved by the Commission on 17 July
1996, with the approval lasting for five years (in the case of Atlas) and seven
years (in the case of Global One). So the Atlas alliance will be reviewed in
2001 along with the Concert alliance between BT and MCI.
A significant conclusion derived from the above case is that, apart from the
commitments and amendments undertaken for the clearance of the Atlas
alliance, a key element of the Commission's satisfaction over Atlas was the
Sprint involvement through Global One. Indeed, as the Commission
commented:
"Phoenix makes it possible that consumers benefit from a considerably wider
range of new services that DT, FT and Sprint would not be capable of
providing separately within the same period of time ... Only a truly global
dimension would make the cooperation between DT and FT in the framework
of Atlas sufficiently important to consider an exemption from the prohibition of
Articles 85(1) of the EC Treaty and 53(1) of the EEA Agreement ... The
creation of a global venture committed to undertaking the investment needed
to be present worldwide is therefore crucial for the choice and quality of
communications available to MNCs and eventually SMEs. Adding global
'connectivity' to Europe-wide services, Phoenix is a substantial step forward in
relation to Atlas".8 ... "At this point in time the Commission regards entry of a
competitor to Concert into this immature market as being dependent on the
participation of an established United States provider with wide geographic
coverage".9
This case (as well as the BT/MCI case) makes it obvious that the Commission
can take greater account of trade with non-Member States and of the




worldwide competition existed in the telecommunications industry. Therefore
the question whether the Commission should try to increase competition
between TOs in order to promote smaller but 'clean' European operators
instead of allowing them to cooperate with non-EU carriers is non-existent. The
answer is simple: the Commission has to follow the latest technological and
market developments and, therefore - under the scrutiny of competition law -
must promote global alliances. The process of globalization of the economy is
accelerating and the Commission's competition policy cannot disregard this
new dimension. As the then Commissioner Karel Van Miert pointed out,
"the telecoms market is more and more no longer essentially a European
Union one, it becomes a global one; the most important alliances notified to
me are fundamentally international not just European; the customers and
companies served by this market want direct access to increasingly global
services - whether this may be a web site in Australia, or a corporate
communications network for a multinational".10
Another important element brought out after considering the Commission's
view in this case is that the attempt by a number of dominant TOs to establish
global telecommunications alliances will likely speed up the pace of
liberalisation in Europe. Indeed, it was showed that the Commission made the
progress of the parties' cooperation dependent on French and German
progress towards telecommunications liberalisation. So the linkage between
the approval of Atlas/Global One alliances and liberalisation demonstrates that
the Commission has the power and the willingness to open up the European
market for telecommunications services to more competition. As Karel Van
Miert put it,
"I am determined to use the full potential of the Competition Rules of the
Treaty to maintain a tough stance in this area ... and luckily we have the legal
tools to impose this We are taking full advantage of the strong and
effective link between implementation of government commitments to
liberalisation and our conditions for allowing alliances involving dominant
10 Karel Van Miert, "Preparing for 1998 and Beyond", European Access 1996 No 5, October, 8-
12, at p. 11.
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telecom operators".11
A relevant case is the Commission's decision of 4 October 1995 in the Italian
GSM case,12 that the Italian Government had infringed EC law in requiring
Omnitel Pronto, Italy's second mobile operator, to pay Lit.750 billion (some
US$500 million) for a mobile licence, while Telecom Italia, the state-owned
operator, was not required to pay for its own licence. The Commission
negotiated with the Italian Government over the mechanism by which the
payment by Omnitel Pronto could be offset and, in the end, a compensation
package was granted.
Those compensatory measures included the Italian Government's
commitment to implement the Mobile and the Full Competition Directives: in
other words, a commitment to liberalize alternative infrastructure as soon as
possible. Omnitel could also have non-discriminatory access (including a 25
per cent reduction of tariff conditions for interconnection) to the GSM network
run by Telecom Italia Mobile.
The above measures show once again the link between competition cases
and implementation of the liberalisation timetable and illustrate how the
Commission can impose conditions not only on governments but also on the
parties of the agreement in the form of non-discriminatory treatment of their
competitors regarding access to the network. In addition, the settlement of this
case can been seen as a vehicle to redress the asymmetry of market
conditions between the new entrants and the TOs, as, despite the existence of
liberalisation measures, incumbents will continue to enjoy significant
advantages over new entrants for the foreseeable future.
11
ibid, at p. 8.
12 Commission Decision 1995/489/EC of 4 October 1995 concerning the conditions imposed on
the second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Italy, [1995] O.J. L280/49.
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2.3. Unisource13 and Uniworld14 cases
The Commission's approach adopted in the Atlas/GlobalOne decisions was
also followed in two other cases. As a result, the creation of two
telecommunications alliances, Unisource and Uniworld, was approved in 29
October 1997.
Unisource is a joint venture between the national operators Telia of Sweden,
PTT Telecom of the Netherlands and Swiss Telecom. The Unisource joint
venture attracted the interest of AT&T with the purpose of creating a
transatlantic alliance to be known as Uniworld. The aim of the Uniworld alliance
is to provide the European business market with pan-European
telecommunications services, following a line of translantic telecommunications
alliances like the 'Concert' and 'Global One'.
Following its investigation, the Commission found that the agreements fell
within the scope of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. However, after discussions with
the governments of the European countries involved in Unisource and subject
to changes to the agreements and behavioural conditions imposed on the
parties, the creation of the two companies was approved. With regard to the
Unisource alliance in particular, the Commission found that the existing
dominant positions of the three Unisource shareholders on many of their home
markets would not be strengthened. The most important commitments which
the Commission regarded as necessary to let the deal go through were as
follows:
- The Netherlands and Switzerland had to commit themselves to the July
1996 deadline for the liberalisation of the so-called alternative communications
network.
- The full liberalisation of telecommunications in Switzerland from 1 January
1998.
- Telefonica of Spain, which was originally a member of the transaction, later
announced its withdrawal from the alliance. It is important, however, to
emphasise that before Telefonica's withdrawal, Spain had been asked to
confirm its decision to open up its telecommunications market without making
13 Case No IV/35.830 - Unisource [1997] O.J. L318/1.
14
Case No IV/35.738 - Uniworld[1997] O.J. L318/24.
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use of the five years derogation which had been granted. This meant that the
Spanish government had to comply with the general 1998 deadline. In
particular, the full liberalisation of the telecommunications market in Spain was
to take place by 30 November 1998, with three licences being granted by 1
January plus limited licences for the cable TV companies to offer
telecommunications within their areas.
- Other commitments included: undertakings to prevent discrimination by the
parent companies in respect of leased lines and interconnection, to prevent
cross subsidies between Unisource and its parent companies and the
prevention of tying or bundling of services.
The exemption would last for five years from the date of the liberalisation of
alternative networks on 1 July 1996 and would be valid until 30 June 2001.
Similar undertakings were made by the parties in respect of the Uniworld
transaction on non-discrimination, against misuse of confidential information
and for the prevention of cross subsidisation and tying of services. In addition,
AT&T offered to the Commission a series of undertakings on interconnection,
access and accounting rates that would be no higher that the lowest
accounting rate established between AT&T and any Unisource shareholder.
The Uniworld arrangements were also exempted for five years.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The Commission has assumed a positive attitude and awards those strategic
alliances whose parents prefer to adapt to the new environment in order to
respond to the requirements asked by multinational enterprises rather than
trying to protect themselves artificially against outside competition.
The Commission has recognised that certain restrictions on competition
between the parent companies can be justified if the alliances in question are
found to contribute to the improvement of telecommunications services.
Furthermore, restrictions on competition can be considered to be
indispensable, i.e. directly related to the accomplishment of the alliances. In
those cases, the non-competition clauses can be regarded as ancillary to the
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creation of the projects by protecting them during their crucial launch phase.
Their role is to commit the parent companies to ensuring the success of the
alliances, and to spread substantially the high costs and risks required for
commercialising and developing the projects.
However, the Commission has made it clear that those restrictions on
competition must be kept to a minimum in order to ensure that the clearing of
the strategic alliances will not lead to re-monopolised market structures. To
address the aforementioned concerns, the Commission has imposed on the
parent companies a number of necessary undertakings as a pre-condition to
let the deals go through. It has already been illustrated that, especially when
the strategic alliances involve incumbents, the liberalisation of home markets is
an indispensable criterion in order to make the restrictions on competition
acceptable.
SECTION B: MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN
PAY-TV SUPPLIERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
OPERATORS
1. INTRODUCTION
This section analyses EU competition policy on the strategic alliances and
mergers which are spurred on by the accelerating change of markets with the
convergence of the telecommunications and media sectors. Companies are
now positioning themselves in order to take advantage of the new
opportunities. Thus EU competition policy - after its success in liberalising the
telecommunications markets and after dealing with those alliances with a more
horizontal nature - has a new challenge to confront: potential anti-competitive
behaviour generated by this rapid change, and the new possibilities for vertical
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integration between market players who try to occupy the key bottleneck
positions and control market developments.
Again, the Commission's main concern is how to draw the right balance in
order to promote technical innovation and the emergence of new products and
services while avoiding market foreclosure which would block market
development and discourage investment in the untested multi-media markets.
2. DISCUSSION OF CASES
2.1. MSG Media Service15
On 6 June 1994 Deutsche Bundespost Telecom (DT), Bertelsmann AG and
Taurus Beteiligungs GmbH (which belongs to the Kirch group) notified the
Commission of the creation of a joint venture called Media Service GmbH
(MSG).
DT is the incumbent telecommunications operator owning most of the cable
network in Germany and controlling the return channels which are
indispensable for interactive services. Bertelsmann AG is involved in the
publication of books and magazines and is also engaged in commercial
television. The Kirch group is the main supplier of films and TV programmes in
Germany. Bertelsmann and Kirch are active in the audiovisual sector and run,
together with Canal Plus, the channel Premiere, which at the moment is the
only pay-television channel in Germany.
The object of MSG was to offer both digital programmes and to undertake
transfers and transactions for smaller providers of programmes (especially the
technical, business and administrative handling of payment-financed
television), as well as other communication services (including subscriber
customer management), using the existing cable network of Deutche Telecom.
After four months of investigation and careful examination of the relevant
market situation (on economic grounds) the Merger Task Force of the EU
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Commission decided on 9 November of 1994 to block the MSG joint venture as
incompatible with the Common Market under Article 8.3 of the Merger
Regulation and with the functioning of the EEA Agreement under Article 57.1 of
that Agreement. The conclusion of the Commission investigation was that,
despite the fact that a joint venture like that could encourage the development
of multimedia in Europe,16 the planned operation would create or strengthen a
dominant position in three separate markets: a) the market for administrative
and technical services supplied to pay-TV operators and operators of other TV
services; b) the market for pay-TV; and c) the market for cable networks.
a) The Commission considered it unlikely that competitors would enter
MSG's market. MSG would have been able to control its competitors in the
pay-TV market through its monopolistic position as a supplier of decoders and
administration of the customer base. This is true given the fact, for example,
that DT Telecom controls most of the cable network in Germany.
b) Furthermore, the proposed concentration would enable Bertelsmann and
Kirch (currently the only suppliers of pay-TV services in Germany via their
Premiere channel) to strengthen their dominant position; MSG could help them
to control competitor's access to this market and could be used as a vehicle to
gain information regarding the activities of competitors.
c) Finally, the dominant position of DT on cable infrastructure would be
protected and strengthened by MSG, something that could have serious
effects on the liberalisation of this market in 1998.
Even last minute undertakings proposed by the parties (such as non¬
discriminatory behaviour of MSG towards pay-TV providers and digital
development of the cable network sufficiently to avoid any shortage of the
transmission capacity)17 were rejected by the Commission on the grounds that
those undertakings were behavioural (which means that they are not easy to
monitor from a technical point of view) and only partly conditional and,
therefore, they could not modify the initial analysis.18
15 Case IV/M.649 - MSG Media Service Decision [1994] O.J. L364/1.
16
ibid., at para. 100: "It is true that the successful spread of digital television presupposes a
digital infrastructure and hence that an enterprise with the business object of MSG can




ibid., paras 95 and 99.
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2.2. Nordic Satellite Distribution19
On 23/2/1995 Norsk Telecom AS (NT), Telemarkt A/A (TD) and
Industrieforvaltningen AB Kinnevik (Kinnevik) notified their intention to create a
joint venture called Nordic Satellite Distribution (NSD).
As regards the NSD's parents, it involves financially important and dominant
players in the Nordic countries. NT is the main cable TV operator in Norway
and controls the Norwegian programme distributor Telenor CTV AS and the
satellite capacity on the one of the two Nordic satellite positions. TD owns the
national broadband distribution network, is the largest cable TV operator in
Denmark and controls, in cooperation with Kinnevik, most of the satellite
capacity on the second Nordic satellite position. Kinnevik is a Swedish
conglomerate and the most important distributor of Nordic Satellite TV
programmes; it has also strong interests, among other things, in broadcasting,
pay-TV, magazines, newspapers and telecommunications.
The NSD's intention was to establish an attractive satellite position for
transmission of TV signals to cable TV operators and households receiving
satellite TV on their own dish. This would not be difficult because NSD would
be the only operator whose programmes could be received within the whole of
the Nordic satellite region.
On 19 July 1995, however, and after a five-month investigation of the case,
the Commission declared the NSD joint venture incompatible with the Common
Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement. The Commission concluded
that the NSD would have created a highly vertically integrated operation
covering a wide range of services. As a result, it would have a competitive
advantage which could foreclose the markets to new entrants in the Nordic
region,20 especially in the field of satellite TV broadcasting.21 As Karel Van
Miert, Commissioner responsible for Competition, has put it:
"the Nordic Satellite Distribution agreement in the Nordic Market had to be
blocked because (it) involved, amongst other things, networks operators,
enjoying essentially gatekeeper functions extending dominance into related






broadcasting and content markets".22
2.3. HMGGroepSA23
Another proposed TV joint venture was the Holland Media Groep SA (HMG)
between RTL4 S.A. (RTL), Vereniging Veronica Omroeperganisatie (Veronica)
and Endemol Entertainment Holding BV (Endemol). The planned operation did
not satisfy the turnover thresholds for the application of the Merger Regulation.
However the Commission decided in May 1995 to proceed to a careful
examination of the above proposed joint venture, after a request from the
Dutch government. Indeed, under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, a
Member State is entitled to request the Commission to examine a particular
case.
As regards the HMG's parents, Endemol is the largest independent producer
of TV programmes in the Netherlands, while RTL and Veronica - involved in
broadcasting activities - would participate in the joint venture with three
commercial TV channels.
Although the Commission's finding in this case could lack the usual
suspension provisions (because the parties did not meet the turnover
thresholds set out in the Merger Regulation) and the parties were entitled to
complete their operation, the decision reached in October 1995 did not allow
the joint venture to take place. The Commission's conclusion was that the
parties' activities in HMG could lead to a strong dominant position on the TV
advertising market in the Netherlands. In addition, the position of Endemol on
the market for independent TV productions could be strengthened.24 So, the
joint venture was declared incompatible with the Common Market.
This decision is important as it follows the decisions set in the MSG and
NSD cases which proved to be unacceptable agreements in their notified
forms. However, although it seems that there is a trend towards refusing
22
Karel Van Miert, "Preparing for 1998 and Beyond", European Access 1996 No 5, October, 8
12, at p. 10.
23 Case IV/M.553 - RTL-Veronica-Endemol, 1996/346/EC [1996] O.J. L134/32.
24 For a more analytical reasoning of the Commission's conclusion, see the Decision of 17 July
1996, 96/649/EC, Case IV/M.553 - RTUVeronica/Endemo! [1996] O.J. L294/14.
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approval for mergers in the converging media/telecommunications area which
result in powerful vertically integrated operators, the situation is not completely
clear yet and the aforementioned cases do not indicate a negative position of
the Commission on media developments. So, for instance, the parties to the
HMG joint venture were invited by the Commission to propose alternative and
appropriate measures in order to restore conditions of effective competition.
After the modification of the HMG venture and subject to full compliance with
the conditions and obligations contained in the Parties' commitments, the
concentration was declared compatible with the Common Market.25
The following three cases also prove that it is by no means apparent that the
Commission has formulated a specific policy regarding this type of alliance.
2.4. Kirch/Richemont/Telepiou26
On 27th June 1994 Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (Richemont) and
Kirch - through their subsidiaries Ichor and Ptb Pay TV Beteiligungs GmbH
respectively - entered the Italian pay-TV market by acquiring joint control of
Telepiu.
Italy is the only country where Telepiu provides television broadcasting
services.27 At the same time, there is no overlap in the geographic areas of
activities of the parent companies. Indeed, Kirch's main television interests are
in the German market whereas Richemont - through its shareholding in
FilmNet - is involved in the broadcasting markets in Belgium, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.28
This was exactly the crucial point in the Commission's analysis: the
acquisition of joint control of Telepiu would not give rise to co-ordination of the
competitive behaviour between the parties since their television activities were
taking place on separate geographic markets. In addition, due to the fact that
broadcasting is directly related to the language, religious and social needs of
25
Ibid., Article 1 of the decision.






each country - the national nature of the television services market29 - Kirch
and FilmNet were not considered to be in a position to enter the Italian market
successfully on their own.30
These factors were enough to convince the Commission that the transaction
would not lead to an increase of the parties' market shares, nor would it result
in a restriction of effective competition in the television market in Italy.31 As a
result, the Commission cleared the notified merger and declared it compatible
with the Common Market.32
2.5. Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/Telepiou33
On 28th March 1995 Richemont and MultiChoice Limited (MultiChoice) merged
their respective pay-TV interests in PayCo. Since MultiChoice had a 50%
interest in Network Holdings (NetHold) - which in turn owned, among others,
FilmNet - and Richemont held the other 50%,34 PayCo would replace NetHold
as the holding company for the television interest of Richemont and
MultiChoice.35 Moreover, as a result of Richemont contributing its interest in
Telepiu to PayCo, Telepiu would be jointly controlled by Richemont, the Kirch
Group and MultiChoice.36
Again the Commission held that the acquisition of joint control of Telepiu
would not give rise to co-ordination of competitive behaviour between the
parties since the Telepiu parents' activities were taking place on different
geographic markets and none of these were present in the Italian television
market.37 Therefore the proposed transaction would not result in an increase of
market shares between the parties, effective competition would not be
29
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impeded and, thus, the notified concentration was declared to be compatible
with the Common Market.38
2.6. Bertelsmann/CLT39
Bertelsmann Aktiengesellschaft (Bertelsmann) is a major German media group
involved in the publication of books and magazines and also engaged in
commercial television. These activities have been conducted by UFA Filmund
FernsehGmbH (UFA), Bertelsmann's subsidiary. Audiofina S. A. (Audiofina) -
a Luxembourg-based company - holds almost total control (approximately
97%) of Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion (CLT), which is the
owner of RTL television station and an important European player in radio and
television businesses. On 4 September 1996 Bertelsmann and Audiofina
notified the Commission of the creation of a joint venture called CLT/UFA.
The Commission identified those substantial characteristics which must be
fulfilled for a joint venture to be concentrative, namely that both parties must
have joint control of the joint venture - for example when a unanimous
resolution is needed: "no decision can be taken ... without the agreement of
both Bertelsmann and Audiofina";40 the joint venture must have sufficient
resources to operate a business activity independently from its parents for a
long period of time:
"CLTUFA will continue the activities performed to date by CLT on the one hand
and UFA of the other. It will receive all the television and radio licences
currently held by CLT and UFA and will employ its own staff. It will have its own
technical and financial resources. [It will be] of an unlimited duration.
Therefore, CLTUFA will be a fullfunction entity formed on a lasting basis".41
37
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There must also be a lack of co-ordination of competitive behaviour between
the parents of the joint venture: "all Bertelsmann and Audiofina's activities
related to radio and television ... will be transferred to the joint venture.
Consequently, the parents of the joint venture will be active on these markets
only through the joint venture".42 In addition, the joint venture was found to
have the required "Community dimension" in order to qualify for review under
the EC Merger Regulation.43
With the exception of Germany, there was no overlap in the geographic
areas of activities of the parent companies.44 Indeed, the only overlap of the
television activities of the two parties took place in Germany where CLT and
UFA were active in the audiovisual sector and ran together, through a joint
venture, the channel RTL.45 However, this fact was unlikely to pose competition
problems since CLT/UFA was facing strong competition, especially from the
channels linked to the Kirch group (a market share in tv advertising of around
50%).46 Indeed, with an increase of only 1.8% in market shares for the
channels tied to CLT/UFA and a total market share in tv advertising of around
38% (compared to Kirch's 50%) the Commission took the view that the
CLT/UFA concentration would not result in a restriction of effective competition
in this market.47
Moreover, with regard to the pay-TV market in Germany, UFA controls
approximately 38% of the Premiere channel, the only pay-TV supplier in
Germany until the launch of DF 1, a digital pay-TV channel linked to the Kirch
group. It was believed that the new digital activities of Kirch (the DF 1 channel),
in conjunction with the absence of CLT in the pay-TV market in Germany,
would not lead to an increase of CLT/UFA's market share and, therefore, the
proposed joint venture would not strengthen the Premiere's current dominant
position.48
In clearing the merger, the Commission refused to follow the view of some
market players that the synergies occurring from the concentration would offer
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should be opposed. The Commission's view was that, although the merger
would improve the position of CLT and Bertelsmann due to the synergies
resulting from the concentration, it would not lead to any negative restrictive
effects - i.e. it was in principle pro-competitive - since "the mere combination
of resources and possible synergies is not sufficient to establish a dominant
position in the foreseeable future".49
What is certain, therefore, is the Commission's concern regarding the
effects of foreclosure on third parties, especially in the sectors of rapidly
developing industries. The view of Karel Van Miert - then Competition
Commissioner - could be indicative of a Commission's decision to adopt a
more flexible and relaxed approach however. As he stated:
"It is rather difficult for me to give a clear indication of my attitude to such
potentially powerful systems. Let me just say at this point that where ventures
draw together content provision and transmission systems we will be keeping a
very close eye on the competition implications. On the other hand, to the
extent that there are now major projects developing in parallel, their market
power may be seen to counterbalance each other".50
The next two cases, due to their importance, are dealt with in detail and
provide a certain amount of guidance about the Commission's view on
strategic alliances in the pay-TV market. The discussion of these cases is
followed by the final conclusions on the Commission's policy.
2.7. Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere51 and Deutsche
Telecom/BetaResearch52
It has already been shown how the Commission cleared the plans of
Bertelsmann (the common parent company of the leading German media
group) and Audiofina (an important European actor in radio and television
businesses) to concentrate their television and radio business in a newly
49
ibid., para. 40.
50 Karel Van Miert, "Preparing for 1998 and Beyond", European Access 1996 No 5, October, 8-
12, at p. 10.
51 Case IV/M.993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere [1999] O.J. L53/1.
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created and jointly controlled entity called CLT/UFA. Kirch is the main supplier
of feature films and TV entertainment programmes in Germany and is also
involved in commercial television. One of the group's activities in the
audiovisual sector includes the digital pay-TV channel DF 1 while it runs
(owning 25%), together with UFA - Bertelsmann's subsidiary - and Canal Plus
(37.5% each), the German pay-TV channel Premiere.53
CLT-UFA and Kirch notified the Commission of their plans to merge their
digital television activities in Germany into the Premiere venture. This operation
would lead to the withdrawal of Canal Plus and to the acquisition of joint control
of Premiere by CLT-UFA and Kirch (50% each). Moreover, it would result in the
termination of the operation of DF 1 as an autonomous pay-TV supplier and in
the transfer of its assets (including the sports channel DSF and all the Kirch's
digital interests) to Premiere. Therefore, if the concentration was concluded, it
would be active on the pay-TV and pay-TV broadcasting rights markets only
via their participation in the Premiere channel.54
At the same time, CLT-UFA would acquire a 50% interest in BetaDigital, until
then a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kirch. BetaDigital operates a playout center
for satellite-transmitted digital television and is the only provider on the market
in technical services for satellite pay-TV in the German speaking area.55
Moreover, CLT-UFA and Beta Technik (owned by Kirch) would acquire joint
control of BetaResearch, a company currently wholly-owned by Kirch.
BetaResearch holds exclusive licences in Germany, Austria and the German
speaking part of Switzerland for the use of the Beta access technology on the
basis of the Kirch D-box decoder, developed by Kirch, which the partners
intended to use to provide their subscribers and other pay-TV operators.
BetaResearch would have further developed the "D-Box" software and licensed
the "D-Box" technology to pay-TV broadcasters, suppliers of technical services
for digital pay-TV and decoder manufacturers.56
In a separate but linked agreement (which would follow the joint control of
BetaResearch by CLT-UFA and Beta Technik), Deutsche Telecom (DT) would
acquire a stake in BetaResearch, taking therefore joint control of that company
alongside Kirch and Bertelsmann. DT's aim with this agreement was to gain
52 Case IV/M.1027 Deutsche Telecom/BetaResearch [1999] O.J. L53/31.
53 Case IV/M.993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere [1999] O.J. L53/1, paras 7 and 8.
54
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55
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149
access to the Beta technology (based on the d-box decoder) in order to obtain
the technical platform required for the provision of technical services for
programme transmission and for the distribution of pay-tv programmes over its
cable network.57
Following the MSG case, the Commission recognised two markets affected
mainly by the planned operation, namely the market for pay-TV and the market
for technical services for pay-TV.58
2.7.1. Market for pay-TV
Currently Premiere and DF 1 are the only suppliers of pay-TV in Germany, with
Premiere holding a dominant position in this market.59 If the proposed
concentration had been concluded, Premiere would have become the only pay-
TV provider, combining the programme resources of both CLT-UFA and
Kirch.60 In addition, the acquisition of joint control of Premiere by CLT-UFA and
Kirch, in conjunction with the termination of the operation of DF 1, would mean
that Premiere would become the only pay-TV programme and marketing
platform in Germany.61
The combination of the program resources of CLT-UFA and Kirch gave
Premiere a massive programme purchasing power, especially with regard
premium films and popular sporting events.62 As the Commission put it,
"Premiere will have access to programme resources unparalleled in Germany
through its parent companies CLT-UFA and Kirch on account of their positions
on the upstream markets for programme rights.63 ... The monopoly in premium
films for pay-TV which Premiere will enjoy as a result of the transaction will
56
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continue for the foreseeable future".64
Furthermore, due to the lengthy and exclusive nature of contracts regarding
the broadcasting rights for premium content65 as well as due to the
combination of Kirch's and CLT-UFA's subscription base,66 Premiere would
enjoy considerable advantages (particularly associated with the prospect of
securing contracts for pay-TV rights). Thus Premiere's potential competitors
would not be able to hold the programme resources required to create an
alternative programme platform. As stated in the decision, "in view of the
advantages which Premiere will consequently enjoy over any potential
competitor in the negotiation of contracts for premium content, it is unlikely that
outsiders will be able to secure adequate access to content of that kind".67
It is interesting to note that the Commission refused to accept the parties'
argument that a strong competitive interrelation between free TV and pay-TV
could result in a controlling influence of free TV on pay-TV and in the restriction
of pay-TV's scope for competitive action.68 Indeed, although the Commission
recognises that there is some interaction between the separate markets of pay-
TV and freeTV - "the more varied and attractive the programmes supplied by
free TV, the less incentive there is for viewers to subscribe in addition to pay-
TV"69 -, it believes that there is no indication that the economic success of pay-
TV depends on the scale of competitive pressure put on by free TV
broadcasters. As the Commission pointed out,
"if ... pay-TV subscribers are prepared, in addition to the existing broadcasting
fees of about 30 DM, to pay an extra 50 DM for a pay-TV subscription,
although they use this for only 10 per cent of their viewing consumption, this
shows that the economic success of pay-TV is not exactly dependent on the
audience share. What is decisive is the subscriber base, which exists















Since the development of an alternative decoder infrastructure entails an
enormous economic risk, it followed that other programme providers entering
the market would have to use the existing decoder infrastructure, i.e. the d-box
decoder and the Beta access technology (controlled by CLT-UFA and Kirch).71
This means that "future competitors of Premiere in pay-TV will be dependent
on access to the d-box decoder base for the broadcasting of their bouqet".72
BetaResearch's ability to prevent - through its licensing policy - other service
providers entering the market in competition with Premiere should be also
underlined.73 This prospect in conjunction with the control of the decoder
infrastructure by CLT-UFA and Kirch (through their stake in BetaResearch) as
well as with DT's commitment to use only the Beta access technology and the
d-box decoder, would give Premiere the ability to determine the conditions
under which other broadcasters could enter into the pay-tv market. The
Commission expressed the fear that
"with their controlling interest in BetaResearch, they [CLT-UFA and Kirch]
could ensure that the terms for the use of Beta access technology, and in
particular the price structure applied, were advantageous to Premiere and
unfavourable to potential competitors' programmes".74
The private free tv channels linked to CLT-UFA and to the Kirch group together
control almost the entire audience of private broadcasting (around 55% out
60% while the public channels control 40% of the market) and have a market
share of approximately 90% of all advertising revenue in German television.75
At the same time, if the concentration was concluded, Premiere would become
the only pay-TV provider in Germany. This would give CLT-UFA and Kirch —
being in a leading position and holding the most important broadcasting rights
for premium content in both pay-TV and free TV - the opportunity to "control
the interaction between free TV and pay-TV".76 "The combined acquisition of
pay-TV and free TV rights and the complementary programming77 which were
71
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foreseeable would lead to a further strengthening of Premiere's dominant
position on the market in pay-TV".78
For all the reasons outlined above, the Commission concluded that the
proposed operation would have led to the creation and strengthening
(approaching a near-monopoly) of Premiere's dominant position as programme
and marketing platform on a lasting basis in the German pay-tv market.79
2.7.2. The market in technical services for pay-TV
The inability of private cable operators - due to the structure of the cable
networks in Germany - to develop alternative technical infrastructure80 in
conjunction with the fact that DT - the only company with the ability to install
an infrastructure for digital television and to supply the corresponding services
- was committed to relying exclusively on the Beta access technology on the
basis of the d-box decoder,81 led the Commission to state that "in the German-
speaking area, there will be no alternative technical platform for digital
television in the foreseeable future".82 The situation worsens with the
Premiere's monopoly position - generated by its programme resources and
subscriber base - which would form a long-term obstacle to the installation of
an alternative technical platform for digital television.83
The above obstacles linked with the development of an alternative technical
infrastructure for the transmission of pay-TV in conjunction with the fact that
BetaResearch - i.e. the licenser of the decoder technology - is not
independent (since it is jointly controlled by CLT-UFA, Kirch and DT), means
that every potential supplier of conditional access services will have to use the
d-box decoder developed by BetaResearch. This also means that those
potential suppliers of technical services for both satellite and cable tv would
have to depend on obtaining a licence from BetaResearch. The Commission's
concern is that it would be in BetaResearch's commercial interest - due to its
78











legal links and shared technology with BetaDigital and DT - not to expose
those companies to competition on the market in technical services for pay-tv
and to use its licensing policy to prevent other service providers entering the
market.84
For the reasons described above, the Commission concluded that the
proposed concentration would give BetaDigital a lasting dominant position on
the market in technical services for satellite pay-TV in the German-speaking
area,85 that DT would obtain a dominant position on a lasting basis on the
market in technical services for cable-TV in Germany,86 and that, if the markets
in technical services for satellite and cable TV are taken to be a single one, a
dominant duopoly would have been produced on this broader market in the
German-speaking regions.87
2.7.3. The market in cable networks
Transmission of cable TV in Germany takes place on the levels 3 and 4 of the
cable network. Level 3 is operated almost entirely by DT since it supplies 16.5
million out of 18.5 million households with cable access.88 DT also operates the
cable network at level 4 and is the largest supplier of home link-ups. So these
data clearly demonstrate that DT "has the preponderant share of the cable
network"89 and that
"if a television channel is to be successful in Germany, it has to be fed into
Telecom's cable network; that is the only way to reach a sufficient number of
viewers. This is borne out by the example of DF 1. Until November 1997 DF 1
was not carried on the cable network. This is generally considered to be one of
the reasons why the number of subscribers to DF 1 fell far below
84
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The cable operators' willingness to increase the value added in their cable
networks in order to provide a variety of multimedia services requires
substantial investment. This means that they have to compete against DT. In
order to finance the necessary investments for the development of their
networks they should turn to their core business, namely television. However,
this is an unrealistic scenario given the present structure of German cable
networks (DT's dominant position) and the cable operators' dependency on
obtaining a licence from BetaResearch (in order to use the Beta technology).
The danger is that BetaResearch could use its position to prevent them -
through its licensing policy and due to its legal links with DT - from entering the
market in competition with DT.91
For the above reasons, the Commission concluded that the proposed
concentration between DT and BetaResearch would considerably restrict the
private cable operators' scope for competition and eliminate competition at
network level 3 and, therefore, DT's dominant position on the cable network in
92
Germany will be strengthened on a lasting basis.
The parties offered undertakings in order to address competition concerns
about the proposed concentration. Thus, among other things, they agreed to
award third parties 25 per cent of the film and sport television rights held by
Kirch, to open up the chance for third parties to take a holding in BetaResearch
and to abandon the veto and special rights of the existing shareholders, to
disclose the API interface of the d-box network to rival equipment makers, to
co-operate with the cable operators as regards sales, and to allow cable
operators to market Premiere's programmes. The latter however proved to be
the most complicated issue as far as the pay-TV domain is concerned since
the cable operators were not allowed to supply programmes for pay-TV nor to
market Premiere's pay-per-view services. As a result, they would not be
allowed to unbundle programmes within individual packages, while they would
not be able to offer pay-TV programmes on the same competitive terms as
Premiere and thus would be entirely dependent on Premiere. Although Kirch
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regarding the above issue so that the deal could go ahead, Bertelsmann did
not agree. Consequently, the Commission had no other alternative but to
declare the proposed concentration as incompatible with the Common Market
under Article 8(3) of the Merger Regulation.
2.8. Re Television Par Satellite93
2.8.1. The facts and the parties94
On 18 October 1996 the Commission received from Television Francaise 1
(TF1), France Television Enterprises, France Telecom, Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion (CLT), Metropole Television (M6), and Suex
Lyonnaise des Eaux an application for negative clearance and notification for
exemption regarding their agreements creating the company Television par
satellite (TPS). On 13 March 1998 the parties notified the Commission of the
withdrawal of CLT from TPS and the subsequent amendment in the
shareholder structure.
TPS was set up with the object to launch and manage a digital platform for
the distribution of satellite pay-TV programmes and services in France and in
the European French-speaking area.
With regard to the TPS' parent companies, TF1 operates the first French
terrestrial television channel and is also distributed via cable in the French-
speaking parts of Belgium and in Luxembourg. France Television Enterprises
consists of France 2 and France 3, two companies wholly owned by the French
State, which operate the second and third French terrestrial television channels
and are also distributed by cable networks in Belgium and Luxembourg. France
Telecom is the incumbent telecommunications operator in France and is also
active in the cable distribution sector where it holds - through its subsidiary
France Telecom Cable - a market share of around 30 per cent (in terms of the
number of subscribers). In addition, it is the designer and owner of the
93 Case IV/36.237, Re Television Par Satellite (TPS), [1999] O.J. L90/6.
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Viaccess conditional access system used by TPS, its rival platform AB-Sat and
the cable operator Lyonnaise Communications. M6 operates a national
terrestrial television channel. And Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, in addition to its
other activities, is involved in the communications sector, mainly via M6 - it
holds 34.45 per cent of its capital - and via its subsidiary Lyonnaise
Communications, which operates a cable network in France with a market
share of around 26 per cent.
2.8.2. The relevant product markets
In its decision the Commission recognised four markets affected by the
planned operation, namely the pay-TV market, the market in technical services
for pay-TV, the market in the acquisition of broadcasting rights, and the market
in the distribution and operation of special interest channels.95
2.8.2.1. The pay-TVmarket
Following its decisions in a line of previous cases,96 the Commission stated
that pay-TV constitutes a relevant product market separate from that for free-
access television.97 This is justified by the fact that, in the case of free
television (i.e. fee- and advertising-financed television), the trade relationship is
established only between the programme supplier (the broadcaster) and the
advertising industry; while, in the case of pay-TV, there is a trade relationship
only between the programme supplier and the viewer as subscriber.
Consequently, the conditions of competition and the objectives are different for
the two types of television: pay-TV requires programmes which cover the
interests of the target groups in order to convince potential subscribers to pay
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audience share, the advertising rates and the subsequent revenues are the
key parameters.98
In addition, the Commission confirmed its position in previous cases99 that
digital pay-TV does not constitute a relevant product market separate from that
for analogue pay-TV. Digital pay-TV constitutes only a further development of
analogue pay-TV. This argument is strengthened by the fact that analogue
pay-TV is expected in the next few years to be completely superseded by
digital pay-TV.100
The Commission for the first time stated clearly that there is no reason to
distinguish between pay-TV markets in terms of their means of transmission
(i.e. digital terrestrial, satellite and cable). With regard to the relationship
between cable and satellite, in particular, data and end-user behaviour show
that cable pay-TV and satellite pay-TV can be regarded as substitutes. There
is, therefore, a single market for pay-TV services irrespective of their modes of
transmission.101
2.8.2.2. The market in technical services for pay-TV
The operation of pay-TV requires a special technical infrastructure in order to
encrypt the television signals and to enable the authorised viewer to decode
them. This is done by the installation of a terminal (decoder or set-top box) in
the home of each pay-TV subscriber. In addition to that terminal, the pay-TV
operator must have a conditional access system which comprises the
transmission of encrypted data containing information on the programmes or
packages of programmes subscribed to and on the entitlement of the pay-TV
subscribers to receive those programmes, together with the television signals.
The system usually also includes smart cards which are made available to the
subscribers and which are able to decipher the encrypted authorisation data
97 TPS, para. 25.
98 ibid.






and transfer them to the decoder.102
2.8.2.3. The market in the acquisition of broadcasting rights, in
particular for films and sporting events
Experience has shown that, in order to convince potential subscribers to pay
for receiving television services, certain types of content are required. Indeed,
premium films and sporting events have been the two most popular pay-TV
products. Hence a pay-TV operator, in order to be sufficiently attractive, must
include a combination of film and sport channels as part of the service.103
It must be stressed that the TPS case, by recognising that movies and
sports are the key drivers of pay-TV, and by identifying the existence of a
market in the acquisition of broadcasting rights for films and sporting events,
paved the way for the BiB case which decided, for the first time, on a separate
market for the wholesale supply of film and sports channels for pay-TV.104
2.8.2.4. The market in the distribution and operation of special
interest channels
Since pay-TV requires programmes which cover the interests of the target
groups, the operation of special interest channels - as opposed to the general
interest (terrestrial) channels - is considered to be indispensable. This market
is enjoying an extremely rapid growth, especially since the introduction of
digital technology, and this can be seen by the emergence of more than 140
special interest channels transmitted via cable and satellite in France.105
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2.8.3. Structure of the markets
TPS's main competitor in the French pay-TV market is the Canal+ group,
which enjoys a particularly strong position. Indeed, the Canal+ group controls
the premium channel Canal+, the CanalSatellite Numerique, the NumeriCable
cable network. As a result, by 30 June 1998 it held a 70 per cent share of the
French pay-TV market (in terms of the number of subscribers) and had a total
of 10.3 million subscribers in Europe.106 As far as TPS is concerned, it was
expected to attract 600,000 subscribers by the end of 1998.107
With regard to the market in technical services for pay-TV, it has been
already mentioned that France Telecom is the designer and owner of the
Viaccess conditional access system used by TPS, its rival platform AB-Sat and
the cable operator Lyonnaise Communications. France Telecom's competitor is
the Canal+ group which is active in this market as the owner and developer of
the Mediaguard conditional access system and the Mediasat digital terminal
respectively.108
Through its two subsidiaries - TPS Cinema and Multivision - TPS is also
active on the market in the acquisition of television rights, particularly for films
and sporting events.109 However, TPS is in a weak position compared to that of
its main rival, the Canal+ group. Indeed, in dealing with the American film
industry, TPS has succeeded in concluding agreements with five large
American studios for the acquisition of pay-TV rights for its movie channels.
However, in three of these cases, the rights acquired are for second window
pay-TV, i.e. they can be exercised only when the films have already been
broadcast on Canal+.110 In contrast, Canal-i- has concluded exclusive output
deals for pay-TV rights - referred to also as 'first run' or 'first release' rights -
with five of the seven major Hollywood studios and with Polygram and has
thereby acquired a commanding position in this market. It is stated that Canal+
holds rights representing around 87 per cent of Hollywood's output, in terms of
box office receipts.111 What worsens the situation even more for TPS is the fact
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reason why the prices of pay-TV rights are determined by reference to the
number of subscribers.112 Thus the price paid by Canal+, because of its 4.3
million subscribers in France, constitutes the floor price, whereas new entrants
- such as TPS - have to pay much more higher prices due to their lack of an
established subscriber base.113 As regards sporting events, the Canal+ group
again enjoys a significant advantage since it has secured, amongst others,
exclusive encrypted transmission and pay-per-view rights to Formula 1 racing
as well as to the French football championship matches and to other European
football championships.114
Finally, with regard to the market in the distribution and operation of special
interest channels, the Commission states that the holdings in these special
interest channels of all the companies involved in pay-TV are evenly
distributed; however, Canal+ remains a major player.115
2.8.4. Legal assessment
2.8.4.1. Application ofArticle 81(1) to the contractual clauses
The Commission considered that the creation of TPS does not in itself
constitute a restriction of competition and does not therefore fall under the
meaning of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.116 In addition, it concluded that there
was no danger of collusion between the parties to the TPS agreements.117 A
clause which committed the two cable operators associated with TPS, i.e.
France Telecom and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, to giving the chains broadcast
on TPS priority access to their cable networks and co-ordinating their offer with
that of TPS was deleted by the parties at the Commission's request.118 As the
112
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decision states: "Given the small size of the cable sector in France and the
position of the two cable operators who are shareholders in TPS and together
hold 56 per cent of the cable market, restricting the access of independent
channels to their network would seriously threaten their validity".119 Moreover,
the Commission considered that a non-competition clause in the shareholders'
agreement was not caught by Article 81(1). However, the Commission noted
that two clauses included in the contract did restrict competition, in particular
by limiting competitors' access to certain type of contents.
More analytically:
a) According to a non-competition clause in the shareholders' agreement,
the parties, for so long as they hold shares in TPS, cannot become involved in
any company engaged in the distribution and marketing of a range of pay-TV
programmes and services which are broadcast in digital mode by satellite to
French-speaking homes in Europe.120 The Commission takes into account the
market uncertainty, the technical risks and the vast investment associated with
entering a new market - and especially a high-risk market such as pay-TV -
and considers that the non-competition clause is justified and indispensable to
TPS's penetration in the French pay-TV market, since its role is to commit the
parent companies to ensuring the success of the project and thus to protect it
for the period of launching the platform.121 As the Commission puts it, "the non¬
competition clause can therefore be regarded as ancillary to the creation of
TPS during the platform's crucial launch phase and can therefore be deemed
pro-competitive in that it contributes to the creation of a new entrant on the
French pay-TV market during that period".122 However, the Commission -
taking into account the data and forecasts supplied by the parties and the
company's performance over the first 18 months of operations - came to the
conclusion that the minimum period during which the non-competition clause is
considered essential to TPS - i.e. during the launch phase - was three years
(contrary to the parties' initial agreement which made reference to a non¬









123 ibid. The two other clauses which will be examined below and which also had originally been
envisaged to remain in place for ten years were exempted under Article 81(1) for three years
as well, see paras 122 and 134.
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competition clause (the scope of which was limited to TPS's core activity by
two amendments dated 17 September 1998) cannot be caught by Article 81(1)
of the EC Treaty during the first three years of its application.124
b) Another clause grants priority to TPS and the right of last refusal to
broadcast channels and television services edited and controlled by its parent
companies.125 As in the case of the non-competition clause, the obligation
imposed upon the parties to give TPS first refusal in respect of all their special
interest channels could also be considered indispensable to the launch and
penetration of TPS in the French pay-TV market. However, because this
contractual agreement results in a restriction of the supply of special interest
channels and television services, it is caught by Article 81(1).126
c) A third clause grants to TPS exclusive rights to distribute digitally the four
general content channels, i.e. TF1, France 2, France 3 and M6.127 The
Commission cites a study conducted by Audicabsat-Mediametrie, according to
which pay-TV subscribers in France devote on average 90 per cent of their
daily viewing time to general interest (terrestrial) channels.128 However,
reception of these programmes which are transmitted via terrestrial
frequencies is often poor or even impossible in a large number of homes in
France (estimated at over 8 million).129 Hence the reception problems with
terrestrial broadcasts in certain areas of France, in conjunction with the fact
that general interest channels attract the largest audience shares, could result
in a great demand from the viewers for receiving these channels in digital
mode. Consequently, the Commission takes the view that the TPS's exclusive
right to distribute digitally the four general interest channels is anti-competitive
and caught by Article 81(1) since it restricts TPS's competitors access to











ibid., paras 88 and 103.
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ibid., paras 88 and 104.
130
ibid., paras 107 and 108.
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2.8.4.2. Application of Article 81(3)
The next step for the Commission is to examine whether two of the
aforementioned clauses - i.e. those concerning the obligation imposed upon
the parties to give TPS first refusal in respect of all their special interest
channels and the TPS's exclusive right to distribute digitally the four general
interest channels - satisfy the criteria for an exemption under Article 81(3).
In particular:
a) Improving the range of services on offer and increasing distribution
and production
By playing an important role in protecting TPS for the period of launching the
platform and thus ensuring its success, these two clauses enable a new
operator to emerge and increase the scope of pay-TV services offered to
French viewers. In addition, the emergence of TPS has led to an increase in
the number of special interest channels. For instance, eight new channels have
been produced by TPS and its shareholders while contracts have been
concluded with foreign channels to be broadcast on the platform. The creation
of TPS, therefore, contributes to an improvement in the production and
distribution of goods and has a positive impact on technical and economic
131
progress.
b) Benefits for consumers
The aforementioned increase in the number of new channels and services
cannot but be considered as beneficial to consumers. However, this would
have not happened without the two clauses in question since, by facilitating the
launch of the new platform, they ensure the development and eventually the
success of TPS in the pay-TV market. In addition, the competition that
developed after the emergence of TPS between that platform and
CanalSatellite/Canal+ has led to lower prices, advantageous financial
131
ibid., paras 114 and 115.
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conditions and higher quality for subscribers as the competitors attempt to
differentiate their service offerings in order to gain a commercial advantage.
This also serves as an incentive to innovate which is considered as an
outcome of effective competition and as a benefit to customers.132
c) Indispensability of the restrictions
It has already been shown that the Canal+ group has concluded exclusive
output deals for pay-TV rights and thus holds a commanding position in the
market. Therefore TPS has to rely on the special interest channels and
services which are edited and controlled by its parent companies. In other
words, the successful launch of the new platform would not materialise without
the clause granting TPS preferential access to those channels. As the
Commission states:
"It is therefore particularly important for TPS, as a new market entrant facing
competition from a well-established first operator possessing attractive and
plentiful programme content, to have priority access to its members' special
interest channels during the launch period so that it can create an identity for
itself and ensure continuity in the services it offers during that period".133
The Commission took the same view with regard to the clause which grants to
TPS exclusive rights to distribute digitally the four general content channels,
namely that the success of TPS would be jeopardised in case the clause was
not included. As it pointed out:
"In order to put together an attractive choice which differs from that of its
competitors and to circumvent the difficulty of acquiring rights to films and
sporting events, TPS has relied on the exclusive presence of the general
interest channels in order to offer a wide range of programmes. The exclusive
transmission of the general interest channels is the factor which differentiates
TPS's package from the others. Given the reception problems with terrestrial






TPS considerable consumer appeal in those areas. Without the general
interest channels, TPS would have no chance of successfully penetrating the
French pay-TV market and standing as a genuine alternative to
Canal+/CanalSatellite. ... It should therefore be concluded that the exclusive
transmission of the general interest channels, by making the TPS package
attractive to consumers and differentiating it from other services, is
indispensable to its penetration of the French pay-TV market".134
d) Non-elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question
The TPS agreements have not eliminated competition on the pay-TV market or
on the markets for the purchase of TV rights or the distribution of special
interest channels. Indeed, according to results recorded on the pay-TV market,
the Canal-i- group's strong position will continue for the foreseeable future. In
addition, the competition that developed after the emergence of TPS between
that platform and CanalSatellite/Canal+, and the increase in the number of
cable subscribers clearly show that "competition has, on the contrary, been
strengthened on these markets by the entry of a new player".135
So, in accordance with Article 81(3), the provisions of Article 81(1) are
inapplicable to the clauses concerning the obligation imposed upon the parties
to give TPS first refusal in respect of all their special interest channels and the
TPS's exclusive right to distribute digitally the four general interest channels.







ibid., Article 3 of the Decision.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
1. As a general comment, and based on the line of cases just discussed, it
seems that the Commission has a positive view on strategic alliances in the
pay-TV market whose parents' television activities are taking place on separate
geographic markets.137 The Commission's approach changes when the parent
companies have a strong presence on the pay-TV market and there is a
significant overlap in the geographic areas of their activities. The Commission
has opposed those cases since, if the proposed operations had been
concluded, they would have strengthened the dominance of the parent
companies and thus they would have had the effect of raising entry barriers still
higher. Indeed, such concentrations would form a long-term obstacle to the
installation of an alternative technical platform for digital television and,
therefore, would be able to use their power in order to strengthen their position
and to eliminate competition in the related broadcasting and content
markets.138 Finally, it appears from its ruling in the TPS case that the
Commission will take a positive attitude under the competition rules to the
creation of strategic alliances between companies which, although active on
the same geographic area, have only limited activities (or are not active at all)
on the pay-TV market.
2. Since the development of a set-top box requires massive investment and
entails an enormous economic risk, the most sensible option (in business
terms) for the new entrants is to use the already existing set-top boxes
(developed by the incumbent pay-TV operators). In addition, it is a fact that
each of the platform operators (digital satellite, terrestrial and cable) has opted
for proprietary technology in key areas such as APIs and EPGs.139 As a result,
content providers who want to enter the market do not have any choice but to
137 See Case IV/M.410, Kirch/RichemontfTelepiou [1994] O.J. C225/1; Case IV/M.584,
Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/Telepiou [1995] O.J. C129/6; Case IV/M.779, Bertelsmann/CLT
[1996] O.J. C364/3.
138 See Case IV/M.649, MSG Media Service Decision [1994] O.J. L364/1; Case IV/M.993
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere [1999] O.J. L53/1.
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use the set-top boxes of the incumbent pay-TV operators. There is therefore
the danger that vertically integrated broadcaster/platform operators will be able
to control market developments and restrict the range of services which can be
made available to consumers. The Commission's goal is to prevent those
dominant players from strengthening their positions and foreclosing further
access; gates cannot be allowed to close before they have even started to
develop. The target of creating open and competitive markets can be achieved
by facilitating entry and introducing competition from alternative platform
operators.
3. The Commission attaches a major importance to the promotion of technical
innovation and to the emergence of new products and services which can
contribute to the development of the information society. The Commission's
determination to encourage technical innovation is evident from the fact that it
recognises the technical risks and vast investment associated with entering a
new and high-risk market such as the pay-TV. Thus, although some
agreements impose restrictions which could distort competition, the
Commission has made it clear that it will view them favourably and grant an
exemption when they are indispensable to the successful launch of a new
product or service, bring important benefits to the consumers, and contribute to
the development of a competitive European pay-TV sector.
4. The Commission has shown that it seeks to achieve the balance between
risks and benefits in its application of EU competition rules. Thus it recognises
that its protectionist intervention, i.e. providing new entrants with the means
(granting exemption to the clauses which could impose restrictions) and the
time to become established, cannot go on indefinitely. The fact that it shortens
the period during which those clauses are considered to be indispensable to
the establishment of the project140 is a clear indication of the Commission's
attempt to strike the right balance in order to facilitate the entry of new
139 See for instance: "The Development of the Market for Digital Television in the European
Union - Report in the context of Directive 95/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24th October 1995 on the use of standards for the transmission of television
signals", Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (1999) 540, 10
November 1999, at para. 3.2.1, p. 18.
140 See TPS, paras 99, 122 and 134.
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competitors and support technological progress without seriously damaging the
market structure and distorting competition.
SECTION 3: THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING
COMPETITION IN INTERNET MARKET
1. INTRODUCTION
As in the pay-TV cases, the issue of access is becoming increasingly relevant
in the Internet market. The speed of the technological and market
developments, alongside with the commercialisation of the Internet, means that
competition issues will be raised very soon. The Commission is aware of this
prospect and wants to prevent a handful of players from abusing key
bottleneck positions and controlling market developments. The following case
is indicative of the policy that the Commission is determined to follow.
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2. THE WORLDCOM/MCI CASE141
In November 1997 the Commission received notification of a proposed
concentration whereby WorldCom Inc. (WorldCom) and MCI Communications
Corporation (MCI) - both telecommunications companies providing inter alia
Internet services - would merge within the meaning of Article 3(1 )(a) of the
Merger Regulation. After an initial assessment of the notification, the
Commission stated that the operation raised concerns with regard to its
compatibility with the common market and thus second phase proceedings
were opened pursuant to Article 6(1 )(c) of the Merger Regulation.
2.1. Commercial operation of the Internet
Alongside its legal analysis, the Commission gave an overview of how the
Internet industry works, in terms of technology and market structure.
End users obtain access to the Internet by subscribing for access services
supplied by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The vast amount of traffic
generated by or destined for customers will have to pass on to another
network. Thus if two networks have no direct interconnection, the traffic must
pass through one or more intermediate networks ('transit traffic') so that it will
reach finally the required network.
The exchange of traffic between networks is usually achieved either by
"peering" or "transit" arrangements. If the model of peering arrangements is
followed, then no settlement payments are involved in the traffic exchange but
there are limitations with regard to the type of traffic which is allowed to pass.
As the Commission points out,
"in order to prevent either party exploiting this arrangement, it is usual to find
that the peering agreement is limited so as to prevent either party using it to
hand off to the other traffic destined for or coming from a third party. Thus, if A
has a peering agreement with B but not with C, and B has a peering
agreement with C, A cannot use his peering agreement with B as a way of
141
Case IV/M.1069, WorldCom/MCI [ 1999] O.J. L116/1.
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getting B to pass his traffic to C. Similarly, A is not obliged to accept from B
any traffic addressed to him but which he knows to have originated from C".142
In transit arrangements, on the other hand, although transmission of traffic
across the networks is unrestricted, settlement payment is required.
It is interesting to note that, although peering agreements are made on a
payment-free basis, the largest networks have started to ignore this practice.
Indeed, especially when there is a clear imbalance in bargaining power
between networks, it is increasingly common for the larger or technically
superior ISP to charge for peering or to impose conditions - such as the
introduction of minimum standards of network quality, traffic flow and technical
upgrades - which, in cost terms, amount to the same for the smaller ISP.
Thus, as the Commission stated, "the term 'peer' can be misleading, because
the ISP who is obliged to pay has his cost structure dictated to some extent by
the superior ISP, and the relationship is akin to a purchase of
interconnection".143 This policy of the larger ISPs, in conjunction with the fact
that transit arrangements are associated with settlement payments, makes it
safe to argue that "internet connectivity represents a service which can be sold
and resold on a commercial basis at any level of the ISP hierarchy".144
2.2. Identification of the problem
However, the only providers of Internet access services capable of offering full
connectivity ('top level' or 'universal' Internet connectivity) on their own account
are the so-called top-level ISPs. These top-level ISPs are in a privileged
position - unlike all subordinated ISPs - since they do not have to pay others
in order to complete the connections. Indeed, what they need, in order to
maintain their position, is to possess peering agreements with all other top-
level networks.145








top-level ISPs, secondary peering ISPs, resellers - and that neither the
secondary peering ISPs nor the resellers can prevent the top level networks
from acting independently. Therefore, it concluded that the market for the
provision of top level or 'universal' Internet connectivity constitutes a distinct
and narrower market within the Internet sector.146
According to the WorldCom and MCl's estimates, their combined market
share - based on their revenues from Internet access services - would not
exceed 20% of the total market. However, the Commission did not accept their
method of calculation, mainly due to the existence of many contradictory
reports, the use of different methodologies, and the lack of reliable publicly
available estimates.147 Thus the Commission conducted its own enquiries and,
after examining factors such as revenue and traffic flow, numbers of addresses
reachable, and aggregate capacity in interconnecting links, it concluded that
the combination of the merging parties' networks would create a single entity
which would hold a market share of more than 50%, irrespective of how widely
the market is defined.148
The Commission presented an analytical list of the strategies that would
enable MCI WorldCom to act independently of its competitors and customers
and thus to control the market and strengthen its market share even further.149
It must be noted that the term 'customers' - in other words, resellers - refers to
the ISPs who are selling Internet connectivity to final users. They will compete
with MCI WorldCom at the retail level but will depend on it for the provision of
the connectivity. Thus there is the risk that MCI WorldCom could leverage its
position, that is, use its power in the market for the provision of top level
Internet connectivity so as to strengthen its position and to eliminate
competition in the related retail market.150
The extent of the bargaining power of the MCI WorldCom network - if the
notified concentration was to go ahead - was well summarized and illustrated










ibid., paras 117-125 and 127-131.
150
ibid., paras 124 and 133.
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"Because of the specific features of network competition and the existence of
network externalities which make it valuable for customers to have access to
the largest network, MCI WorldCom's position can hardly be challenged once it
has obtained a dominant position. The more its network grows, the less need it
has to interconnect with competitors and the more need they have to
interconnect with the merged entity. Furthermore, the larger its network
becomes, the greater is its ability to control a significant element of the costs of
any new entrant. It can achieve this by denying such entrants the opportunity to
peer and insisting that they remain as customers and pay a margin accordingly
for all the services they want to offer. The merger could thus have the effect of
raising entry barriers still higher".151
It is interesting to note that the Commission's conviction about the enormous
negative impact of the proposed concentration on the market is such that it
does not hesitate to qualify it as an essential facility. It is argued that, as a
result of the merger, the MCI WorldCom network would be indispensable for all
those ISPs willing to develop viable economic operations. They would have no
choice but to interconnect since only then would they be able to provide
credible Internet access services to their customers.152
For the reasons described above, the Commission concluded that the
proposed concentration, if not altered, would give MCI WorldCom a dominant
position on a lasting basis in the market for the provision of top level Internet
connectivity.153
2.3. Divestment of MCl's Internet business
In order to address the Commission's competition concerns about the
proposed merger, the parties offered undertakings. The most important
commitment involved the divestment of MCl's entire Internet activities.
According to the proposal, all of MCl's Internet business would be first divested







would be transferred to a single purchaser who had to be selected and
identified prior to the Commission's final decision on the notification.154
The Commission - after conducting a market test - concluded that the
divestment of the MCl's Internet activities was sufficient to remedy the
competition concerns about the impact of the proposed merger.155 Thus the
proposed concentration of MCI WorldCom was declared compatible with the
Common Market, subject to the carrying out of the commitments undertaken
by the notifying parties.156
3. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Commission takes a positive attitude to the creation of strategic
alliances which promote technical innovation, offer new products and services
and, therefore, contribute to the development of multimedia markets.
2. At the same time, the Commission's target is to maintain open and
competitive market structures in the Internet. It is, therefore, determined to
prevent a handful of players from having unconstrained power and controlling
access to the key networks. In addition, it will not allow dominant players in the
telecommunications sector leveraging their dominance into new or
neighbouring markets. Otherwise, market foreclosure can hinder innovation,
hold back market development and have an enormous impact on the future
competitive structures of the EU communications sector.
3. Thus the Commission will not accept foreclosure of markets (caused by
defensive commercial moves), especially in those markets which have not yet
started to develop. So, in order to prevent the gatekeepers from strengthening
their positions (or forming new super-monopolies), competition law comes to
the forefront because it can be applied across sectors. Competition rules,






and, in particular, to deal with those cases where telecommunications or cable
operators are moving into related fields such as Internet or digital TV.
4. It is generally accepted that structural separation constitutes the most
effective measure in order to achieve transparency, effective monitoring of
abusive behaviour and to facilitate pro-competitive structures in the EU
communications sector. This is the reason why the Commission considered the
divestment of the MCI internet business to be sufficient to tackle the
fundamental competition problems raised by the proposed concentration. It
seems therefore that the Commission will not hesitate to take action under the
relevant instruments of competition law by imposing divestiture measures if
required. Finally, a similar example of the Commission's determination to apply
competition rules in order to create the right pro-competitive structures for the
expansion of multi-media industry can be seen in its approach in the British
Interactive Broadcasting (BiB) case.157 In that case, BT decided to accept the
Commission's central condition for clearing the proposed joint venture, namely
to divest its remaining cable interests in the UK and not to expand them
further.158
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER 3
This chapter also dealt with the second phase of the transition from a regime
of a State-run monopoly to an effectively competitive market. It showed that
competition law can address the serious anti-competitive problems that might
arise by the creation of strategic horizontal alliances between several
telecommunications operators, which hold strong positions in their respective
domestic markets. The Commission has made it clear that certain restrictions
on competition between the parent companies can be justified, provided that
the parties would accept to fully comply with a number of necessary
undertakings. In an attempt to accelerate the implementation of the
156
ibid., para. 165 and Article 1 of the decision.
157 Case IV/36.539, British Interactive Broadcasting (BiB)ZOpen [1999] O.J. L312/1.
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liberalisation timetable, and alongside the target of preventing monopolistic
abuse and anti-competitive behaviour, the Commission has imposed on
governments the obligation to break down the monopolies and lift the legal
barriers of their home markets as a necessary pre-condition to let the deals go
through.
In addition, as already mentioned, the nature of competition law is inherently
flexible and allows for the application of its rules and the effective handling of
the issues appearing in the converging markets. This is the reason why
competition law can deal with those cases where large telecommunications or
cable operators are moving into related fields in an attempt to take advantage
of the new opportunities arisen due to the accelerating change of markets with
the technologicaf and market-led convergence. Due to its nature, therefore, the
application of competition law can prevent those dominant players from
strengthening their positions, foreclosing further access, and eliminating












EU Radio Spectrum Policy in the
Converging Environment
Tackling the Barriers to the Convergence of
Telecommunications, Media and IT Sectors
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According to the Commission's Green Paper on the Convergence of the
Telecommunications, Media, and Information Technology sectors,1 the term
convergence is most commonly expressed as "the ability of different network
platforms to carry essentially similar kinds of services, or the coming together
of consumer devices such as the telephone, television and personal
computer".2
Convergence on a technological level has been taking place for more than
ten years and has largely been driven by digitalisation. Whereas since the
early 1990s market-based convergence has been fuelled by the alliances and
mergers formed by players active in the telecommunications, media and IT
sectors. Those alliances have already been examined in Chapter 3.
Convergence of the telecommunications, media, and IT sectors is driving the
emergence of a multimedia market, with the latter being defined as:
"a service which incorporates more than one type of information (e.g. text,
audio, images and video) on the same delivery mechanism, and which gives
the user the ability to interact with or manipulate that information. The key
elements of the definition, therefore, are two-way communication or
interactivity, and the combination of different types of information".3
The Convergence Green Paper identified a series of existing and potential
barriers, which have and may, in the future, have a substantial impact on the
development of a European multimedia market. This chapter focuses on one of
the most important barriers and examines how the Commission attempts to
address the problems that could arise.
In particular, there is a popular notion that, with the launch of digital
television and radio and with the development of the new transmission
technologies, the problem of the present shortage of capacity in the delivery of
1 Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information
Technology Sectors, and the implications for Regulation - Towards an Information Society
approach, COM(97) 623, 3.12.1997. Hereafter: The Convergence Green Paper.
2
Convergence Green Paper, Chapter 1, p. 1.
3
"Study on Adapting the EU Telecommunications Regulatory Framework to the Developing
Multimedia Environment", prepared for the European Commission by Squire, Sanders and
Dempsey L.L.P. and Analysys Ltd., January 1998, at p. 9.
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telecommunications and broadcast services will be solved.
However, although frequency scarcity can be partly overcome by the
emergence of digitalisation, it will remain a finite resource - at least for the
foreseeable future.4 This is the result of an increasing demand for radio-
spectrum from new digital services - especially the parallel growth of services
like television broadcasting, mobile multimedia and voice applications.
Furthermore, additional spectrum will be needed since broadcasting will be
simultaneously transmitted - for some time - through digital and analogue
frequencies.
Another aspect raised in the Convergence Green Paper is the different
principles applied for the allocation of frequencies between broadcasting
(essentially free) and telecommunications (increasingly the result of an
auction). Those differences in prices between broadcasting and
telecommunications usage as well as the manner in which spectrum is
allocated in the broadcasting sector are considered potential barriers since
they may favour competitive entry into one sector over another and thus act as
a brake to market development.
Due to the complexity of the issues associated with the European policy on
radio spectrum in conjunction with the publication of the Radio Spectrum Green
Paper and the hot debate it has generated, this chapter in its entirety will cover
the issue of regulation of radio frequencies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Radio spectrum is becoming crucial for the development of the European
economy since a number of industrial activities in sectors such as mobile and
satellite communications, broadcasting, transport, R&D and services of general
interest rely on its availability.5 This is the reason why radio spectrum is
characterised as "essential backbone" for the aforementioned areas.6
The emergence of digitalisation, the liberalisation of the telecommunications
market, the phenomenon of convergence, the increasing number of
4
ibid., at p. 25.
5 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the context of European Community policies such
as telecommunications, broadcasting, transport, and R&D (hereafter: the Green Paper on
Radio Specturm Policy), COM (1998) 569 final, 09.12.1998, at para. 2.1, pp. 4-5.
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commercial applications and the globalisation of services and players (through
strategic alliances and world-wide business deployment) will increase the
demand for radio spectrum.7 The Commission rightly identifies the fact that the
growing demand for spectrum will exceed supply - "demand for frequencies is
greater than what is available"8 - and points out that "the increasing demand
for radio spectrum is not counter-balanced by additional radio spectrum
becoming available as new technology can stretch-up the availability of usable
radio spectrum".9 So the fact that spectrum is a finite resource in conjunction
with the growing demand for it will inevitably lead to a situation where "radio
spectrum availability can no longer be taken for granted".10
This chapter attempts to address strategic matters relating to the
Community's approach by focusing on some of the most important issues
raised during the public consultation period which followed the 1998 Green
Paper on radio spectrum policy. Its aim is to assess whether the Community
radio spectrum policy with regard to those issues requires adaptation and, if
so, what kind of changes are needed in order to ensure that the new regime
can respond to the increasing demands and complexities of spectrum
management.
2. STRATEGIC PLANNING OF THE USE OF RADIO
SPECTRUM: POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
The planning of the usage of radio spectrum and, in particular, the decisions as
to whether, how and under what conditions radio frequencies are allocated for
the provision of specific services, are taken at World Radiocommunications
Conferences (WRCs). At WRCs - organised under the auspices of a
specialised body of the United Nations called International
6 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at p. 1.
7
ibid., para. 2.3, pp. 10-11.
8
ibid., para. 2.1, p. 4.
9
ibid., para. 2.3, p. 11.
10
ibid., para. 2.3, p. 9.
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Telecommunications Union (ITU) - 186 Member States (including the 15
Member States of the EU) participate biannually with the aim of achieving
international radio spectrum harmonisation. At the European level a co¬
ordinated approach to the use and allocation of radio spectrum is being
developed within the framework of the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT). CEPT comprises 43 European
countries, and its aim is to adopt harmonised frequency allocation measures in
Europe in order to facilitate the pan-European introduction and provision of
services and equipment and to promote the Community interests by
developing corresponding European positions in the WRC process. CEPT
participates in the WRCs and negotiates on behalf of its 43 European
members by developing the so-called European Common Proposals (ECPs).
In the telecommunications sector, a political and legal framework is set up
within the European Union where certain requirements are introduced and
specific legislative measures are adopted with regard to the strategic planning
of the use of radio spectrum.
So, by means of Council Resolutions, CEPT is requested to undertake
research into long-term requirements for the frequency spectrum taking
account of market demand, standards requirements, and development of
products as well as the needs of other users of the radio frequency spectrum.11
When CEPT has completed its research and identified those factors which
constitute an essential basis for a long-term frequency planning, it is asked to
forward its recommendations to regulatory authorities or to the Community.12
Moreover CEPT is requested to achieve a better-balanced allocation of radio
spectrum between its various uses13 while, in the context of the European
Radiocommunications Committee (ERC), the timely allocation of adequate
frequency resources to mobile and satellite systems and the establishment of
measures regarding common European standards are considered to be
essential in order to foster the development of the mobile and personal
11 Council Resolution of 28 June 1990 on the strengthening of the Europe-wide cooperation on
radio frequencies, in particular with regard to services with a pan-European dimension, 90/C
166/02, at p. 6.
12
ibid.
13 Council Resolution of 29 June 1995 on the further development of mobile and personal
communications in the European Union, 95/C 188/02, at p. 4, 3(h).
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communications sector.14
Alongside the political base, specific legislative measures are introduced with
regard to the planning of the use of radio spectrum. Thus the GSM Directive15
requires Member States to ensure exclusive reservation of adequate frequency
for the introduction of cellular digital land-based mobile communications
systems.16 In particular, Member States are required to draw up plans for GSM
to occupy the reserved frequency bands fully according to commercial demand
as quickly as possible17 and to communicate these plans to the Commission.18
The ERMES Directive19 is aimed at reserving adequate frequency band for the
introduction of land-based radio paging services. Member States are required
to ensure that the necessary plans for ERMES are prepared as quickly as
possible in order to fully occupy the reserved frequency bands according to
commercial demand.20
Also, the aim of the DECT Directive21 is to encourage the introduction of the
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telephone system by requiring Member States to
designate a specific frequency band for those services.22 Moreover, with regard
to future designation of frequencies for specific communications services, the
Mobile Directive23 lays down the obligation of the Member States to publish the
relevant frequency plans as well as the procedures to be followed. In addition,
the Directive provides that allocation schemes of frequencies specifically
reserved for mobile and personal communications services, including the plans
for extension of those frequencies, must be published by the Member States
every year and made available on request. Furthermore, current frequency
14
ibid., at p. 4, 3(i).
15 Council Directive 87/372/EEC of 25 June 1987 on the frequency bands to be reserved for the
co-ordinated introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile
communications in the Community, OJ L 196, 17.7.1987, p. 85 (hereafter: the GSM Directive).
16





19 Council Directive 90/544/EEC of 9 October 1990 on the frequency bands designated for the
co-ordinated introduction of pan-European land-based public radio paging in the Community,
OJ L 310 of 9.11.1990, p. 28 (hereafter: the ERMES Directive).
20 ERMES Directive, at Article 2(2).
21 Council Directive 91/287/EEC of 3 June 1991 on the frequency bands to be designated for the
co-ordinated introduction of digital European cordless telecommunications (DECT) into the
Community, OJ L 144 of 8.06.1991, p. 45 (hereafter: the DECT Directive).
22 DECT Directive, at Article 2(1).
23 Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EC with regard
to mobile and personal communications, OJ L 20 of 26.01.1996, p. 59 (hereafter: the Mobile
Directive).
183
allocation must be reviewed by the Member States at regular intervals. Finally,
where the number of licences is limited due to spectrum scarcity, Member
States must review whether advances in technology can lead to an adjustment
in the distribution of radio spectrum and, in particular, whether those
developments can allow spectrum to be made available for further licences.24
3. THE COMMISSION ASSESSES THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Commission attempts to assess whether the Member States have
effectively implemented the requirements laid down in the legal framework
regarding the planning of the use of radio spectrum. The conclusion it reaches,
however, is that the procedures and measures applied in many Member States
do not conform to those obligations. Thus, although it has been already
mentioned that the GSM and ERMES Directives require Member States to
draw up plans as regards radio spectrum availability for mobile and personal
communications and to forward them to the Commission, "these plans have
been notified only by a limited number of Member States so far".25 Moreover
the Commission recognises that the allocation of spectrum has fallen behind
schedule in many Member States and underlines concerns regarding "the lack
of procedural rules, ... the split of competences for the allocation of frequency
... or delays in the allocation of frequency".26 Furthermore, contrary to the legal
requirements laid down in the Mobile Directive,27 the Commission has not been
informed by the Member States about any national reviews of current
frequency allocation nor whether advances in technology can allow spectrum
to be made available for extra licenses.28 In addition, the Commission points
24 Mobile Directive, at recital 15 and Article 3b.
25 Communication from the Commission on the implementation and functioning of the mobile
communication frequency Directives, COM (1998) 559, 9.10.1998, at 6.2, p. 20.
26 Communication from the Commission - Fourth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM (1998) 594, 25.11.1998, at 2.4.7, p. 27.
27 Mobile Directive, at recital 15 and Article 3b.
28 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, Annex II, at p. II.
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out that the CEPT has not responded efficiently to the requests laid down in
the already mentioned Council Resolutions29 to forward its recommendations
for a long-term frequency planning to the Community and to achieve a better-
balanced allocation of radio spectrum between its various uses.30
Contrary to the exception of radio spectrum availability for mobile
communications - where Community legislation exists - the planning of the
availability and use of radio spectrum for other services (e.g. broadcasting,
transport, R&D) has not been addressed in the European Union as a matter
calling for political or legislative action.31 The European Union mainly relies on
the work undertaken in CEPT regarding a strategically planned use of radio
spectrum through a harmonised European table of frequency allocation and
utilisation. It is sufficient to mention here that, since the CEPT is not a Treaty-
based organisation, its harmonisation measures are not legally binding and,
therefore, Member States are not required to comply.
Thus the fact that most of the Member States have not effectively implemented
the legal requirements regarding the planning of the use of radio spectrum in
conjunction with the discretion of Member States to comply or not with a
harmonised European table of frequency allocation and the criticism of CEPT's
performance led the Commission to the conclusion that the strategic planning
regarding the future availability of radio spectrum is not characterised by clarity
and legal security - necessary preconditions for investment decisions to be
made.
29 Council Resolution of 28 June 1990 on the strengthening of the Europe-wide cooperation on
radio frequencies, in particular with regard to services with a pan-European dimension, 90/C
166/02; and Council Resolution of 29 June 1995 on the further development of mobile and
personal communications in the European Union, 95/C 188/02.
30 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, Annex II, at p. II.
31
ibid., at para. 2.2, pp. 8-9.
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4. MAJOR ISSUES RAISED IN THE CONSULTATION
PROCESS
As a result of the changing environment for radio spectrum policy, a strategic
and coherent approach is required in order to lead to an effective management
of the radio spectrum to the benefit of the European Community and all its
citizens. This presupposes a strategic review of spectrum policy which will
comply with the following main objectives set out in the Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy:
- to stimulate the development of new services while ensuring an
appropriate representation of consumer and governmental demands for radio
services;
- to facilitate the development of the internal market for and competition in
radiocommunications equipment and services. This implies that, in the context
of the introduction of pan-European and global systems and services, a policy
of harmonisation measures on the use and allocation of radio spectrum is
required in order to avoid delay in the deployment of such systems;
- to safeguard the benefits to society resulting from the use of radio
spectrum that is made for non-economic purposes such as defence, safety,
cultural and social aspects etc.;
- to strengthen the negotiating position of Europe and promote European
objectives and interests in multilateral and bilateral negotiations on radio
spectrum;
- to encourage and support European industry's innovation and
competitiveness;
- to contribute to economic growth, employment, and welfare.32
In pursuance of the above objectives, the Commission recognises that
effective spectrum management tools must be introduced and that, for the
realisation of this target, the following key issues regarding the way in which
spectrum use and allocation should be conducted must be taken into serious
consideration:
- to secure radio spectrum availability for pan-European radio systems,
services and equipment;
32
ibid., at para. 3.1, p. 12.
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- to ensure the efficient use of radio frequencies. This includes the need to
reconcile the interests of the many different categories of spectrum users and
to balance commercial and other public policy interests in the allocation of
radio frequencies. It also includes the introduction of a policy according to
which the fees payable for a licence reflect the economic value of the spectrum
made available. An additional indication that the objective of an efficient
spectrum management has been achieved is when radio spectrum policy does
not impede competition and does not prevent technological innovation;
- to establish a predictable and legally certain regulatory framework
regarding the future availability and use of radio spectrum so that investment
decisions can be made;
- to ensure that the principles of openness, transparency, objectivity, and
non-discrimination are applied in the management procedures of radio
spectrum and, consequently, to establish a level playing field for all spectrum
users;
- to support the development of economies of scale for the deployment of
new equipment which meets the users' needs;
- to ensure that there are close links between the procedures for the
elaboration and agreement of technical standards and the allocation of
harmonised radio spectrum. There is also the need for a close co-operation
between the standards making bodies and the spectrum management
33
organisations.
The aim of the following sections is to examine whether the current practice of
radio spectrum policy can ensure that the Community's aforementioned policy
objectives are met or whether adaptation may be required - and in what extent
- in the light of technological, market, and regulatory developments.
33
ibid., para. 3.1, pp. 12-13.
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4.1. The institutional framework for radio spectrum co¬
ordination - A priori agreement on radio spectrum
harmonisation - Voluntary implementation of ERC
decisions - The case for legal obligation
With regard to the question on whether the current institutional arrangements
for radio spectrum co-ordination are sufficiently transparent and legally certain,
views were evenly balanced. Thus many contributions saw the CEPT
machinery as sufficiently open and transparent. In addition, they highlighted its
role in achieving the right balance between establishing appropriate stability
and predictability on the one hand and recognising the need for flexibility and
national discretion on the other. Following on from this, they argued in favour
of the maintenance of the current framework for radio spectrum co¬
ordination.34
They also emphasised that an a priori Community agreement on radio
spectrum harmonisation would seriously undermine the developments within
CEPT.35 As the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) points out,
"strategic planning and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum for the
whole of Europe is of utmost importance. Harmonisation and planning
activities carried out within the European Union only would lead to an
undesirable split. Planning of spectrum for the countries of the European Union
has to be carried out as an integral part of the planning for Europe in its
entirety. Consequently strategic planning and harmonisation of the use of radio
34
Opinion of the Hungarian Administration concerning the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, April 1999, at p. 4; BBC's response to the European Commission Green Paper on
Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 8; comments of the Telecommunications
Administration Centre of Finland (TAC) on the Green Paper of Radio Spectrum Policy, 13
April 1999, at p. 11; submission by WorldDAB, the Forum for Digital Audio Broadcasting,
regarding the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, Brussels, 15 April 1999, at p. 13;
European IT Industry Round Table (EITIRT) response to the EC Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, 9 April 1999, at p. 3; comments from Tele Danmark regarding the EU
Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20 April 1999, at p. 7; Vodafone's
response to EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20 April 1999, at p. 5; comments of
the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Commission Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 11.
35 Comments of FINNET Group on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at
p. 6; BBC's response to the European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy,
April 1999, at p. 8; One 2 One response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy,
April 1999, at p. 9; Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (O.D.T.R.), Ireland
- Response to the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 14 April 1999, at p. 17; Comments
of the Telecommunications Administration Centre of Finland (TAC) on the Green Paper of
Radio Spectrum Policy, 13 April 1999, at p. 12; Norwegian Administration's response to the
questions in the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 7.
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spectrum is to be carried out within a pan-European forum. Since the CEPT
consists of competent authorities from all European countries, the present
arrangement with the CEPT responsibility within this area seems to be very
appropriate".36
Besides, it is stressed that there has never been a case where a CEPT
position contradicts with the objectives of the EU countries37 and, therefore, the
current framework for radio spectrum co-ordination in CEPT is suitable to
preserve the European Community's interests without resorting to an a priori
Community decision.
In addition, many responses considered that the existing system of voluntary
implementation on CEPT agreements constitutes an effective institutional
arrangement. Otherwise, the decision-taking process within CEPT could be
undermined.38 As the Office of the Director of the Telecommunications
Regulation of Ireland has put it,
"for an ECP to have a good possibility of being adopted at an ITU/WRC, it
needs to be supported by the maximum number of countries possible. If there
is a mandatory requirement to support ECPs then the possibility exists that
ECP could not be agreed to for those topics that may conflict with the interests
of some Member States. [Thus] the principle of subsidiarity should apply and
procedures to mandate Member States to support the CEPT position should
not be introduced".39
36
Response by the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) to the Commission's Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 10 April 1999, at p. 3.
37 Comments of the Telecommunications Administration Centre of Finland (TAC) on the Green
Paper of Radio Spectrum Policy, 13 April 1999, at p. 12; Office of the Director of
Telecommunications Regulation (O.D.T.R.), Ireland - Response to the Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, 14 April 1999, at p. 17.
38 Comments of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the
Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 12; comments from
Tele Danmark regarding the EU Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20
April 1999, at p. 7; Vodafone's response to EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20
April 1999, at p. 6; comments of FINNET Group on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 6; opinion of the Hungarian Administration concerning the Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 5.
39 Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (O.D.T.R.), Ireland - Response to the
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 14 April 1999, at p. 18.
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On the other hand, many responses40 agreed with the Commission's criticism
of CEPT's performance, namely that it did not forward its recommendations for
a long-term frequency planning to the Community and did not achieve a better-
balanced allocation of radio spectrum between its various uses. Moreover,
there is the criticism that the current processes undertaken by the CEPT are
lengthy and cannot always reflect and promote the Community's position and
interests.41
Thus they put forward the view that an a priori Community agreement on
radio spectrum harmonisation is required - especially when major Community
interests are at stake (e.g. the development and promotion of pan-European
systems) - due to the non-binding character of ERC decisions.42 The fact that
the implementation of ERC decisions occurs on a voluntary basis has led them
to argue in favour of the introduction of additional procedures (i.e. the
imposition of legal obligations in Member States) to ensure that the Member
States support ECPs.43 Their main argument is that when the ECPs are signed
by the 43 CEPT members and submitted to the WRCs as a common
40
Swissphone Telecom - Comments on the Green Paper on Spectrum Policy, 14 April 1999, at
pp. 4-5; One 2 One response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at
p. 9; Telefonica's comments on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p.
12; comments of the European Cable Communications Association (ECCA) concerning the
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 11; European Public
Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) - Reflection Document on the
EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 11; Telia's comments on the EC
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 11.
41
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at 4(5)(c), p. 22.
42
Comments of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the
Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 12; the EU
Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium - Comments on the European
Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 13 April 1999, at p. 15; Telia's
comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 11;
European Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) - Reflection
Document on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 11; submission
by CLUB DAB Italia & Radio Nazionali Associate (RNA) to the European Commission
regarding the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, Roma, 14 April 1999, at p. 11;
comments of the European Cable Communications Association (ECCA) concerning the Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 12; comments by the Association of
European Airlines (AEA) on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 13.
43
Telia's comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 12;
Motorola's response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 7 April 1999, at p. 6;
One 2 One response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 10;
Norwegian Administration's response to the questions in the Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, at p. 7; European Public Telecommunications Network Operators'
Association (ETNO) - Reflection Document on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, April 1999, at p. 11; The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Belgium - Comments on the European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy,
13 April 1999, at p. 16.
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Community position, Europe can have a powerful bargaining and voting
advantage vis-a-vis third regions and countries. However, their argument goes,
due to the controversy and complexity of many issues - in economic and
strategic terms - which emerge in the WRCs, there is a great possibility that
some of the Member States will disagree and will not sign the relevant common
proposals. In that case, the aforementioned strong European negotiating
position could be seriously undermined.
It should be stressed that the Commission has opted for the adoption of
legally binding harmonisation spectrum measures. Indeed, in the light of the
1999 Communications Review,44 the Commission has proposed the
introduction of a new European Parliament and Council Decision on
harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum that will replace the UMTS and S-
PCS Decisions when they expire.45 The proposed Decision will simplify
Community legislation and will be in line with the principle of technological
neutrality, namely that radio spectrum policy issues will be governed by a
single set of technologically neutral rules. Under the proposed Decision, the
Commission will be authorised to mandate the CEPT to agree on technical
harmonisation measures with the aim of securing a pan-European approach to
radio spectrum availability across all sectors relevant to Community policies.
4.2. The need to balance the varying commercial and
public interests in the allocation of radio spectrum -
Criteria to identify priorities
A significant number of spectrum users are providing services which are not
directly linked to commercial interests but are important from a political,
cultural, consumer protection and safety as well as a public welfare point of
view. These non-commercial spectrum users include the military, national
broadcasters (before public broadcasters began to expand their activities into
44 Communication from the Commission, "Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications
Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999.
45 Communication from the Commission, "Next Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy - Results of the
Public Consultation on the Green Paper", COM (1999) 538, 10 November 1999, at 4.1.2, p.
16.
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new on-line information and inter-active services), and services such as air and
maritime transport, radio navigation, earth observation, radio-astronomy and
space exploitation, as well as public services such as the police and fire
departments. So while previously the allocation of radio frequencies was co¬
ordinated by Member States on behalf of a limited number of national
spectrum users (mainly for the defence sector and for public
telecommunications and broadcasting operators), the historical availability and
preferential treatment of radio spectrum for these activities is being challenged
by the emergence of global commercial players who compete for radio
spectrum availability and use.
As a result, commercial applications now compete with non-commercial ones
for radio spectrum access. Moreover convergence means that services from
different sectors compete with each other for available radio spectrum. At the
same time, due to convergence, current definitions of services and their
classification under telecommunications or broadcasting law cannot be
applicable any more on the new services offered. Hence it will become
increasingly arbitrary to classify many services within one category rather than
another and, consequently, it will become difficult to apply the traditional
classification of spectrum users in order to assess how and under what
conditions radio spectrum should be allocated.
The aforementioned technological, market and regulatory developments
have inevitably increased the complexity of radio spectrum management and
illustrate the need to address the balance between the varying commercial and
public interests in the allocation of radio frequencies as a key issue in the EU
decision-making process. As the Commission recognises,
"the share of commercial applications using radio spectrum is growing ... This
puts pressure on the availability of radio spectrum for other applications of
importance to the public interest ... Setting priorities as to who should be
allowed access to spectrum can no longer be taken solely on the basis of
technical information but requires careful balancing of interests taking
economic and political factors into account... A significant number of spectrum
users do not operate in a commercial environment, but have to compete with
commercial users when obtaining spectrum. A key regulatory task is to find the
balance between certain well-defined public/non-commercial uses of radio
spectrum and the need for radio spectrum as an essential resource for doing
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business".46
According to the Commission's proposal, the objective of meeting the various
needs of the different categories of spectrum users and balancing commercial
and other public interests in the allocation of frequencies can be achieved by
setting up a Spectrum Policy Expert Group (SPEG).47 The role of the SPEG
will be to advise the Commission on market, technical and other relevant
developments, to ensure that all economic and social policy considerations are
taken into account, to promote the EU interests regarding radio spectrum in the
global trade context, and to guarantee that the Community's policy objectives
with regard to radio spectrum are safeguarded.
However, the establishment of priorities for the use and allocation of radio
spectrum will be a challenging task and the SPEG will have to consider the
following crucial question: on the basis of what criteria should priorities be set
in order to ensure that commercial and public interests are appropriately
balanced? It must be noted that, according to the Council,
"the proliferation of wireless technology, digital television and other new
communication services will continue making frequency spectrum a sought-
after commodity ... Governments should take into consideration the needs of
the broadcasting sector when allocating spectrum. It is in particular stressed
that, because of the rapidly expanding mobile-communications industry,
adequate space should be saved for the television industry given its
contribution to political and cultural pluralism".48
If we accept that the Council's recommendation implies that priority should be
given to public broadcasting, it is logical to assume that priorities should also
be given to other services of equal - if not higher - social significance (e.g.
health, national defence, public safety, air traffic control and emergency
services). If we want to believe that we live in a civilised society that respects
and protects individuals, then we can easily conclude that there is no point in
46 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at para. 2.3, p. 11.
47 Communication from the Commission, "Next Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy - Results of the
Public Consultation on the Green Paper", COM (1999) 538, 10 November 1999, para. 4.1.1,
p. 15.
48 Council's Recommendation on Media Pluralism, January 19th 1999.
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attempting to find how commercial and public interests should be appropriately
balanced. This simply means that measures should be taken to ensure that
adequate radio spectrum (and on an exclusive basis) is reserved for
applications that safeguard public interest objectives.
It should be stressed that the tight association of a public organisation with
the ability to safeguard the public interest objectives is increasingly becoming
blurred. Obvious examples are the privatisation of previously government-
owned enterprises in the telecommunications, railway, gas and electricity utility
industries or the provision of services linked with non-commercial purposes
(such as air traffic control and emergency services) by private companies. This
is also recognised by the Commission when it states that "in the areas of
broadcasting and transport, for instance, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
define the boundary between public and commercial services".49 It should be
underlined that the above analysis regarding the services to be given priorities
for the allocation of spectrum does not refer to the distinction between a public
or private operation. Indeed, the analysis focuses on whether a service is
associated with the general public interest or not, irrespective of the fact that
the service in question could be provided by a private/commercial company.
As a conclusion, therefore, the target of an effective spectrum management
reaching a satisfactory balance between varying and conflicting demands on
the allocation of frequencies should refer exclusively to the necessity of
reconciling the commercial interests of market players from different sectors.
Only then can economic considerations play a predominant role in frequency
allocation decisions. In this context, the criteria to apply in order to set priorities
should be associated with the number of users, the time of consumption, and
the growth of market demand for the services. In addition, consideration should
be given to whether the services stimulate technological innovation, promote
the competitiveness of the European industry on the world market, and
contribute to economic growth and welfare.
49 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at para. 2.2, p. 9.
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4.3. Harmonisation is not suitable for all circumstances
Harmonisation of radio spectrum allocation is indispensable in order to permit
the usage of services and equipment across Europe, to facilitate the
production of new pan-European services and applications, to minimise
coordination problems at frontiers and to exploit the economies of scale for the
manufacturers. As a result, equipment costs for the consumer will be reduced
and the European industry's position on the world market will be strengthened.
However, the different stages of economic and technological development
among European countries in conjunction with the significant national
divergences make it obvious that the advantages derived from harmonisation
are particularly achieved only when major Community interests are at stake,
i.e. when the applications offered have pan-European spectrum requirements.
Otherwise, the case for harmonisation is weak. Indeed, each Member State
needs to use the spectrum optimally in a way that takes account of local needs
and reflects their own specific requirements. For example, maritime search and
rescue (SAR) services in the UK are in need of sufficient frequencies on a non¬
interference basis - in order to ensure safety-of-life communications - due to
the extensive coastline of this country. In contrast, it is logical to expect that a
land-locked country like Austria will address radio spectrum availability and use
of such services in a different manner.50 In addition, the location and amount of
radio spectrum reserved for defence purposes differ significantly between, for
instance, Belgium and Greece. In the latter, the allocation of a considerable
amount of radio spectrum for military applications is justified and
understandable. Indeed, this is regarded as essential for the maintenance of
an effective national defence policy considering the inherent military/political
tensions in the Aegean area. It should be stressed that this point cannot be
ignored, especially since the calls for releasing many bands previously
allocated for defence purposes - due to the supposingly reduced international
50 The United Kingdom Government - Comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, April 1999, at p. 7.
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military tensions - are increasing.51
Thus it is important to identify those applications which have pan-European
spectrum requirements before any harmonisation measures are decided. It is
obvious that the Council of the EU follows this approach when it recognises
that "there is an indispensable requirement for coordination at the European
level, in particular in the field of the new public mobile communications systems
and that of satellite applications"52 and asks CEPT to identify those frequencies
best suited for services with pan-European characteristics and to communicate
its recommendations to the regulatory authorities or to the Community.53
Moreover, the Council requires Member States to participate in the
development of ERC decisions on harmonisation measures regarding the
provision of the necessary frequencies for significant pan-European radio
services.54 And it concludes by requesting Member States to implement the
ERC decisions on the coordinated introduction of TFTS (Terrestrial Flight
Telecommunications System) and RTT (Road Transport Telematics),
according to ERC procedures.55
This political commitment to secure the harmonised availability of radio
spectrum for pan-European services is accompanied by the establishment of
certain legal measures, such as the already mentioned GSM, ERMES, and
DECT Directives, as well as the European Parliament and Council Decisions
on S-PCS and UMTS.56 These Decisions require CEPT to harmonise
frequencies and authorisation conditions for S-PCS and UMTS and allow for
51
See for instance: the response by the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) to the
Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 10 April 1999, at p. 3; Ericsson's
comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 1; European IT
Industry Round Table (EITIRT) response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 9
April 1999, at p. 2; European Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association
(ETNO) - Reflection Document on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999,
at p. 1; ITV's response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 12 April 1999, at p.
3; Telia's comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 1.
52
Council Resolution of 28 June 1990 on the strengthening of the Europe-wide cooperation on
radio frequencies, in particular with regard to services with a pan-European dimension, 90/C
166/02, at p. 4.
53
ibid., at p. 6.
54 Council Resolution of 19 November 1992 on the implementation in the Community of the
European Radiocommunications Committee Decisions, 92/C 318/01, at point 1.
55
ibid., at point 2.
56 Decision No 710/97/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on a co-ordinated
authorisation approach in the field of satellite personal communications services in the
Community, OJ L105, 23.4.97; and Decision No 128/1999/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 14 December 1998 on the coordinated introduction of a third-generation
mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the Community.
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Community action to be taken in case work by CEPT is not satisfactory or the
Member States do not implement sufficiently the measures adopted by CEPT.
In sum: a harmonisation policy must focus (on a case-by-case basis) on
those emerging services that are of particular significance, i.e. services with a
pan-European dimension which can contribute to the EU economy. An over-
interventionist approach could undermine the decision-taking process within
CEPT. Besides, it is interesting to note that the ERMES Directive is not
considered to have contributed to the early introduction and development of
ERMES services in Europe.57 This proves that legally binding spectrum
harmonisation measures do not necessarily ensure the take-off of innovative
pan-European services.
4.4. Re-farming
There was a general agreement among the responses to the Spectrum Green
Paper that re-farming constitutes an important element for an effective
strategic planning of radio spectrum. The term 're-farming' refers to the case
where the incumbent radio spectrum user is required to move to less
congested frequency bands in order to accommodate the introduction of new
services.58 It is, in other words, a process which - given the growing demand
for spectrum in conjunction with its finite availability - aims to modify the
allocation of certain radio frequency bands. Examples of re-farming could be
the phasing out of the service of one technology in favour of a technically
superior one (e.g. the move from analogue to digital broadcasting and the re-
farming of GSM spectrum for UMTS). Moreover re-farming is linked with the
reallocation of spectrum for a completely different usage, such as the release
of broadcast spectrum for mobile services (in case this reallocation of
57 See the Communication to the Council and for information to the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation
and functioning of the mobile communication frequency Directives, COM (1998) 559,
9.10.1998, at 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, pp. 14-15.
58 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at para. 2.1, p. 4.
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spectrum is regarded to be beneficial in efficiency terms).59
There is therefore a recognition that the target of re-farming is not just to
modify the allocation of certain parts of the radio spectrum but to achieve a
better frequency utilisation. However, it is also recognised that excessive use
of re-farming could have undesirable effects. This is the reason why, in order to
avoid compromising the investment made by the frequency users and
customers, adequate consideration must be given to whether or not the
efficiency gains from re-farming surpass the costs.60 As the Commission
admits, trade-offs have to be made when re-farming goes ahead, since the
incumbent radio spectrum user will have "to replace or adapt existing
equipment in order to comply with the different characteristics of the frequency
bands he is moved to".61 Thus, considering the financial consequences that re-
farming can have for the incumbent radio spectrum user in conjunction with the
fact that huge investment is required for the launch of commercial wireless
ventures, it is logical that compensation mechanisms are recommended in
order to offset non-recovered investments.62 As underlined in the US
Government's response,
"the proponents of new services must be encouraged to develop creative
solutions to minimize disruption of existing services. In addition, in some cases
it may be possible for multiple services to share the same spectrum based
upon sharing etiquettes. ... Where the cost of relocation is great and there is
no ability to share the spectrum, it may be appropriate for the proponents of
the new services to pay to move the incumbents to new spectrum".63
59 See Motorola's response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 7 April 1999, at p.
2.
60
See for instance the comments from Tele Danmark regarding the EU Commission's Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20 April 1999, at p. 3; Motorola's response to the EC Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 7 April 1999, at p. 2; BBC's response to the European
Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 4.
61 Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at para. 2.1, p. 5.
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Moreover, an effective spectrum re-farming policy must make sure that the
incumbent radio spectrum user is given reasonable transition time54 in order to
move to the new frequency bands and to respond to the change by using the
necessary measures to accomplish an equipment replacement programme.
Furthermore, as already mentioned above, an excessive use of re-farming
could have undesirable effects. Therefore, in order to be successful, a re-
farming policy must carefully focus on identifying and promoting those
emerging services with a pan-European dimension which can contribute to the
EU economy in terms of technological innovation, competitiveness, economic
growth and employment. Thus it is clear that re-farming should be addressed
in the context of facilitating the introduction of new services - especially those
with a European dimension - and that this approach requires the necessary
political support. This is illustrated by the Council Decision of 14 December
199865 which committed the Member States to introduce a concerted approach
at Community level and to secure frequency availability for the development of
Europe's future third generation mobile communications systems, known as
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System). This is also reflected in
the Council's determination to facilitate the rapid introduction of compatible
satellite personal communications services (S-PCS) in the Community through
the harmonisation of frequency bands and the removal of barriers to the free
movement of terminal equipment.66
It seems however that the aforementioned cases constitute the exception,
since only a small percentage of radio services can be provided on a pan-
European or international level; the majority of the allocated licences are linked
63
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to local or regional services.67 In addition, due to the uneven status and the
various levels of technological and market development among Member
States, different strategic planning is set-up by the national regulatory
authorities regarding the speed of phasing out of analogue spectrum and the
take-up of digital.68 Thus each Member State needs to use the spectrum in a
way that will reflect their own specific local needs and requirements. This is the
reason why the majority of the responses to the Spectrum Green Paper argue
that there is no need to implement common European mechanisms for re-
farming and that, on the contrary, the responsibility for a re-farming strategy
should be undertaken at the national level by the national frequency
authorities.69
4.5. Radio spectrum assignment and licensing
As the Commission recognises, there are large differences in Member States
with regard to assignment mechanisms. In addition, there are even differences
in the amount of spectrum assigned to operators within the same country.70
Thus some responses illustrated the possibility that these differences could
have a negative effect on competition and consequently lead to inefficient use
67
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of spectrum.71 However, the majority of the commentators argued that
diverging assignment methods are justified by the different needs and priorities
of the individual Member States.72 Thus there is general recognition that the
issue of the assignment methods should be left to the discretion of Member
States. This view is supported by the Commission when it states that "the
frequency assignment is a matter for the national authorities to decide".73 It is
therefore widely recognised that, where systems are essentially local and do
not require a pan-European provision, there is no need for a unified
assignment approach as long as licensees are treated in accordance with the
principles laid down in the Licensing Directive, i.e. on an open, objective,
transparent and non-discriminatory basis.74 On the other hand, the significance
of having a common process for spectrum assignment for pan-European
services (such as third generation mobile telephony and satellite personal
communication services) was highlighted.75 However, many responses
questioned the necessity for reaching such a uniform approach as
unnecessary and unrealistic - "there are up to now no indications that
diverging national mechanisms did influence the successful introduction of
71
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pan-European services"76 - despite the fact that they recommended a specific
assignment method.77
Whilst there was general agreement on the need to encourage greater
efficiency in radio spectrum use, there were opposite views on how this could
be achieved. Thus some placed emphasis solely on the commercial value of
frequencies while others perceived the term 'efficiency' as a notion which
includes technical and economic as well as public interest considerations. More
analytically:
The assignment of radio spectrum is described as "the process where
administrations authorise individual users to use radio stations or to provide
radio services within identified frequency bands".78 Currently the fees for the
use of radio spectrum cover only the administrative costs incurred. However,
since demand for radio spectrum is increasing rapidly, it is believed that the
administrative cost of licensing does not reflect the real market value of the
frequency spectrum. As a consequence, spectrum pricing measures must be
introduced (in addition to administrative costs) in order to ensure a better
management of the spectrum resources.
The ability of NRAs to increase spectrum fees is established by the legal
principles laid down in the Licensing Directive. Indeed, it is stated that the
charges required for the use of radio spectrum must cover only "the
administrative costs incurred in the issue, management, control and
enforcement of the applicable individual licences" and "be proportionate to the
work involved".79 Nevertheless, national administrations are given the
discretion to impose additional non-discriminatory charges "which reflect the
need to ensure the optimal use of these [frequency scarce] resources" and
"take into particular account the need to foster the development of innovative
75
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services and competition".80
This imposition of additional charges for the use of frequencies (in order to
reflect the real economic value of spectrum) finds its application in the form of
competitive bidding (auctions) which, it is argued, can stimulate an efficient and
effective use of radio spectrum. This can be achieved due to the major
advantages that auctions can offer in comparison with the traditional
assignment methods. In particular, auctions address licence applications in a
manner that minimises delay. In addition, the speedy licensing procedures are
not achieved at the expense of proper evaluation of the facts. Indeed, contrary
to the 'beauty contest' mechanism (comparative hearings) - where it is argued
that the decisions are likely to be biased towards incumbent operators with an
established track record81 - auctions are associated with a fair, objective and
transparent decision-making process. Furthermore auctions make sure that
licences are acquired by those bidders who value them most and who then
have the incentive to use the assigned spectrum efficiently (in order to avoid
compromising their investment and to maximise their commercial return).82
Thus many responses put forward the view that spectrum pricing and the
choice of auction as a method of assigning spectrum will play a valuable role in
achieving an efficient spectrum management policy. Indeed, spectrum
efficiency will improve since users will have the economic incentive to release
some of their existing under-used spectrum - while previously they were able
to reserve spectrum in anticipation of the rapid market developments.83
Furthermore, when the fees payable for the use of radio spectrum cover only
the administrative costs incurred, prices charged to small users of spectrum
are the same as those charged to large ones.84 This policy is considered to be
inconsistent with the overall goal of establishing a level playing field. The
obvious implication of this discrimination is that the competitive process is
distorted as small users find themselves unfairly disadvantaged. Auctions, on
the other hand, ensure that fees are more realistic and reflect an objective
80
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price of spectrum set by the market.
On the other hand, many responses drew attention to possible distortions of
competition arising from the fact that later market entrants are required to pay
a market value for the use of radio spectrum whereas existing users were
charged much lower fees.85 It is also argued that the proponents of auctions
have failed to take into account the fact that the spectrum manager has to
balance a wide range of technical, cultural, geographic, and social
considerations in order to ensure that the specific local needs, views and
priorities of each Member State are accurately addressed. Thus there are
widespread concerns about the fact that auctions can result in excessive
charges for the players involved and, as a consequence, these charges are
passed on to the consumer. As Motorola argues,
"the cost of auctions and associated relocations place a tremendous financial
burden on the operators, which trickles down to the end user. Allowing the
highest bidder to determine the use of the spectrum causes inconsistency and
uncertainty, which in turn raises equipment cost to users, negate economies of
scale, retard manufacturer investment, increase the potential for interference
and threaten the investment of existing operators. Such results are not
compatible with sound spectrum management".86
The imposition of such high charges is considered by many responses to be
driven by national budgetary thinking rather than by the target to ensure the
efficient use of radio frequencies - "the auction must be designed in a manner
that optimises the efficiency of the allocation, rather than maximises
» 87
revenue .
85 See the Working Document of the Commission, summary of the results of the public
consultation on the Convergence Green Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 23.
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Thus comparative bidding ('beauty contest') mechanisms were held by the
majority of the responses to the Spectrum Green Paper to be more appropriate
and effective and less restrictive in the development of competition and the
88
promotion of innovative services.
Even the most passionate supporters of auctions, whilst recognising the
advantages and potential benefits that derive from this spectrum assignment
mechanism, nevertheless cautioned against excessive reliance on such
method. In particular, it must be remembered that spectrum auction is an
assignment method used when the number of licensees must be restricted
because of spectrum scarcity. Thus in the case where the licences offered can
accommodate all the qualified applicants, auctions are not suitable. The same
is true when radio spectrum is not being available on an exclusive basis since
89
the spectrum manager is not required to consider any competing alternatives.
In addition, given the satellite's unique international character - their beams
are not confined to national borders - sequential auctions are required since
satellite service operators will have to obtain licenses from multiple
governments in order to operate a system. These sequential auctions can
create significant uncertainty for potential service providers as they cannot
predict the final cost of their enterprise, let alone the fact that it would be
87
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virtually impossible to win auctions in all the countries they wish to operate.90
This uncertainty can obviously discourage technological innovation and
investment in new satellite systems. This is the reason why the Satellite
Industry Association (SIA) points out that "satellite auctions could create
substantial harms that outweigh any alleged benefits of administrative
efficiency or revenue generation"91 and asks the Commission to "consider the
public harms unique to satellite spectrum auctions and to prohibit their use in
licensing satellite services".92
Finally, a sole reliance on a pure market mechanism like auctions cannot
ensure a balanced approach between achieving an efficient (from an economic
standpoint) assignment of spectrum - in order to meet the commercial
interests and requirements of market players - and safeguarding public
interest objectives. This is the reason why the BBC believes that, in order to
secure public interest objectives, it is essential that adequate radio spectrum at
an affordable price is reserved for applications which can safeguard the public
interest objectives, before any spectrum is assigned to commercial operators
via auctions.93 This proposal reflects the concerns of public service
broadcasters that they will face a competitive disadvantage due to the ability of
commercial operators to earn investment returns from the utilisation of
spectrum. If this is the case, then auctions can act as a brake on the realisation
of public interest objectives such as pluralism of opinions and diversified
information. This inability of auctions to achieve a satisfactory balance between
ensuring that the fees payable for the use of frequencies reflect the economic
value of radio spectrum and meeting public policy objectives is illustrated by
the view of the Forum for Digital Audio Broadcasting (WorldDAB):
"auctions would lead to spectrum allocations being made solely on the basis of
'ability to pay'. This would place broadcasters at an enormous disadvantage
90 For more details, see: The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium
- Comments on the European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 13 April
1999, at p. 10; United States' comments regarding the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
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and, even within the broadcasting sector, only the handful of very large
companies would be likely to succeed in such an environment. Radio's
pluralism - one of its core strengths - would be severely threatened".94
4.6. Radio equipment and standards
Many responses were critical of the fact that ETSI (European
Telecommunications Standards Institute) often started producing radio
equipment standards without taking account of spectrum issues at an early
stage - "i.e. standards now and frequencies later".95 As a result of ETSI's
approach, there were cases where standards equipment did not comply with
the characteristics of the frequency bands or radio spectrum was not available
at all for specific equipment standards.
From the above it is obvious that standardisation of radio equipment and
harmonisation of spectrum allocation are closely connected. This interrelation
was also recognised by the Commission and the Council when it was stated
that
"agreement on common frequency bands for radio communications systems
with pan-European characteristics is an essential basis for technical
standardization in the field of radio equipment ...; common frequency bands
are required in order to permit the use of equipment in different countries, to
minimize coordination problems at frontiers and to facilitate the large
production runs for equipment necessary to make European industry
93
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competitive on the world market".96
In addition, there was widespread agreement on the need to encourage a
close co-operation between those bodies responsible for developing
equipment standards (e.g. ETSI) and those organisations responsible for radio
spectrum management (e.g. CEPT).97
This particular attachment to the importance of co-operation is reflected in
the Memorandum of Understanding signed by CEPT and ETSI with the aim of
improving the relationship between standardisation and frequency use. This
arrangement is the result of the Council's political commitment to secure it as a
major policy goal. Indeed, according to the Council, CEPT was required to
adopt a framework where it would "cooperate and interact closely with ETSI
and with the other standardisation bodies concerned in order to take full
account of the close link between standards development and allocation of
frequency spectrum".98 The co-operation of ETSI and CEPT under this
Memorandum of Understanding has proved generally to function smoothly,99
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although it is recognised that there is still ground for improvement.100
The Commission's proposal for a Directive on radio and telecommunications
terminal equipment101 was finally adopted by the Council and the European
Parliament on 9 March 1999.102 This Directive replaces current Directive
98/13/EC103 (which applied only to terminal equipment) and its scope is
extended by covering also radio equipment.
It is believed that the R&TTE Directive will remove many regulatory barriers
to the free movement and use of equipment and will provide a single European
regulatory framework for R&TTE. This can be achieved since
telecommunications equipment which conforms to the essential requirements
laid down in the Directive104 can move freely in the European Community
without being subject to further national regulation.105
Thus the new regime will provide a substantially simplified procedure for
equipment manufacturers to access the market since it will replace the "one-
stop-shopping" notification regime introduced by Directive 91/263/EEC106 and
will avoid the need for mutual recognition arrangements between Member
States. Indeed, it must be remembered that Directive 91/263/EEC had
100
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cancelled the obligation for multiple testing and type approval carried out in
each Member State (introduced by Directive 86/361/EEC)107 and provided that
terminal equipment which is authorised in one Member State may be sold and
utilised throughout the Community, without having to undergo additional testing
and approval procedures.
This abolition of the a priori market access controls established by the
R&TTE Directive will be supplemented by an increase in the responsibility and
liability of manufacturers and suppliers108 and by the imposition of increased
responsibility for surveillance on Member States.109
So the R&TTE Directive provides for safeguards allowing Member States to
protect their radio spectrum. Thus, for instance, one of the essential
requirements laid down in the Directive is the "effective use of spectrum
allocated to terrestrial/space radio communication".110 Member States have the
right to withdraw from the market products which do not comply with the
relevant essential requirements.111 In addition, when the manufacturer/supplier
intends to place on the market equipment which uses non-harmonised
frequencies, then a 4 week advance notification period is required.112
113
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commentators thought it to be less satisfactory with regard to radio equipment
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[and] contributes less to the harmonisation of radio spectrum"114 - and
highlighted the need to intensify the efforts for further radio spectrum
harmonisation.115
4.7. Ensuring availability of information on spectrum use
It should be emphasised that the responses to the Spectrum Green Paper
recognised that, in order to ensure legal certainty and transparency to market
players, information on spectrum allocation must be made available by
114
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publishing a full set of national frequency allocation tables.116 This information
should be presented in a homogeneous and normalised format, be easily
accessible and therefore, given the speed and ease of modern
communications, be available electronically on the administrations' websites in
the individual countries. It should be stressed that the trend towards open
availability of information concerning frequency allocations is in line with the
obligation of the Member States to publish the allocation schemes of
frequencies specifically reserved for mobile and personal communications
services117 as well as in accordance with the ERC Decision on the Publication
of National Tables of Frequency Allocations.118
It is useful here to distinguish between the terms 'allocation' and
'assignment' - radio spectrum allocation means the allocation of a frequency
band to a service/application while radio spectrum assignment is associated
with spectrum assignment to a radio transmitter119 - and to stress that, with
regard to the latter, the level of detail of information available should be
assessed against some sensitive issues regarding business demands for
confidentiality. Thus the information on individual frequency assignments -
116 One 2 One response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at pp. 3-4; response
from the Independent Television Commission (ITC) to the EC Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, at p. 5; Telefonica's comments on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, at p. 3; response by the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) to the
Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 10 April 1999, at pp. 8-9; Vodafone's
response to EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20 April 1999, at pp. 2-3; Nortel
Networks' response to the European Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy,
at pp. 1-2; United States' comments regarding the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 14
April 1999, at p. 4; Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (O.D.T.R.), Ireland
- Response to the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 14 April 1999, at pp. 6-7;
European Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) - Reflection
Document on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at pp. 3-4;
Norwegian Administration's response to the questions in the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, at p. 2; the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium -
Comments on the European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 13,
1999, at pp. 3-4; Motorola's response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April
7, 1999, at p. 2; comments of the Telecommunications Administration Centre of Finland (TAC)
on the Green Paper of Radio Spectrum Policy, 13 April 1999, at p. 4; comments from Tele
Danmark regarding the EU Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 20,
1999, at p. 2; comments of FINNET Group on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15
April 1999, at p. 2; Telia's comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15
April 1999, at p. 4; the United Kingdom Government - Comments on the EC Green Paper on
Radio Spectrum Policy, at pp. 7-8; comments of the European Cable Communications
Association (ECCA) concerning the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at p. 8.
117 Mobile Directive, Article 3b.
118
ERC/DEC/(97)01 of 21 March 1997.
119
Response by the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) to the Commission's Green
Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 10 April 1999, at p. 17.
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which would include the details of the licence holder120 - must be regarded as
confidential since an operator of a mobile telecom system, for instance, "may
not wish a competitor to get hold of data concerning the infrastructure of the
base station network".121 Moreover it is obvious that such detailed information
regarding frequencies reserved for defense use and for specific government
uses could have undesirable effects.122
With regard to where and how information on radio spectrum allocation should
be collected and presented in the European Community, views were evenly
balanced between those favouring a centralised European information
database and those opting for a decentralised approach. Among the former,
there was agreement that the National Table of Allocations of each Member
State should be published in a spectrum database created and maintained by
the European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC) and that the ERO could
be the appropriate organisation to maintain Internet links with the relevant
government departments.123 It seems that the CEPT has similar views since it
is working towards the production of a European Common Frequency
Allocation table, through the Detailed Spectrum Investigation (DSI) process.
On the other hand, there are arguments that the provision of information on
radio spectrum allocation centrally on an EU-wide basis - considering the
124
requirement for constant revision of information relating to 15 countries -
120
This kind of information could include the name/address of licensee/contact person, channels
assigned per transmitter, location/coverage area of operation, operating power, height of
antenna, authorized emission, term and expiration date of license, see: The EU Committee of
the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium - Comments on the European Commission
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 13, 1999, at p. 3.
121
Telia's comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at p. 4.
122
Norwegian Administration's response to the questions in the Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, at p. 2; United States' comments regarding the Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, 14 April 1999, at p. 4; European Public Telecommunications Network
Operators' Association (ETNO) - Reflection Document on the EC Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 4.
123 See for instance the comments of the European Cable Communications Association (ECCA)
concerning the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, at p. 8; Motorola's response to the EC
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 7 April 1999, at p. 2; Vodafone's response to EC
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 20 April 1999, at p. 3; response by the European
Telecommunications Platform (ETP) to the Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, 10 April 1999, at p. 9; the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Belgium - Comments on the European Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy,
13 April 1999, at p. 3.
124
The United Kingdom Government - Comments on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy, at p. 8.
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could "create bureaucracy without solving the problem"125 and "require
excessive resources ... and lead into inefficiency and maintenance
difficulties".126
5. CONCLUSIONS
1. It is in the interest of the EU Member States that strategic planning and
harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum has as broad a support as possible
throughout Europe, taking all diverging contributions into account. Therefore, a
pan-European forum is required and CEPT - consisting of competent
authorities from all European countries - provides a suitable framework for
this. The consequence of an a priori agreement on radio spectrum
harmonisation would be that the non-EU CEPT administrations would not be
able to influence the content of the ERC decisions. In other words, the EU
would take over the power of decisions within the CEPT and, therefore, the
possible risk of an undesirable split would undermine the negotiating position
of Europe at the global market.
2. In general, the Community should avoid imposing legal obligations on
Member States to harmonise availability and usage of radio spectrum. Indeed,
an over-zealous approach - referring to an increase in the imposition of legal
obligations on Member States - is problematic and could seriously undermine
the decision-taking process within CEPT. Only in specific cases might there be
a need for legal obligation, in particular when there is a serious indication that
the adoption of harmonisation spectrum measures can facilitate the
introduction of new and pan-European services. Therefore, in order to be
successful, a harmonisation policy must carefully focus on identifying (on a
125 Comments of FINNET Group on the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999,
at p. 2.
126 Comments of the Telecommunications Administration Centre of Finland (TAC) on the Green
Paper of Radio Spectrum Policy, 13 April 1999, at p. 4.
214
case-by-case basis) and promoting those emerging services with a pan-
European dimension which can contribute to the EU economy.
3. The significance of the services which perform public interest functions
makes it obvious that harmonisation of radio spectrum allocation for these
uses is neither practical or desirable. Indeed, since the spectrum manager has
to balance a wide range of technical, cultural, geographic and social
considerations, the amount of spectrum allocated for applications safeguarding
the public-interest objectives must be decided in a political process and be
undertaken at the national level by the national frequency authorities. In
addition, there should be no doubt that, with regard to the allocation of radio
spectrum, demand for public interest applications should be satisfied first.
4. The current licensing framework allows Member States to use auctions and
administrative pricing as a means to encourage the optimal use of radio
spectrum. According to the Commission's proposal regarding the new
regulatory framework, Member States will remain free to establish auctions and
other spectrum pricing mechanisms for assignment of frequencies.127 This
reluctance to adopt a single EU-wide assignment approach is justified by the
existence of different views as to which assignment mechanism is best suited
to achieving spectrum efficiency and fostering the development of innovative
services and competition. Finally, it is submitted that the responsibility for a re-
farming strategy should be a matter of national competence in order to ensure
that specific local needs and priorities are efficiently addressed.
127 DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: A common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, 27 April 2000, at p. 10; Communication
from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999 Communications
Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000) 239 final,
26.4.2000, at p. 20.
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Chapter 5
The Challenges of Convergence to
Current Regulatory Approaches - Nature
and Scope of the Future Regulatory
Regime
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1. HORIZONTAL REGULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE -
SPLIT BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND CONTENT
REGULATION - REGULATION OF SERVICES
One of the points made in the Convergence Green Paper1 was that the
application of digital technology leads towards a rapid transformation of the
existing telecommunications, media and IT sectors.2 One of the results of the
technological developments is the fact that the convergence of technological
platforms and network infrastructures is a reality: "technological convergence is
already happening".3 That networks may increasingly provide both
telecommunications and broadcasting services as well as the development of
the Internet is cited by the Commission in order to illustrate the emergence of
the technological convergence phenomenon.4 It is accepted therefore that any
network can carry any service, which means that different forms of
communication have become independent of the method of technological
delivery. This is in line with the Commission's definition, according to which the
term convergence expresses "the ability of different network platforms to carry
essentially similar kinds of services".5
However, it should be stressed that, although there was a general
agreement on the emergence of the technological convergence of networks,
there were different views regarding the scope and the time duration of its
impact on markets and services.6 As the Working Group 3 - set up by the
Birmingham Audiovisual Conference in order to examine the right regulatory
framework for a creative media economy in a democratic society - stated,
1
Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information
Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation - Towards an Information Society
Approach (hereafter: the Convergence Green Paper), COM (97) 623, 3.12.1997.
2
Convergence Green Paper, at p. 1.
3
ibid., at p. 2.
4
ibid., at pp. 2-4.
5
ibid., at p. 1.
6
ibid., at p. 8.
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"even those who are most convinced of the inevitability of technological
convergence differ on the timing of its achievement. The sheer complexity of
the process, and the difficulty of predicting consumer behaviour, create an
uncertainty that makes all forecasting risky. By a considerable majority, it was
the Group's opinion that the transition period is likely to be long rather than
short".7
The recognition of the reality of the technological convergence strengthens the
view which supports the change from a sectoral organisation of the regulation
towards a more horizontal approach. An important first step towards horizontal
regulation would be the separation of the regulation of content provision from
that of service provision and infrastructure for all three sectors of the
convergence. The regulation of content would deal with content issues and be
concerned with aspects such as media plurality, taste, decency, harmful and
illegal content, security, privacy, cultural and linguistic diversity, and universal
service obligations as well as the protection of IPRs and liability. On the other
hand, transport (economic) regulation would deal with the communications
services required to provide access to the content and the infrastructure over
which the services operate. This regulation would typically cover the economic
or technological aspects, such as the safeguards required for the development
of effective competition, access to networks and digital gateways, licensing
procedures, the interconnection and interoperability of services and networks,
frequency spectrum, and equipment certification.
The vast majority of the comments received by the Commission favoured the
7
Birmingham Audiovisual Conference, 6-8 April 1998, Conclusions of Working Group 3, at p. 2.
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split between content/cultural and transport (economic) regulation,8 an
approach recommended by the Squire, Sanders and Dempsey L.L.P and
Analysys Ltd study.9 Furthermore, in order to underline the general agreement
which has emerged (and not only in the industry) regarding the separation of
transport and content regulation, it is useful to cite some of the conclusions
and recommendations adopted by two prestigious conferences, organised
under the aegis of the UK and Austrian Presidencies respectively. Thus it was
held that "the developing legal framework needs to be capable of dealing
separately with technological issues and content issues";10 that "the regulatory
focus should in future distinguish between infrastructure and content";11 and
that "the desire to see a tendency towards separate regulation for
infrastructure and content is reaffirmed".12 Even more importantly, the
8 See for instance: Telecom Italia's comments on the Convergence Green Paper, Roma, 18
March 1998, at p. 9; VECAI (the Dutch Association for cable TV operators) comments on the
Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p. 21; the Cable Communications Association
(CCA) response to the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at pp. 6-7; European
Telecommunications Platform (ETP) - Position Paper on the Convergence Green Paper, 30
April 1998, at p. 2; Submission by Cable & Wireless Communications on the Convergence
Green Paper, May 1998, at p. 12; European Broadcasting Union (EBU) Reply to the
Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p. 20; European IT Industry Round Table (EITIRT) -
Informal responses to the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p. 2; Legal Advisory
Board's (LAB) position on the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p. 4; EFTA's
comment on the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at pp. 4-5; Opinion of the Centre
europeen des entreprises a participation publique et des entreprises d'interet economique
general (CEEPT) on the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p. 7; Draft Opinion of the
Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services on the Convergence Green Paper -
Economic and Social Committee of the European Union, Brussels, 20 March 1998, at pp. 2-3;
Coalition of Service Industries - Response to the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p.
5.
See also the Commission's papers: Communication from the Commission, "The results of the
public consultation on the 1999 Communications Review and Orientations for the new
Regulatory Framework", COM (2000) 239 final, 26.4.2000, at p. 20; Communication from the
Commission, "Principles and Guidelines for the Community's Audiovisual Policy in the Digital
Age", COM (1999) 657 final, 14.12.1999, at p. 11; Communication from the Commission
"Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated
services - The 1999 Communications Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at p. 5;
Commission Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the
Convergence Green Paper, COM (1999) 108, 10.3.1999, at p. 9; Working Document of the
Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the Convergence Green
Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 30.
9
"Study on Adapting the EU Telecommunications Regulatory Framework to the Developing
Multimedia Environment", prepared for the European Commission by Squire, Sanders and
Dempsey L.L.P and Analysys Ltd., January 1998, at p. 256.
10
Birmingham Audiovisual Conference, 6-8 April 1998, Conclusions of Working Group 3, at p. 3.
11
ibid., at p. 6.
12
Vienna Conference on convergence, 3 November 1998, see the Commission Communication
reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence Green Paper, COM
(1999) 108 EN final, 10.3.1999, at p. 22.
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European Parliament agreed that the "regulatory framework applicable to
electronic communications infrastructure should remain separate from that
applicable to the content conveyed".13
The indisputable emergence of the convergence of technological platforms
and network infrastructures in conjunction with the agreement on the
separation of transport and content regulation are the determinants which can
take the horizontal approach to the regulation one step further. Indeed, these
two factors could easily result in the acceptance of the notion that similar
regulatory conditions should apply to all network infrastructure and associated
services, irrespective of the types of services carried over them. In other
words, networks should be governed by a single set of technology neutral
rules.14 This agreement on the horizontal approach to the regulation of
infrastructure was once again backed by the opinion of the European
Parliament when it stated that "there should be a single regulatory framework
for what is basically the same activity, the transport of information through the
different networks".15
However, there is a wide agreement that the trend towards horizontal
regulation of networks will not change the nature of the services which are
carried through this infrastructure. Indeed, services must keep their specific
characteristics, which were and still are crucial in deciding how and to what
The opinion of EP of 22 October 1998, see the Commission Communication reporting on the
Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence Green Paper, COM (1999) 108 EN
final, 10.3.1999, at p. 7.
14
DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: A common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, 27 April 2000, Chapter I, at p. 5;
Communication from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000)
239 final, 26.4.2000, at pp. 8 and 20; Communication from the Commission "Towards a new
framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999
Communications Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at pp. 3 and 6; Commission
Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence
Green Paper, COM (1999) 108 EN final, 10.3.1999, at pp. 2 and 9; Working Document of the
Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the Convergence Green
Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 30.
15
The opinion of EP of 22 October 1998, see the Commission Communication reporting on the
Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence Green Paper, COM(1999) 108,
10.3.1999, at p. 7.
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extent these services should be regulated.16
Moreover, the Commission has identified the inability of the current
definitions to follow the rapid advances in technology and the new mixture of
services now possible. The result is that those definitions are becoming
increasingly blurred and obsolete. This happens because current definitions of
services and their classification under telecommunications or broadcasting law
are created in national and mono-product contexts and are based on a
technology-deterministic approach. What is therefore required is the review of
those definitions which are based on technological concepts and the
establishment of a clear and predictable regulatory framework built on the new
commercial realities and the market characteristics of the specific services.
The idea that the regulation of services will and must become independent
from the technology used - technology-neutral regulation - is widely
supported.17 Consequently, services must be regulated independently of the
form of distribution and therefore it can be argued that, in order to reflect the
specific nature and the distinctive characteristics of the services concerned,
different types of regulation are required for different types of services.
1.1. Conclusions
1. The shift towards the horizontal regulation of networks will not change the
nature of the services which are carried through this infrastructure. In other
words, services must be regulated independently of the form of distribution.
Therefore, regulation will have to reflect the distinctive nature and
characteristics of a given service.
16 Communication from the Commission "Principles and Guidelines for the Community's
Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age", COM (1999) 657 final, 14.12.1999, at p. 11; Working
Document of the Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the
Convergence Green Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at pp. 6 and 9.
17 Communication from the Commission "Principles and Guidelines for the Community's
Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age", COM (1999) 657 final, 14.12.1999, at p. 10;
Communication from the Commission "Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications Review",
COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at p. 13; Working Document of the Commission,
summary of the results of the public consultation on the Convergence Green Paper, SEC (98)
1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 27.
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2. Rejecting the tight association between a specific service and its relevant
infrastructure - and thus applying the kind of regulation which is based on the
market characteristics of the specific services - has as a result that the rules
traditionally applied to broadcasting will be prevented from applying
mechanically to the on-line services.
2. SPECIFIC REGULATION VERSUS COMPETITION LAW
This section examines whether market forces and competition law should be
the sole drivers for the development of an effective communications market or
whether sector-specific regulation is still required.
2.1. Limitations of the current specific-regulation
The open network provision (ONP) rules were conceived in order to safeguard
and promote the development of competition in the telecommunications sector
by monitoring operators with significant market power and making sure that
new entrants had sufficient and fair access to public switched
telecommunications networks (PSTN). This means that the scope of the ONP
framework is limited, in the sense that it cannot address issues which are
found in the other sectors affected by the convergence process, and which
may remain in a fully converged market. So, for instance, the current ONP
rules cannot cover issues such as access agreements between private
networks and service providers and cannot apply to converging services such
as Internet telephony.
This limitation of the sector-specific regulation in conjunction with the fact
that access problems are not confined to the public telecommunications
networks only raises competition concerns. For instance, Commission officials
identify the increasing commercial importance of the Internet and underline the
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significance for market players of having access to that marketplace.18
However, they are concerned that the increasing involvement of established
players from the telecommunications, media and IT sectors into the Internet
market creates "risks of anti-competitive behaviour on the Internet [which] are
already apparent and could become dramatic", and could lead to "a substantial
potential for abuse of market positions or conclusion of anti-competitive
agreements in the global arena".19 This is the reason why the Commission
expresses determination to maintain an open and competitive Internet
market,20 and states that "the area of backbone access to the Internet is one
which the Commission will keep under close review".21
Thus it becomes clear that the ONP regime - in its current form - cannot
work satisfactorily in the future converging environment. Indeed, this is true not
only because of its inability to address the issues from a wider point of view
(and not just from a strict telecommunications one). It is also because the
regime has become obsolete,22 since the emergence of new converged
services requires a technology-neutral regulation which is based on market
concepts23 and not one like the current ONP framework, which is based on a
technology-determined approach. Therefore one could find a sound basis in
Belgacom's argument that "at the network level, ... the 1998 regulatory
framework is already looking out of date, even before the ink has dried".24
BT also seems to back this view when it states that
"the application of ex-ante rules on a sector specific basis cannot hope to be
18
Karel Van Miert, "Mapping the new open telecommunications marketplace", at p. 2, IIC
Telecommunications Forum Brussels, 7/07/1997.
19
Kevin Coates, DG IV- C-1, "Competing for the Internet", Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998,
Number 1 February, at p. 17.
20
Herbert Lingerer, "Open competition in the post-1998 European telecoms market", at p. 8,
Swedish Telecoms Summit '97, 3/12/1997.
21
Kevin Coates, DG IV- C-1, "Competing for the Internet", Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998,
Number 1 February, at p. 14.
22
See the response from Microsoft Corporation to the Working Document [SEC(98) 1284], 3
November 1998, at p. 7; submission by Cable & Wireless Communications on the
Convergence Green Paper, May 1998, at p. 15.
23 See the Northern Telecom Limited (Nortel) response to the Convergence Green Paper, at p.
6; Telefonica's comments on the Convergence Green Paper, at p. 9; VECAI (the Dutch
Association for cableTV operators) comments on the Convergence Green Paper, at p. 21;
Draft Opinion of the Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services on the Convergence
Green Paper - Economic and Social Committee of the European Union, Brussels, 20 March
1998, at p. 13.
24
Belgacom's position on the Convergence Green Paper, at p. 10.
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other than a temporary fix in this situation. They will quickly become outdated
and have a distorting effect on the development of competition".25
This argument can find support from the fact that a very specific regulatory
framework is not flexible enough and thus not capable of predicting and coping
with rapid market developments:
"The speed of technological and market change is greater than the speed by
which regulation can move";26 "the faster the technological and market lead
development is going the more difficult it will be for regulators to keep up with
the pace of changes when trying to regulate the market".27
As it was put by lonica:
"there is little point in regulators or market participants claiming any particular
foresight or devising detailed solutions at this stage. This market requires an
ex post regulatory environment which must be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate unanticipated developments".28
So the acceptance that the current ONP framework is not sufficient to address
the issues of a fully converged market - especially the access issues - raises
the question of whether competition law alone can be an effective instrument
for the realisation of that target.
2.2. Limitations of competition law
It is true that competition law can cope with the rapidity of technological and
market change, given its ex-post nature and its case-by-case approach. Thus it
is sufficiently flexible to deal with all future problems that may arise in a
converged environment and to accommodate unanticipated developments. On
25 BT's response to the second stage of the European Commission's Consultation on
convergence [SEC(98) 1284], 29 October 1998, at p. 2.
26
Response from Olivetti to the Convergence Green Paper, at p. 6.
27
Tele Danmark's comments on the Convergence Green Paper, 30 April 1998, at p. 2.
28
lonica's comments on the Convergence Green Paper, at pp. 1-2.
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the other hand, however, if it is decided that market forces and competition law
should be the guiding principles driving convergence, then it would probably
result in lack of legal certainty. This uncertainty derives from the fact that the
market is still developing - "convergence and the information society are still in
their infancy"29 - and thus it is difficult to predict the speed and the exact way in
which many convergent services, products and markets will develop. It is not
hard for someone to understand that this uncertainty and unpredictability
characterising the process towards convergence can easily discourage
investment and hamper the incentive to develop new services. This uncertainty
and unpredictability become even stronger if we take into consideration the
inability of competition law to address anti-competitive practices quickly. For
example, intervention by a competition authority on the grounds of Article 82
EC will not take place when a market player has the ability to harm competition
significantly but only after an abuse of a dominant position has been
committed. This approach is not considered satisfactory by many market
players, since it can discourage companies from entering the market. Indeed,
by the time the competition authority attempts to restore competition it is
possible that the complainant will have already been forced out of business. As
it was put by ITV,
"ex post competition law procedures are inherently unsuited to start up
businesses. The gatekeepers should not be allowed to deny access to new
businesses, given that these businesses may no longer exist by the time that
the ex-post competition law remedy has been obtained. Further, if the remedy
in question is compensation, the problem of accurately quantifying the loss
suffered by being denied the opportunity to start up a business is such that the
remedy will not be able to reflect the loss sustained. It is for these reasons that
sector-specific rules remain necessary".30
29 The Cable Communications Association (CCA) response to the Convergence Green Paper, at
p. 6.
30 The Independent Television Association's (ITV) reply to the Commission's Working
Document [SEC(98) 1284], at p. 2.
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2.3. Interrelation between competition law and sector-
specific regulation
It is also true that Community competition rules cover areas which are not
addressed by a sector specific regulation such as the ONP framework, and are
thus able to apply horizontally across the sectors which participate in the
convergence process. This is recognised by the Commission when it states
that the objectives of its Access Notice are "to explain how competition rules
will be applied in a consistent way across the sectors involved in the provision
of new services, and in particular to access issues and gateways in this
context", and "to create greater market certainty and more stable conditions for
investment and commercial initiative in the telecoms and multimedia sectors".31
It also points out that "as this notice is based on the generally applicable
competition rules, the principles set out in this Notice will ... be equally
applicable in other areas, such as access issues in digital communications
sectors generally".32 On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the ONP
rules are applied to TOs with significant market power to engage in abusive
behaviour and to prevent the development of competitive market structures. So
the level of market power needed to invoke ONP obligations is lower than the
level required for the application of competition law. This is illustrated in the
1998 Access Notice where the determination of whether an organisation is
dominant requires - amongst a number of factors - a market share of more
than 50%.33 In comparison, the starting presumption that an organisation has
significant market power depends on the demonstration of a market share of
over 25%.34 In that sense, the application of the ONP rules is wider, since it is
not bound to meet the criterion of 'dominance' which is an essential condition
for the application of Article 82 of the Treaty. In addition, the detailed nature of
ONP rules lays down obligations imposed on TOs (e.g. obligations with regard
to price structures, accounting obligations and also price levels) that go
substantially beyond the requirements of Article 82.35
31 Commission's Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in
the Telecommunications Sector, C 265/2, 22.08.1998 (hereafter: The Access Notice), at the
preface.
32
Access Notice, at para. 6.
33
ibid., at para. 73.
34 See the Interconnection Directive, 97/33/EC, OJ L 199, 26.7.1997, p. 32, at article 4 (3); see
also the Access Notice, at footnote 57.
35
See, for instance, the Access Notice, at para. 15.
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Of course, sole reliance on competition law would be sufficient if effective
competition was introduced and established in the distinguishable markets and
then in the converged environment. However, this is not the case, because the
telecommunications sector - and especially the local access market - is not
being fully exposed to competitive forces. On the contrary, the incumbent
telecommunications operators still control a huge share of the market - more
than 90%36 - by virtue of their monopoly background. There are also market
players who insist that fully effective competition on the local loop - introduced
by a satisfactory number of alternative local loop infrastructures - may never
happen.37 This problem is recognised by the Commission when it states that
"the development of effective competition from alternative network providers
with adequate capacity and geographic reach will take time",38 and that these
parallel networks cannot be regarded as "satisfactory alternatives to the
facilities of the incumbent operator".39 One of the most important reasons for
this is that lots of capital is required in order to build a network which can
provide the same extensive geographic coverage as that of the TO's network.40
However, some market players take a diametrically opposite position and
argue that issues regarding access to networks cannot be identified as a
barrier which may distort competition and hamper the convergence process.
Their view is based on the presumption that the liberalisation process has
provided a competitive environment and that cable, satellite and the third
generation of mobile telephony systems (UMTS) can constitute a viable
alternative access route in the local loop. Thus it is stated that "access
networks ... are becoming less of an obstacle to development",41 and that, "by
the time convergence is fully developed, access networks will not remain a
bottleneck";42 "the last remaining network bottleneck and access concerns will
have been eliminated".43 However, despite the fact that the CATV networks are
36 Herbert Ungerer, "Beating the bandwidth bottleneck", at p. 8, ATM Year 98 Europe
Conference, London, 16th September 1998.
37
MCI WorldCom response to the Commission's Working Document [SEC(98) 1284], at p. 3.
38 Access Notice, at para. 64.
39
ibid., at para. 91(a).
40 See BBC's response to EU Convergence Working Document ]SEC(98) 1284], November
1998, at par. 1.4, p. 4.
41 Telefonica's comments on the Commission's Working Document ]SEC(98) 1284], at p. 2.
42
European Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association's (ETNO) Reflection
Document on the Commission's Working Document ]SEC(98) 1284], at p. 2.
43 KPN Telecom's submission to the European Commission Working Document ]SEC(98) 1284],
November 1998, at p. 3.
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reaching penetration rates of over 90% in some countries,44 it is recognised by
the Commission that the penetration of cable networks is "very unevenly
spread across the EU's Member States, with a wide variation from nearly 0% to
nearly 100% penetration",45 and that "only in some Member States has cable
developed into a credible alternative in some areas".46 In addition, many argue
that satellites and wireless access means still have limited technological
capabilities in order to reach the same interactive multi-media requirements as
telephone and cable networks.47 This was also one of the results of the
Commission's Cable Review of the impact on competition of the joint provision
of telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator and the
restrictions on the use of telecommunications networks for the provision of
cable TV capacity. Indeed, after examining four criteria which were identified as
'key issues' in the reports48 undertaken for the Commission - i.e. the range of
services, the level of service innovation, the potential limitations of different
network types and the encouragement of competition in the local loop - the
Commission found that only two network types can fully qualify as capable of
fostering the development and realisation of the widest range of the new
telecommunications and multi-media technologies: the telephone and cable
networks. As it was put in the Commission Communication concerning the
Cable Review,49
"the two wireline technologies - telecommunications and cable TV networks -
are at this stage the only ones which can promote optimal development
44
ibid., at p. 2.
45
H. Ungerer, "Infrastructure, Telephony, and Competition: Developing cable networks into full-
scale multi-media networks", p. 3, at the Second World CATV Strategies Summit, 3-5
February 1999, Cannes, France.
46
H. Ungerer, "Managing the Strategic Impact of Competition Law in Telecoms", at p. 8,
Brussels, 9th February 1999.
47
Position of AOL Bertelsmann Online on the Commission's Working Document [SEC(98)
1284], 09 November 1998, at p. 2.
48
"Cable Review - Study on the competition implications in telecommunications and multimedia
markets of (a) joint provision of cable and telecoms networks by a single dominant operator
and (b) restrictions on the use of telecommunications networks for the provision of cable
television services", Arthur D. Little International, 1997, and "Study on the Scope of the Legal
Instruments under EC Competition Law available to the European Commission to implement
the Results of the ongoing review of certain situations in the telecommunications and cable
television sectors", Coudert, 1997.
49 Commission Communication concerning the review under competition rules of the joint
provision of telecommunications and cable television networks by a single operator and the
abolition of restrictions on the provision of cable television capacity over telecommunications
networks, (98/C 71/EC) OJ C 71, 7.3.1998, p. 4.
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according to all four criteria The other wireless technologies currently
available still have limitations of one or more of the criteria which makes them
less suitable for the optimal development of multimedia services".50
2.4. Conclusions
From a market perspective, regulation is only necessary until the establishment
of effective competition on the markets. Since the market is still developing,
adequate regulatory safeguards are required in order to promote and establish
effective competition. Indeed, moving directly to the application of competition
rules alone could lead to new forms of integrated dominance and to new
multimedia market monopolies. As the Commission states,
"it would be counterproductive to remove sector specific rules designed to
ensure fair competition too rapidly if this resulted in anti-competitive outcomes,
for example if it were to lead to incumbent operators extending their strong or
dominant position throughout the converged markets".51
Beyond the market perspective, the justification for regulatory intervention is
associated with a social policy aim involving issues such as the need for
universal access to networks - achieved through universal service obligations.
Regulation is also required in order to meet public interest objectives such as
media plurality and diversity, taste and decency, impartial information,
dissemination of culture and languages, education, and the need to protect
consumers, especially minors, from 'inappropriate' material - i.e. positive and
negative obligations within the audiovisual sector which are usually linked with
public service broadcasting. There is widespread agreement on the fact that
the aforementioned social objectives cannot be ensured by means of
50
ibid., at para. 23.
51
DGXIII, Discussion Document, Subject: The 1999 Review: regulatory principles, Brussels, 21
May 1999, at Chapter 4.2, p. 6.
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competition law;52 on the contrary, "competition law may even turn a blind eye
to the public policy objectives of both media and telecoms law".53
Therefore, three main points should be underlined. The first is that the level of
market power needed to invoke ONP obligations is lower than the level
required for the application of competition law, that the proceedings for the
application of competition law tend to be lengthy and, therefore, safeguards
and certainty to investors and new entrants cannot be provided. The second is
linked with the social policy aim of securing certain public interest objectives.
And the third is associated with the role of economic regulation to provide the
temporary measures in order to guarantee equal and fair conditions to all
market players until the converged market has matured.
From the above points, we can easily reach the conclusion that sector
specific regulation will continue to be necessary. Of course, the long-term
objective that competition law will take over and specific regulation will fall
away remains valid. However, this will happen only with the realisation of an
effectively competitive market. In the meantime, during the transition phase,
specific regulation will play a fundamental role alongside the application of
competition law.
Thus, at this transitional stage of development, sector-specific regulation
should be divided into two different regulations (economic and social) and,
accordingly, specific rules should focus on two general areas:
- rules to provide the temporary measures in order to prevent market
failures from restricting or distorting competition. These rules will have to mimic
the effect of competition and address issues such as access to networks and
interconnection, access to digital gateways, standards and interoperability,
pricing, and the establishment of objective licensing criteria for ensuring an
equitable distribution of limited resources (like frequencies and numbering);
- rules to ensure public interest objectives (including the universal service
obligation in the telecommunications industry and the public service mission
conferred on public broadcasters) and rules of content.
52 Commission Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the
Convergence Green Paper, COM(1999) 108, 10.3.1999, at p. 3.
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3. SCOPE AND EXTENT OF THE NEW
INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATORY REGIME IN THE
CONVERGENCE ENVIRONMENT
3.1. Introduction
It has already been shown that general agreement exists on the need for a
homogenous treatment of all transport network infrastructure. It was also
confirmed that the telecommunications sector - and especially the local access
market - is not being exposed to competitive forces since the incumbents
control almost all local access by virtue of their monopoly background.
Moreover it was established that sole reliance on competition law during an
intermediate stage can neither encourage market entry, nor ensure efficient
and non-discriminatory access to networks and, therefore, cannot promote the
development of open and competitive markets.
Therefore the immediate question concerns the scope and nature of the
sector-specific rules that should apply to infrastructure and whether self-
regulation could play an equally significant role.
3.2. Discussion
Based on the general agreement that a single set of technologically neutral
regulatory rules should apply to all transport network infrastructure irrespective
of the types of services carried over them, and on the fact that the regulatory
regime for ensuring access in the telecommunications sector is far more
mature and comprehensive than in the neighbouring sectors, the application of
ONP-type open provision rules seems the most reasonable, practical and
53
European Broadcasting Union (EBU) Reply to the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p.
19.
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efficient approach. Thus for a number of years - and until effective
infrastructure competition has finally become established - the regulatory
model of infrastructure in the converging environment should resort to the
existing European regulation, namely the ONP regime and interconnection
regulation of the telecommunications sector. This answers the Commission's
question of whether the ONP telecommunications rules should be expanded to
the other sectors affected by the convergence process.54
Thus the scope of the new infrastructure ONP style regulatory regime will
become broader. It will not be confined to the telecommunications sector but
will apply to all forms of cable- and radio-based infrastructure (including cable
TV and broadcast infrastructure, Internet etc.), and to any operator with
significant market power across sectors. In addition, it will cover issues such as
access agreements between private networks and service providers and will
not distinguish between fixed-network and mobile communications
network/services.
The problem is that this expansion of ONP telecommunications rules to the
other sectors contradicts the Commission's stated target for dis-engaging from
detailed regulatory intervention.55 Therefore it becomes obvious that, in order
to pursue the goal of a light regulatory approach, convergence enforces
reconsideration of the present regulatory regime's basic principles and tools.
So a large majority of the prescriptive regulations currently in place will need to
be replaced by a harmonised framework of very light and general principles
and overall targets which can identify and monitor barriers to competition within
a converging market and can ensure equal and fair conditions for market
players.
3.3. Conclusions
It must be remembered here that the aim of the ONP telecommunications
framework was to create an open and harmonised approach for infrastructures
and to enhance interoperability of networks and services throughout Europe. It
should be also underlined that, according to that framework, open network
54 See the Convergence Green Paper, at p. 23.
55 See for instance the Convergence Green Paper, at p. 33.
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provisions must meet a set of basic principles, namely that they must be based
on objective criteria, be transparent and published in an appropriate manner,
guarantee equality of access and be non-discriminatory.56
What is therefore needed for the convergence environment is a regulatory
regime which will draw on the basic principles set out within the ONP access
framework. These principles will be extended and applied equally to the
broadcasting sector in order to provide a common regulatory approach to
communications infrastructure in the European Union.
In addition, the different approaches to licensing within Member States
regarding the treatment of broadcasting and telecommunications threaten to
impede the development and distribution of innovative multimedia products and
services. What therefore is required is the establishment of a common
approach to licensing - with the minimum possible variations - which will cover
both the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors and will be consistent
with the basic principles set out in the Licensing Directive. In order to achieve
this target, and in the light of convergence, it is obvious that a number of
aspects of existing broadcasting regulation will need revision.
In Part IV of this thesis we will examine in detail the Commission's proposed
Framework, Access/Interconnection, and Licensing Directives. But the next
section deals with the issue of the access to digital gateways and examines the
scope of the necessary regulation and its interrelation with competition law.
56 Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision,
90/387/EEC, OJ L 192/1, 24.7.1990, (hereafter: the 1990 ONP Framework Directive), at
Article 3(1).
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4. THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL
GATEWAYS - THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF
COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC
REGULATION
This section identifies the access to digital gateways as a key commercial and
regulatory issue in the converging environment and attempts to examine
whether regulation should play a prominent role alongside the application of
competition law. In the light of the widespread public debate on the
Commission's Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications,
Media and Information Technology Sectors and the 1999 Communications
Review,57 it describes the existing access regulatory regime for digital
television conditional access systems and comments on the future regulatory
framework.
4.1. Introduction
An issue of major concern in the Convergence Green Paper is the ability of
certain actors to control bottlenecks in the provision of services. In particular,
the control of essential interfaces towards consumers may be used in such a
way as to exclude competitors from access to consumers. So new possibilities
for abusing a dominant position will emerge, mainly due to the technical and
economic restrictions which can be imposed by 'gate-keeping' companies at all
stages of delivery to customers.
The main examples of interfaces with the consumer are set-top boxes,
electronic program guides (EPG) and application programming interfaces
(APIs). The set-top box is a device which adds intelligence to the basic
television set and allows it to have some interactive capabilities. Again,
browsers (e.g. Netscape, Microsoft Explorer), search engines (e.g. Altavista,
Yahoo, etc.) and EPG are necessary to navigate through the mass of content
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that is becoming available in the Internet. A solution is not easy, particularly
because there are two opposite objectives: on the one hand, the introduction of
proprietary access systems - a policy associated with the need to encourage
innovation and investment - and, on the other hand, the need to promote a
degree of openness in order to create pro-competitive market structures.
In addition, market players who control the bottlenecks in question will have
the commercial incentive to extend their power to the provision of content. This
can be done, for instance, when gatekeepers block or limit consumer access
via their set-top boxes to certain programme services. Therefore the bottleneck
issue must be tackled, not only because of its anti-competitive effects, but also
because of certain public policy priorities, for instance the preservation of
pluralism.
4.2. Structure of the market - Identification of the problem
There are three essential technical services embedded in a set-top box which
control the conditions of access: conditional access systems, electronic
program guides (EPGs) and application programming interfaces (APIs). These
technical components in the set-top box are gateways which a service provider
must use in order to reach the consumer.
Since the development of a set-top box requires massive investment and
entails an enormous economic risk, the most sensible option (in business
terms) for the new entrants is to use the already existing set-top boxes
(developed by the incumbent pay-TV operators). In addition, it is a fact that
each of the platform operators (digital satellite, terrestrial and cable) has opted
for proprietary technology in key areas such as APIs and EPGs.58 As a result,
consumers are not willing to buy separate set-top boxes for each service
provider and are, therefore, discouraged from subscribing to several platforms.
Hence it seems that content providers who want to enter the market do not
57 Communication from the Commission, "Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications
Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999.
58 Communication from the Commission "The Development of the Market for Digital Television
in the European Union - Report in the context of Directive 95/47/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24th October 1995 on the use of standards for the
transmission of television signals", COM (1999) 540, 10 November 1999, at 3.2.1, p. 18.
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have any choice but to use the set-top boxes of the incumbent pay-TV
operators. In other words, access to existing boxes is indispensable for all
those companies willing to develop viable economic operations, since they will
not be able to operate on the service market if they are refused access.
This is the reason why there is a widespread concern59 that, if allowed not to
grant access, vertically integrated broadcaster/platform operators - in Europe
pay-TV operators are also the proprietors of technical services - will be able to
control market developments and restrict the range of services which can be
made available to consumers.
So, for instance, the API is an interface between the operating system of a
set-top box and the application software. If potential competitors want to enter
the market, they need to make content compatible with this interface. In order
to achieve this, knowledge of the key technical specifications of such interface
is essential. However, where the proprietor of the technology (i.e. the platform
operator) is at the same time a programme provider, its content and services
can be facilitated and provided smoothly due to its prior knowledge of the
design of the API. Vertically integrated broadcaster/platform operators
therefore have the incentive and the opportunity to enjoy considerable
competitive advantages. Indeed, this can happen where the platform operator
refuses access to the requesting competitors (while access has been of course
available to its own programme provider) or when the platform operator
decides to grant access to rival programme providers as well but treats its own
downstream services operations more favourably (e.g. by discriminating on the
terms of their access). The latter scenario was identified by the Commission in
the Bertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Telecom case,60 where CLT-UFA and Kirch
wanted to merge their digital television activities in Germany into the Premiere
venture. If the proposed concentration had been concluded, Premiere would
have become the only pay-TV provider in Germany. This prospect in
conjunction with other factors would give Premiere the ability to determine the
conditions under which other broadcasters could enter into the pay-TV market.
Thus, as the Commission stated, the fact that the existing decoder
infrastructure, i.e. the d-box decoder and the Beta access technology, was
59 See the Commission Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on
the Convergence Green Paper, COM (1999) 108, 10.3.1999, at p. ii; and the Working
Document of the Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the
Convergence Green Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 19.
60
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Case IV/M.993 and IV/M.1027, OJ L53/1, 27 February 1999.
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controlled by CLT-UFA and Kirch "could ensure that the terms for the use of
Beta access technology, and in particular the price structure applied, were
advantageous to Premiere and unfavourable to potential competitors'
programmes".61
EPG was also identified as another potential technical bottleneck. EPG
serves the purpose of providing the user with the information about the
programmes on offer for viewing. Besides simple program listings, EPG
provides supplementary services such as program descriptions and reviews
and gives users the ability to highlight those programs in which they are
interested and to modify the order in which program information is displayed.
Again content providers can be guaranteed to have access to the consumer
only if their programmes on offer are displayed in the EPG menu. So it is clear
that vertically integrated broadcaster/platform operators will have the chance to
exclude other broadcasters' programme information from their services or to
unfairly favour their own programme providers (e.g. by discriminating against
the presentation of other providers' details on the EPG). As is pointed out in
the Danish Government's response to the Convergence Green Paper,
"when the consumer is to choose among several hundred offerings, it is not
immaterial in what order or context an offering is presented. Control of an EPG
may therefore serve as a basis for drawing attention to one's own offerings,
while offerings that the controlling operator does not wish to be promoted are
given a less conspicuous presentation".62
4.3. The current regulatory regime
It must be remembered here that the TV Standards Directive63 in 1995
established a regulatory regime for digital television conditional access
systems with the aim to govern the economic behaviour of market players.
The TV Standards Directive recognises, on the one hand, that investors will
have an incentive to enter such a highly uncertain market only if they can make
61
ibid., at para. 58. See also at paras 67-68.
62 Danish Government's reply to the Convergence Green Paper, April 1998, at p. 6.
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a reasonable return on their risky investment. As it stated in the preamble, "the
operators of conditional access services should be entitled to earn a return on
their investments and for the provision of services to broadcasters as an
incentive to continue to invest".64 This is the reason why the Directive tolerates
proprietary conditional access systems embedded in digital television
decoders. In addition, it seems to accept the fact that, in comparison with open
standards, proprietary technology is developing more rapidly. This happens
mainly because the process associated with open standards is time consuming
and requires the participation and co-operation of different administrations and
committees. Moreover, since the market development of digital platforms in
Europe is still uncertain and definitely not yet completed, it would be premature
to impose mandatory open standards. Indeed, such an approach would require
regulators to choose standards and entail the risk that the wrong choice was
made. As a result, investment and innovation could be hindered.
On the other hand, the Directive identifies the significance for a provider of
content and services to have access to the services required for the utilisation
of a digital infrastructure. Thus a requirement is introduced according to which
a provider of services subject to conditional access is obliged to
"offer to all broadcasters, on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis,
technical services enabling the broadcasters' digitally-transmitted services to
be received by viewers authorized by means of decoders administered by the
service operators, and comply with Community competition law, in particular if
a dominant position appears".65
Thus it seems that the TV Standards Directive has opted for a light and
compromising regulatory regime in order to support the start of digital TV
services. Indeed, although it does not introduce unnecessarily onerous
conditions (since it allows proprietary technology), it recognises the fact that, in
order not only to prevent proprietary standards from hampering the creation
and development of new services and markets, but also to ensure plurality and
consumer choice, safeguard measures are required. This is therefore the role
63 Directive 95/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
use of standards for the transmission of television signals, 95/47/EC, OJ L 281/51, 23.11.95
(hereafter: the TV Standards Directive).
64
TV Standards Directive, at the preamble.
65
ibid., at Article 4(c).
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of the aforementioned requirement that relations between conditional access
providers and broadcasters should be conducted on fair, reasonable and non¬
discriminatory terms: to sustain competition and, at the same time, to ensure
that the public interest is protected.
The Directive's attempt to find the right balance between encouraging
sustainable competition in the market place and safeguarding the public
interest while not hindering investment and innovation is well illustrated in the
Convergence Green Paper:
"The Directive takes a deliberately balanced position for the start-up phase of
this new industry. Its requirements are sufficiently light to encourage innovation
and investment in a rapidly evolving technical and commercial environment,
and sufficiently strong to protect fair competition and consumer welfare".66
4.4. Proposals for a new regulatory framework
It should be stressed that the TV Standards Directive addresses only
conditional access services for digital television. Thus it does not cover the
provision of conditional access services for other kind of services, such as on¬
line services. In addition, it was conceived when the focus was on set-top
boxes and conditional access as the only proprietary technical gateways. Due
to rapid technological progress, however, as already mentioned, further
gateway technologies related to digital television have emerged (e.g. APIs and
EPGs) since the Directive was adopted.
So, with regard to the question of how digital gateways should be tackled in
the converging environment,67 many responses supported the principles of the
Digital TV Standards Directive and considered them to be the best model for
the regulation of digital services in the future. Thus some argued that the TV
Standards Directive needs updating in order to include all the existing and
potential gateway technologies (particularly, but not exclusively, the APIs and
66
Convergence Green Paper, at p. 24.
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EPGs).68 Others went even further and, in the light of the agreement for a
horizontal approach to the regulation of infrastructure, argued that the Directive
should be replaced by an entirely new one providing a broader framework for
access both to networks and gateways.69 More specifically, in the context of
evolving technology and markets, they stressed the need to take a cross-
sectoral perspective on problems associated with access. Therefore, since the
role of digital gateways is not confined to the broadcasting services only but
extends to all digital services, they put forward the view that a consistent set of
regulatory rules and principles should apply to any proprietary technical
devices which may be used to restrict access, irrespective of the types of
services carried via them.
This approach avoids the need for listing in detail all present and potential
barriers to access and, therefore, in contrast to a simple updating of the TV
Standards Directive - where there is the risk of the inability to predict and keep
up with the pace of the rapid advances in technology - it allows regulators
sufficient flexibility to react against all future access problems that may arise in
a converged environment and to accommodate unanticipated technological
and market developments. In addition, by not distinguishing between access to
networks and access to digital gateways, it strengthens even more the general
agreement on the need to move from sectoral organisation of the regulation of
infrastructure towards a more horizontal approach: networks and digital
67
See the Working Document of the Commission, summary of the results of the public
consultation on the Convergence Green Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 10; and the
Commission Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the
Convergence Green Paper, COM (1999) 108, 10.3.1999, at p. 11.
68 See for instance the BBC's response to EU Convergence Working Document [SEC(98) 1284],
November 1998, at p. 9; the Independent Television Commission's (ITC) response to the
Commission's Working Document [SEC(98) 1284], November 1998, at p. 3; DigiTAG
responses to the questions posed by the European Commission's Working Document
[SEC(98) 1284], November 1998, at p. 1.
69 See for instance the response of the World DAB Forum (the Forum for Digital Audio
Broadcasting) to the Commission's Working Document ]SEC(98) 1284], November 1998, at
pp. 5-6; and the Independent Television Association's (ITV) reply to the Commission's
Working Document ]SEC(98) 1284], November 1998, at p. 3.
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gateways should be governed by a single set of technologically neutral rules.70
4.5. The essential facilities doctrine and sector specific-
regulation
Many Commission officials seem sceptical about the application of specific
regulation whereas they appear to rely on the use of competition law and, in
particular, on the essential facilities doctrine. For instance, Jean-Eric de
Cockborne - Head of the Communications Regulatory Policy Unit at the
European Commission - underlines the limitations of specific regulation when
he stresses the timescales (two years) associated with the legislative process
under the EU co-decision procedure (especially if we consider the rapid
technological advances and market developments which will take place during
that time).71 Furthermore, Dr. Ungerer supports an increasing reliance on
competition law when he states that
"competition law - in the form of a developed essential facilities concept - can
adjust, in a flexible manner, to situations of convergence, by adjusting the
market definitions used and without changing either the regulatory framework
or its basic principles".72
He justifies his preference for the application of competition law by stressing
the disadvantage of the sector-specific regimes with regard to access to
70 DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: A common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, 27 April 2000, Chapter I, at p. 5;
Communication from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000)
239 final, 26.4.2000, at pp. 8 and 20; Communication from the Commission "Towards a new
framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999
Communications Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at pp. 3 and 6; Commission
Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence
Green Paper, COM (1999) 108 EN final, 10.3.1999, at pp. 2 and 9; Working Document of the
Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the Convergence Green
Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 30.
71
Jean-Eric de Cockborne, Bernard Clements and Adam Watson Brown, "EU policy on
multimedia regulation", presented on 14 June 1999 at the Montreux Symposium '99, p. 10.
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Herbert Ungerer, "Ensuring efficient access to bottleneck network facilities: the case of
telecommunications in the European Union", at p. 27, Florence, 13th November 1998.
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bottleneck situations, namely "their intrinsic ex-ante and more interventionist
nature" which results in the need to "outguess to some extent the future
(market and social) development if they want to ensure efficient access in such
a situation of rapid market change".73
Of course, the disadvantage of the specific regulation associated with the
long timescales required for the legislative process can be tackled, as
proposed, by issuing non-binding interim access guidelines. The role of these
guidelines (until the adoption of legislation) will be to establish legal and
economic principles, clarify how NRAs should react to problematic situations
and, thus, provide them with the opportunity to take steps in order to ensure
effective competition on the market.74 Even then, however, many believe that
digital gateways can be considered as bottlenecks only in the short term75 and,
therefore, as BT has put it, in attempting to predict and accommodate market
developments, "disproportionate effort will be put in to regulating for such
eventualities".76
In addition, a number of contributions suggested that only competition law
and, in particular, the application of the 'essential facilities' doctrine, can
provide sufficient flexibility in order to take into account the rapid technical,
economic and market developments and balance the interests of investors on
the one hand with the interests of consumers and the need for open and
competitive markets on the other.77
It should be not forgotten, however, that investment is encouraged only by a
regulatory framework characterised by stability and legal certainty. Since the
73
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case law of the Court of Justice has not yet developed well-established
principles and practices regarding access issues, it is obvious that reliance
solely on competition law cannot provide the necessary stability and certainty.
Otherwise, investors run the risk of becoming the 'sacrificial lambs' of an
experimental policy. In addition, issues associated with access to digital
gateways are considered to be of major importance, not only because of their
potential anti-competitive effects, but also because of the existence of certain
public policy objectives - such as the preservation of pluralism and consumer
choice - which cannot be safeguarded by the sole application of competition
law. This is another reason why the majority of the responses favoured a
continuing role for specific regulation.78
Moreover, it has already been shown above79 that an over-zealous and over-
interventionist approach concerning the application of the essential facilities
doctrine can seriously undermine the incentive for firms to invest and innovate.
So the essential facilities doctrine should be applied with caution and,
therefore, a number of conditions should be identified which could help towards
reducing or minimising the negative effects on the essential facilities operators.
Among these conditions, a prominent role should be played by the principle
that the essential facilities doctrine will apply only when the operator of the
essential facility is also active (and possibly dominant) on the market
downstream of that facility and, at the same time, there is no effective
competition in the downstream market or the refusal to provide access can
have a significantly negative effect on the downstream competition. The above
principle should be always used alongside the qualified criteria identified by the
Commission's Access Notice of August 1998.80
The necessity for a less interventionist approach with regard to the
application of the essential facilities doctrine is demonstrated by the ECJ in the
Oscar Bronner case.81 In that case, the defendants (collectively referred to as
Mediaprint) were all part of the same publishing group and published two
newspapers read by 71 per cent of all newspaper readers in Austria, delivered
by Mediaprint's nationwide early morning home delivery scheme. This scheme
78 See the Commission Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on
the Convergence Green Paper, COM (1999) 108, 10.3.1999, at p. 12.
79 See Chapter 2.
80 Commission's Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in
the Telecommunications Sector, [1998] O.J. C 265/2, at para. 91.
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constituted the only nationwide home-delivery distribution service for
subscribers of daily newspapers in Austria.
Mediaprint refused to include Oscar Bronner's newspaper, Der Standard
(which had a 3.6 per cent share of the Austrian daily newspaper market), in the
delivery service for a reasonable payment. Oscar Bronner applied for an order
restraining Mediaprint from abusing its alleged dominant position on the
market. Oscar Bronner referred to the essential facilities doctrine by arguing
that Mediaprint's network was indispensable for all those companies willing to
develop viable economic operations, since they would not be able to compete
effectively on the daily newspapers market if they were refused access.82 It
based its arguments on the grounds that Mediaprint was the only operator of a
nationwide home-delivery scheme, that postal delivery does not represent an
equivalent alternative to home delivery and that, due to the small circulation
and consequently small number of Der Standard subscribers, it would not be
economically viable to organise and operate - by itself or in co-operation with
other publishers - its own national delivery scheme.83
84
The Court held that there was no abuse of a dominant position, as it did not
consider Mediaprint's delivery scheme to be indispensable, i.e. a facility without
access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers. In
particular, it stated that there were satisfactory alternative methods to the
Mediaprint's network - such as distributing daily newspapers by post or
through shops and kiosks - even if they were less advantageous.85 Further,
there was not
"any technical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of making it
impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher of daily
newspapers to establish, alone or in co-operation with other publishers, its own
nationwide home-delivery scheme and use it to distribute its own daily
newspapers".86
81 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791.
82
ibid., at ground 24.
83
ibid., at ground 8.
84
ibid., at ground 47 and the operative part.
85
ibid., at ground 43.
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The mere fact of the small circulation of Der Standard could not be used as an
argument to demonstrate that it would be seriously and unavoidably
uneconomic for Oscar Bronner to build up its own home-delivery scheme.87
The opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in this case also illustrates the view
that, in order to encourage innovation and technological progress, significant
consideration should be given to the vast investment required to establish
digital platforms and services as well as to the uncertain returns on digital
investments. As Jacobs stated,
"in the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of
consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has
developed for the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a
production, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there
would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus
while competition was increased in the short term it would be reduced in the
long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in
efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able
to share the benefits";88 "particular care is required where the goods or
services or facilities to which access is demanded represent the fruit of
substantial investment".89
Thus, in line with the Court's view, it seems that most of the digital gateways
cannot qualify as 'essential facilities'. Indeed, it will be difficult to establish that
the refusal to provide access to a digital gateway can have a significantly
negative effect on the downstream competition. This is true since, in parallel
with the digital gateway in question, other distribution systems will give content
providers the opportunity to deliver their programmes to the consumers. This is
also recognised by the study conducted by Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and
Analysys when it points out that the essential facilities doctrine "cannot be
relied on as the sole or principal tool to regulate ex post interconnection and
86
ibid., at ground 44.
87
ibid., at ground 45.
88
Oscar Bronner, Opinion of Jacobs, A.G., 28 May 1998, at para. 57.
89
ibid., at para. 62.
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access relationships";90 ex ante specific regulation will "continue to be
necessary to regulate certain types of access issues, as competition rules may
not always be able to produce satisfactory results of themselves".91
In addition, since convergence and the information society are still
developing, relying solely on competition law would result in legal uncertainty
and, therefore, in discouragement of investment and innovation. This
uncertainty becomes even stronger if we take into consideration the inability of
competition law to address anti-competitive practices quickly. For example,
intervention by a competition authority on the grounds of Article 82 EC will not
take place when a market player has the ability to harm competition
significantly but only after an abuse of a dominant position has been
committed. This approach is not considered satisfactory by many market
players,92 since it can discourage companies from entering the market. Indeed,
by the time the competition authority attempts to restore competition it is
possible that the complainant will have already been forced out of business.
Until the market has matured, therefore, dominant players holding potentially
bottleneck positions must be prevented from strengthening their positions and
controlling market development; gates cannot be allowed to close before they
have even started to develop. As the Commission admits,
"it would be counterproductive to remove sector specific rules designed to
ensure fair competition too rapidly if this resulted in anti-competitive outcomes,
for example if it were to lead to incumbent operators extending their strong or
dominant position throughout the converged markets".93
90
Final Report of the Study "Consumer demand for telecommunications services and the
implications of the convergence of fixed and mobile networks for the regulatory framework for
a liberalised EU market", prepared by Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and Analysys, February
2000, at p. 111.
91
ibid., at p. 103.
92
See, for instance, the Independent Television Association's (ITV) reply to the Commission's
Working Document [SEC(98) 1284], November 1998, at p. 2.
93
DGXIII, Discussion Document, Subject: "The 1999 Review - regulatory principles", 21 May
1999, at Chapter 4.2, p. 6.
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4.6. Conclusions
We therefore reach the conclusion that, with regard to the access issues
relating to digital gateways, the most efficient solution combines the application
of competition law alongside the development of specific regulation. It has
been shown that competition law in general and the essential facilities doctrine
in particular will play a major role as the market develops. However, specific
regulatory rules will still be required in order to promote and establish effective
competition and to guarantee equal and fair conditions to all market players
until the converged market has matured. Indeed, moving directly to the
application of competition rules alone could lead to new forms of integrated
dominance and to new multimedia market monopolies.
These specific regulatory rules will take the form of a new Directive which will
include the principles of the Digital TV Standards Directive and provide a
broader framework for access both to networks and digital gateways. As the
Commission states, the objective for a horizontal approach to all transport
network infrastructure and associated services will be achieved with the
introduction of the Access/Interconnection Directive (which will be based and
elaborate on the assumptions and principles of the current Interconnection and
TV Standards Directives).94 Well established principles - such as the obligation
for accounting separation and the requirement for timely declaration of the
necessary information on key technical specifications of digital gateways - will
also have a significant role to play. The new Directive will be valuable during
the transitional period towards a mature and competitive converged market and
until the case law of the Court of Justice has specifically dealt with access to
digital gateways.
94 Communication from the Commission "Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications
Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at pp. 16 and 17. See also the DG
Information Society Working Document, Subject: Access to, and interconnection of,
electronic communications networks and associated facilities, 27 April 2000.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF PART III
Part III of this thesis examined the third phase of the transition from a regime
of a State-run monopoly to an effectively competitive market. This third phase
has arisen due to the convergence of telecommunications, media, and IT
sectors, and relates to the way the current EU telecommunications regulatory
regime must be adapted to the emerging multimedia environment.
Although it could be argued that competition law (given its ex-post nature
and its case-by-case approach) can cope alone with the rapid technological
and market developments, in practice it is not sufficient enough to deal with all
future problems that may arise in a converged environment. This is true
especially given the inability of competition law to address anti-competitive
practices quickly, something which can result in lack of legal certainty and
discourage companies from entering the market. Therefore, at least during the
transition phase towards the realisation of an effectively competitive market,
specific regulation will have to play a fundamental role alongside competition
law.
At the same time, however, it was shown that the current EU regulatory
regime cannot work satisfactorily in the converging environment since, in its
current form, it is not flexible enough and thus not capable of predicting and
dealing with rapid market developments. Thus, for ex-ante regulation to deal
with the convergence phaenomenon, reconsideration of the current regulatory
regime is required. This means that a series of barriers which can have a
substantial impact on the development of a European multimedia market have
to be tackled. An example of such barrier is associated with the increasing
demand for radio-spectrum from new digital services - especially the parallel
growth of services like television broadcasting, mobile multimedia and voice
applications -, something which results in frequency scarcity. In addition, the
role of ex ante regulation will be to provide the temporary measures in order to
guarantee equal and fair conditions to all market players until the converged
telecommunications, media, and IT markets have matured. Therefore,
although the long-term objective that competition law will take over and specific
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regulation will fall away, remains valid, this will happen only with the realisation
of an effectively competitive market. In the meantime, during the transition
phase towards the realisation of an effectively competitive market, specific
regulation will remain in force. Thus, taking account of the overall objective that
regulation must be kept to the minimum where competition is self-sustaining,
and in order to accommodate the new technological and market developments,
the new regulatory framework must be light-touch, predictable, and based on
the new commercial realities rather than on arbitrary and obsolete regulatory
distinctions. Regulation has to be viewed as a tool that can be decreasingly
used as effective competition develops.
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PART IV










According to the Commission's proposal in the 1999 Communications Review,
the number of legal measures in the field should be reduced from the current
twenty to a total of six.1 So, alongside a new consolidated and simplified
Liberalisation Directive, the new regulatory regime will consist of a new
Framework Directive (replacing the ONP Framework Directive) and four
specific Directives: the Access/Interconnection Directive (based on the current
Interconnection Directive and the TV Standards Directive); the Authorisation
Directive (based on the current Licensing Directive); the Universal Service
Directive (incorporating elements of the current Voice Telephony and
Interconnection Directives); and the revised Data Protection and Privacy in the
Telecommunications Sector Directive (based on the Telecommunications Data
Protection Directive).
The Commission states that the above proposal constitutes "a substantial
simplification and consolidation of current legislation"2 and can render the new
regulatory framework "more transparent and user-friendly".3 However, it is
important that the Commission's proposal to simplify the current regulatory
regime goes beyond merely reducing the number of Directives.
This Chapter focuses on the future Framework and Access/Interconnection
Directives and attempts to assess whether the proposed regulation for
electronic communications networks and associated services is in line with the
main policy objectives and those regulatory principles that underpin the existing
1
Communication from the Commission, "Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications Review"
(hereafter the 1999 Communications Review) COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at
Section 3.3.1., pp. 15-17.
2
The 1999 Communications Review, at p. 16.
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regulatory framework and whose significance has been confirmed by the vast
majority of the comments received in the course of the public consultation,
namely legal certainty, flexibility, continuity, and transparency.
2. SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER AND DOMINANCE -
THE TWO-TIER APPROACH IS FINALLY ABANDONED
According to the Commission's proposal in the 1999 Communications Review,
the new regulatory framework for access to infrastructure will be based
primarily on commercial negotiation. Any party will be entitled to request
access but the request in question would not have to be granted if neither party
had market power. For access providers with market power, however, a two-
tier approach was proposed with the aim of creating a regulatory regime which
makes more use of competition law concepts. In particular, the Commission
proposed to use the competition law concept of dominant position as the more
appropriate trigger for the heavier ex ante obligations, e.g. obligations to
supply unbundled, cost-oriented interconnection services as well as obligations
concerning non-discrimination. At the same time, the Commission intended to
retain the current lower threshold of significant market power (SMP) for other
obligations, e.g. obligations to negotiate access and obligations for
transparency. In any case, the new framework would make provision for the
possibility of regulatory intervention in the event of an unresolved dispute or if
commercial negotiation fails. The Commission also highlighted the importance
of the application of the principle of proportionality in sector-specific regulation
by stating that the degree of regulatory intervention must be proportionate to
the level of competition in the market.4
It should be recognised that the Commission's proposal - with the
introduction of the trigger of dominance in ex ante regulation and a SMP notion
conceived along the lines of competition law - would bring the notion and
application of ex ante regulation closer to the concept of competition law.
In addition, the Commission believed that "the use of two triggers gives
3
ibid., at p. 3.
253
NRAs [national regulatory authorities] the means to apply the least
burdensome regulation to market players".5 Some responses agreed with this
view.6 This could be based on the grounds that, according to the current
regime, operators with SMP status are obliged to provide non-discriminatory
access as well as cost-orientation and transparency obligations. If the
Commission's proposal was accepted, then the obligation to provide, e.g. non¬
discriminatory access, would be imposed only upon dominant operators. Those
players with SMP would only be obliged to negotiate. Therefore, the argument
goes, the target of having less regulation without sacrificing legal certainty is
achieved.
However, regardless of whether the responses argued in favour of
abolishing or retaining the SMP concept, the vast majority of the comments
underlined its limitations.7
In order to illustrate this wide criticism, it is useful to quote some typical
comments. Thus Vodafone AirTouch stated:
"Uncertainty would also arise from the fact that in a dynamic market where
new market initiatives and technologies emerge at a rapid rate, companies
would regularly cross the 25% boundary either by gaining market share or by
losing it. Just as often they would have to be appointed as having SMP, or be
discharged of their SMP obligations. This too, would lead to a great deal of
4
ibid., at pp. 27 and 50.
5
ibid., at p. 50.
6 See for instance: Comments of Energis on the five EC Working Documents, May 2000, at p.
3; Response of the United States Government to the 1999 Communications Review, February
11, 2000, at p. 7; Response from Oftel to the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000,
at para. 58, pp. 9-10; Submission from Esat Telecom on the 1999 Communications Review,
February 2000, at p. 10.
7
See for instance: Sonera Corporation's comments on the 1999 Communications Review, 20
December 1999, at p. 3; Finnet Group's comments on the 1999 Communications Review,
February 2000, at p. 4; European Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association
(ETNO) Reflection Document on the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000, at para.
2.1, p. 8; Position Paper by Telecom Austria on the 1999 Communications Review, 14
February 2000, at para. IV, pp. 10-11; European Cable Communications Association (ECCA)
submission on the 1999 Communications Review, 15 February 2000, at para. 2.5.3, p. 10;
Comments by BT on the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000, at p. 18; Response
from Oftel to the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000, at para. 46, pp. 7-8;




And the BBC pointed out:
"In a converging and fast moving market, market positions can be built up -
and lost - very rapidly. The new entrant who is refused access from a gateway
controller with only 24% of the market for the delivery of one particular service
today, may well find that the same firm has 60% of the market one year later.
... By the time gateway controllers become subject to access obligations their
position may well be unassailable".9
In addition, the overwhelming majority of the responses to the Commission's
proposals stressed the point that an obligation only to negotiate, coupled with
the parties' disincentive to reach an agreement and the power of NRAs to
intervene, creates an equally problematic situation and results in regulatory
uncertainty.10 Again, it is beneficial to cite some of those responses.
Take for example the European Cable Communications Association
(ECCA):
"Imposing an obligation to negotiate access offers the worst of both worlds. ...
The incentive of those requesting access is to turn the bargaining process into
a managed media event, which would almost inevitably become political. ...
[with] the risk that a politically expedient decision would be imposed on the
parties. In expectation of this, political lobbying would become intense. This, of
course, is an anathema to the idea of independent regulation and were this to
occur it would likely have severe consequences for the level of investment in
8
Response from Vodafone AirTouch to the 1999 Communications Review, 24 January 2000,
at pp. 13 and 23.
9
Response from BBC to the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000, at para. 21, p. 7.
10 See for instance: Response of the Dutch Government to the 1999 Communications Review,
January 2000, at p. 15; Position of AOL Europe to the 1999 Communications Review, 14
February 2000, at para. 32, p. 9; Omnitel Pronto Italia comments on the 1999
Communications Review, February 2000, at para. 3.2, p. 10; Submission of Versatel
Telecom International to the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000, at p. 6.
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the whole of the converging industries".11
And as Oftel has put it:
"The Commission's belief that it will be sufficient to place SMP players under
an obligation to negotiate access or interconnection is unrealistic. Market
players with SMP will have no incentive to reach agreement unless the ground
rules for NRA resolution of a dispute are clear. They need clarity about NRAs'
approach to interconnection and access. Equally, market players without SMP
should not be encouraged to take unreasonable negotiating positions in the
hope that these will be upheld by the NRA".12
It is obvious from the aforementioned comments that the Commission's
proposals, even if we accept that they could contribute to a less regulated
regime, would not tackle the problem of legal uncertainty. Therefore the
Commission's proposals should be reconsidered. However, instead of opting
for abolishing the SMP criterion and relying exclusively on competition law - as
some have argued - what is required is the revision of the definition of SMP in
a relevant market. The aim should be to construct the definition along the lines
of competition law, i.e. taking account of factors such as demand and supply
substitutability as well as homogeneity of competitive conditions. This was
finally recognised by the Commission which, as a result of the public
consultation and the comments received, decided not to introduce two
thresholds for the imposition of ex-ante rules. Instead, it proposed to have only
one threshold, called SMP, but re-defined on the basis of the competition law
concept of dominant position. As the Commission explained:
"[The] proposal to introduce two thresholds (SMP and dominance) for ex ante
regulation is unlikely to be effective. ... A more flexible mechanism than the
current SMP concept is required for determining the cases where imposition of
ex ante regulation is indispensable, based on an economic market analysis
and identification of the real sources of an operator's power in a given market
or market segment. This will have the advantage of giving flexibility to national
11
European Cable Communications Association (ECCA) submission on the 1999
Communications Review, 15 February 2000, at para. 2.4, p. 8.
12
Response from Oftel to the 1999 Communications Review, February 2000, at para. 18, p. 4.
256
regulators to fit the regulatory framework to its national situation, while
maintaining the integrity of the single market through strong co-ordination
procedures at European level. The Commission therefore proposes to modify
the concept of SMP and use it as the underlying concept for imposing ex ante
obligations relating to access and interconnection. In particular, the market
share threshold of 25% would no longer be part of the definition. Instead, the
definition would be based on the concept of dominant position in particular
markets, calculated in a manner consistent with EC competition law practice,
as a trigger for the heavier ex ante obligations, and would cover all aspects
including joint dominance and leverage of market power into associated
markets".13
The following sections identify the most important issues found in the Working
Documents of April 2000 and the Proposed Directives of July 2000 and attempt
to assess whether the Commission's goal of having a regulatory framework
characterised by legal certainty, predictability, flexibility, continuity, and
transparency is reached.
3. UNDERTAKINGS WITH SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER
With regard to when NRAs will be able to notify companies as having SMP and
thus to impose ex-ante obligations, the Commission follows the principles
established in competition law practice. Thus it states that NRAs will be able to
designate undertakings as having SMP only where such firms would be
considered to have a dominant position under competition law and, in
particular, if the undertaking in question,
"either individually or jointly with others as a result of economic
interdependence between them, enjoys a position of economic strength
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of
13 Communication from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000)
239 final, 26 April 2000, at para. 3.3, p. 22.
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competitors, customers and ultimately consumers, and where
- the undertaking has financed infrastructure partly or wholly on the basis of
special or exclusive rights which have been abolished, and there are legal,
technical or economic barriers to market entry, in particular for construction of
network infrastructure;
or
- the undertaking concerned is a vertically-integrated entity owning or
operating network infrastructure for delivery of services to customers and also
providing services over that infrastructure, and its competitors necessarily
require access to some of its facilities to compete with it in downstream
market".14
It should be remembered that the Commission decided to abandon the "pre-
established presumptions" based on 25% of market share and to rely on a
more sophisticated economic market analysis. However, Section 13(2) puts the
focus on incumbents by referring to undertakings which have "financed
infrastructure partly or wholly on the basis of special or exclusive right". This
reference reflects judgments based on historic circumstances without taking
into account the current situation and other market-oriented criteria. As the
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) has put it,
"The concept of the original sin that will follow the incumbents does not go
along with the developments in the market. The legislation of the sector must
be aligned to the corresponding one for competition and the NRAs should
intervene only in cases where market failures are observed according to the
14 DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: A common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services (hereafter the Working Document on a
common regulatory framework), 27 April 2000, at Section 13(2).
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powers provided for by the legislation".15
Indeed, there is no sufficient reason to presume anti-competitive behaviour and
thus to regulate incumbents as such only because they enjoyed special or
exclusive rights in the past. Any decision to assess the competitiveness of a
given market should be taken on consumer-benefit grounds and on the basis
of a careful analysis of the actual and prospective state of competition in that
market by identifying - amongst other things - the real sources of an
operator's power. Therefore, the reference to "special and exclusive rights"
should be deleted.
Moreover, the Commission seems to have accepted the argument that it is
excessive regulatory intervention and not consistent with EU competition law to
suggest that a vertically integrated entity should be per se subject to ex-ante
regulation even when no abuse of a dominant position has taken place.16
In addition, the Commission needs to clarify whether the term "necessarily"
refers to the essential facilities doctrine. Although many responses believe that
this is the case,17 the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) warns the
Commission that "the essential facility test is too restrictive to use as a basis
for a sector-specific threshold for intervention. The availability of an alternative
facility is not a sufficient guarantee of effective competition".18
As a result of the comments received, the Commission decided to delete
paragraph 2(b) of Section 13. So, an undertaking will be considered to have
15
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) comments on the Working Documents of
DG Information Society, May 2000, at p. 2. See also: Submission of Telenor AS to the
Working Documents of DG Information Society, 19 May 2000, at p. 2; Royal KPN N.V.
comments to the Working Documents of DG Information Society, May 2000 , at p. 5;
Preliminary comments of the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications on the DG
Information Society Working Documents, May 2000, at p. 3; Comments by BT on draft
proposals for Directives of 27 April 2000, May 2000, at p. 1; Belgacom S.A. position paper on
the Working Documents of DG Information Society, May 19, 2000, at p. 1.
16
See for instance: Orange comments on DG Information Society's Working Documents, May
2000, at p. 3; One 2 One's comments on DG Information Society's Working Documents, May
2000 , at p. 5.
17 See for instance: United Pan-Europe Communications (UPC) comments on the DG
Information Society Working Documents, May 2000, at pp. 4-5; E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH,
comments on the DG Information Society Working Documents, May 2000, at p. 1;
Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH (MMO) comments on the DG Information Society Working
Documents, May 2000, at p. 2; BT comments on the DG Information Society Working
Documents, May 2000, at p. 1; Royal KPN N.V. comments on the DG Information Society
Working Documents, May 2000, at p. 5.
18
Independent Regulators Group (IRG) common position on the DG Information Society
Working Documents, May 2000, at para. 59, p. 12.
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SMP "if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position of economic
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers".19
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Commission takes into
consideration the finding of the ECJ in Tetra Pak.20 In that case, due to the
extremely high market share on the dominated market and the close links
between the dominated and non-dominated market, Tetra Pak was found "in a
situation comparable to that of holding a dominant position on the markets in
question as a whole".21 Based on Tetra Pak, therefore, the Commission is
determined to deal with those cases where dominant telecommunications (or
cable) operators are moving into related fields such as the Internet or digital TV
and are leveraging their dominance into those new or neighbouring markets.
Indeed, if not acting, a potential market foreclosure could hinder innovation,
hold back market development and have an enormous impact on the future
competitive structures of the EU communications sector. This is why the
Commission states:
"Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it
may also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related
market where it has a leading market position, and the links between the two
markets are such as to allow the market power held in one market to be
leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market power of the
undertaking".22
The Commission follows the same approach it took in its Communication of
March 1998 on the Cable Review.23 There, the Commission stated that Article
82 will
19
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (hereafter the
Proposed Framework Directive), COM (2000) 393, 12 July 2000, at Article 13(2).
20
Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR 1-5951.
21
ibid., at ground 31.
22
Working Document on a common regulatory framework, at Section 13(3).
23 Commission Communication concerning the review under competition rules of the joint
provision of telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator and the abolition
of restrictions on the provision of cable TV capacity over telecommunications networks, OJ C
71/4, 7.3.1998.
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"be applied a fortiori to an undertaking which is the owner of both a
telecommunications and a cable network, in particular when it is dominant on
both markets. Where companies enjoy a dominant position on two markets,
they must take particular care not to allow their conduct to impair genuine
undistorted competition. In particular, that dominance cannot be leveraged into
neighbouring markets, impede the emergence of new services or strengthen
their dominance through acquisitions or co-operative ventures either
horizontally or vertically".24
However, the notion that Article 82 will be applied when the owner of both a
telecommunications and a cable network enjoys a dominant position on both
markets is problematic and does not seem to take into consideration the
finding in the Tetra Pak case. Indeed, it is enough that the undertaking in
question is dominant in one market and that there are close links between the
dominated and non-dominated market.
Interestingly, it seems that the aforementioned argument is recognised by
the Commission in its Proposed Framework Directive, since the words "where
it has a leading market position"25 are deleted in order to ensure consistency
with the ECJ's ruling. So Section 13(3) was amended to read as follows:
"Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it
may also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related
market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow the
market power held in one market to be leveraged into the other market,
thereby strengthening the market power of the undertaking".26
Finally, the Commission is obviously concerned that following an overly-
interventionist approach could hinder innovation and thus it points out that
NRAs will not be able to classify any player in newly emerging markets as
having significant market power - and therefore subject to regulatory
obligations - since the first mover will almost certainly enjoy a substantial
market share.27 However, there is need for more clarification of what might be
classified as a newly emerging market.
24
ibid., at para. 67.
25
Working Document on a common regulatory framework, at Section 13(3).
26
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 13(3).
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In the end, the Commission decided not to include Section 13(4) in its
Proposed Framework Directive. It is submitted that guidance and further
clarification of the circumstances in which a market can be classified as "newly
emerging" could be given by the Commission's Decision on Relevant Product
and Service Markets which will be issued under Article 14 of the Proposed
Framework Directive.
4. MARKET DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
According to the Commission's proposed model, relevant markets will no
longer be prescribed in Directives - a method used in the current regime where
the relevant market is defined in the specific ONP Directives (interconnection,
voice telephony, leased lines). Instead, the responsibility for defining markets
for the purposes of ex ante regulation will belong to the national regulatory
authorities. Thus NRAs will be empowered to determine relevant markets from
time to time using a methodology which follows the principles of EU
competition law.
Such an approach achieves the target of bringing ex-ante specific regulation
closer to the concepts of competition law. In addition, the regulatory framework
becomes more technologically independent and, therefore, flexible enough to
accommodate evolutionary market developments.
However, there is the risk that this approach could lead to legal uncertainty
and market fragmentation since NRAs will have a significant degree of
freedom to depart from the principles of competition law when undertaking the
relevant market analysis. This could result in divergence of regulatory decision¬
making across the EU. The question therefore is, how can the process of
defining the markets upon which the market power of an undertaking is
assessed be associated with flexibility, objectivity, transparency, and legal
certainty? It is submitted that harmonised EU guidance for the NRAs on
making the assessment of relevant markets is indispensable. Indeed, such a
guidance will constitute the right mechanism to co-ordinate a consistent
27
Working Document on a common regulatory framework, at Section 13(4). See also the 1999
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regulatory approach with regard to market definition and will ensure that NRAs
decisions are compatible with EU competition rules. As the Commission has
put it, "guidelines at European level would be necessary to facilitate correct
application of the competition law principles, and to avoid having different
market definitions in different Member States, which would have a negative
impact on the internal market".28
The process to be used by NRAs when defining the markets and deciding
whether to either impose, maintain or remove obligations on specific
undertakings is set out in Article 14 of the Proposed Framework Directive.
According to this process, the Commission - after consultation with the High
Level Communications Group - will be required to publish a Decision (a Notice
according to the Working Document on a common regulatory framework) on
Relevant Product and Service Markets. This Decision - which will be subject to
regular review (preferably issued on an annual basis) - will list those product
and service markets within the electronic communications sector whose
characteristics may justify the imposition of ex-ante regulatory obligations. In
addition, the Commission will publish Guidelines on market analysis and the
calculation of SMP.29
NRAs will not be able to impose such ex-ante regulation in markets not
identified in this Decision. Ex-ante regulatory intervention in markets not listed
in the Decision can be justified only in exceptional circumstances - and only
after the prior agreement of the Commission.30
Within two months of the date of adoption of the Decision, NRAs will have to
carry out an analysis of the product and service markets identified in the
Decision, in line with the Commission's Guidelines. Thereafter, NRAs will
assess the extent of competition in a given market and will provide the
Commission with a list of those undertakings with SMP for the purpose of
implementing the ex-ante obligations. The NRAs' analysis of each market will
have to be published.
In particular, the following provisions will apply:
- When the analysis carried out by NRAs shows that a market identified in
the Commission's Decision is effectively competitive or that an operator no
Communications Review, at p. 27.
28
The 1999 Communications Review, at p. 50.
29
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(1)(a).
30
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(1 )(c); Working Document on a common regulatory
framework, Section 14(2)(b).
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longer has SMP status, then no ex-ante regulatory obligations can be
introduced. If ex-ante obligations already existed, then NRAs will be required to
suspend those obligations imposed on undertakings in that specific market.31
- When NRAs conclude - on the basis of the market analysis undertaken -
that the characteristics of the market in question justify regulatory intervention
(i.e. where competition is not effective), then the already existing regulatory
obligations will be maintained. If the market analysis justifies the introduction of
further ex-ante obligations, then NRAs will identify the undertakings on which
the new obligations will be imposed as well as the obligations themselves.32
The vast majority of the market players supported the aforementioned market
analysis procedure, mainly due to the legal certainty that it seems to introduce.
Indeed, the fact that NRAs will be able to impose ex ante obligations only in the
markets identified in the Commission's Decision on Relevant Product and
Service Markets (with the exception of Article 14(1 )(c)) can lead to a more
certain and predictable environment.
However, nothing clarifies when and under what circumstances a "prior
agreement of the Commission" can be given so that NRAs can impose ex ante
obligations in markets not listed in the Decision. As an example of how vague
this is, the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) took the view that the
Commission's consent is not necessary when NRAs want to impose ex-ante
obligations on markets not set out in the Decision on Relevant Product and
Service Markets. As IRG pointed out, any market may exhibit a large variation
in the state of competition across Member States and, therefore, the issue of
deciding the markets that are relevant for the assessment of SMP should be
left to the discretion of NRAs. If the target is to carry out a detailed economic
and competition analysis (which will take account of national circumstances),
NRAs will need the power to consider additional markets - i.e. markets not
listed in the Commission's Decision - whenever that is objectively justified. As
stated by IRG, section 14(2) - now article 14(1)(c) - constitutes an
"excessive centralisation of decision-making by the Commission, contrary to
the principle of regulating as close as possible to the market. It also has the
31
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(4); Working Document on a common regulatory
framework, Section 14(4).
32
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(5); Working Document on a common regulatory
framework, Section 14(5).
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potential to significantly restrict and slow down appropriate actions by NRAs
while they await decisions by the Commission on the status of any markets. ...
the Commission is in a poor position to reach conclusions on whether a
particular market in a particular Member State is one where a competition
problem arises. NRAs, not the Commission, have the expertise to do this and
the local knowledge to do so in a timely manner".33
What IRG proposed therefore is that the second sub-paragraph of section
14(2) should be amended to read as follows:
"Where, after a justified application from an interested party or in an action
taken on its own behalf, an NRA has to impose ex ante regulation on a market
not listed in the Notice [now Decision], it shall: - Define such markets in
accordance with the principles of market definition for the purposes of
competition law, paying the utmost regard to any guidance issued by the
Commission for that purpose; - and, observe the agreed transparency
procedure [referring to section 6 of the Working Document on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services]".3
It is submitted that this IRG proposal, in conjunction with the safeguards of a
provision allowing the Commission the possibility of revoking a decision of the
NRAs and the application of the transparency procedure set out in Article 6 of
the Framework Directive, can contribute to the achievement of the right
balance between flexibility and stability. Indeed, such an approach will provide
the necessary legal certainty for market players while making room for
sufficient flexibility to allow NRAs to deal effectively with a market problem by
interpreting it in the light of national circumstances.
In the end, the Commission did not proceed to any major modifications of
the text. However, for the sake of transparency and legal certainty, it explicitly
stated that "measures taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be subject to
the procedure set out in Article 6".35
3
Independent Regulators Group (IRG) common position on the DG Information Society
Working Documents, May 2000, at paras 69 and 71, p. 13.
34
ibid., at para. 73, p. 14.
35
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(6).
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5. CONSULTATION AND TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM
The NRAs' decisions to impose, maintain or remove obligations on
undertakings will have to be notified to the Commission and other NRAs and to
be in line with the procedures laid down in Section 6 of the Working Document
on a common regulatory framework.
When NRAs take decisions affecting third parties, they will publish the
decisions in draft and will give all interested parties the chance to comment.
NRAs will postpone adoption of the final decision for three months from the
date of receipt of the aforementioned notification by the Commission. The
adoption of the final decision could be postponed for six months if the
Commission believes (after delivering a detailed opinion) that the decision in
question may jeopardise the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty.
The consultation and transparency procedure set out in Section 6 of the
Working Document on a common regulatory framework is indispensable in
order to ensure greater transparency and to promote a coherent application of
communications law by regulators across the EU. However, there are some
problem areas which certainly require further review:
• Clearly the Commission and other NRAs within Europe are included in the
definition of "interested parties". However, it is not clear what the scope of "all
interested parties" is and, therefore, further clarification is required on who
should have the chance to comment on those measures suggested by NRAs.
In addition, for the sake of transparency and certainty, the third sub-paragraph
of paragraph 2 should be amended to read as follows: "The national regulatory
authority shall take such comments into account, together with those of
interested parties referred to in 6(1), as far as possible ...".
• Furthermore, it is unclear what might be classified as a decision "which will
affect" providers and users and the Commission needs, therefore, to clarify
whether all decisions of NRAs or only a certain type of decision will be subject
to the notification procedure. Thus guidelines are needed in order to provide a
clear interpretation of the abstract concept of a decision which is capable of
affecting providers and users. A sensible approach would be to distinguish
between decisions with fundamental consequences and routine or minor
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operational decisions. Otherwise, treating all decisions - irrespective of their
nature - under the same process and timescales can significantly complicate
and slow down the consultation process, create uncertainties for firms
considering investing in infrastructure and services and jeopardise the efficient
development of new services and products. As NTL illustrates:
"... the notification procedure can become too burdensome and time-
consuming to be applied to every single NRA decision likely to affect market
operators or users. NTL would therefore recommend that the fully-fledged
notification procedure would be used only for major and precedent-setting NRA
decisions, such as proposed ex ante obligations involving access to
communications networks. For decisions of lesser importance, it should
probably be sufficient for the NRAs merely notifying the Commission without
an obligation to postpone the implementation of the decisions".36
Taking into consideration the comments received, the Commission hints that,
in order to avoid an unnecessarily complicated and time-consuming
consultation mechanism, only major decisions will be subject to the notification
procedure. Indeed, in its Proposal for a Framework Directive, the Commission
replaced the words "decisions which will affect" so that the text reads as
follows: "Member States shall ensure that where national regulatory authorities
intend to take measures in accordance with this Directive or the Specific
Measures [found in the Proposal for an Access Directive], they give interested
parties the chance to comment within a reasonable period".37 Moreover, it
makes clear that NRAs will be subject to the consultation mechanism of Article
6 - and thus be obliged to follow the notification procedure and to
36
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Documents, May 19, 2000, at p. 4; BT comments on the DG Information Society Working
Documents, May 2000, at p. 2; WorldCom comments on the DG Information Society Working
Documents, 24 May 2000, at p. 5.
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communicate their draft measure to the Commission and other NRAs - only
when they intend to take measures with fundamental consequences, namely
measures under Article 8 or Article 14(4) and (5) of the Proposed Framework
Directive or Article 8(2) of the Proposed Access and Interconnection
Directive.38
• The timeframes proposed in paragraphs 4 and 5 (6 and 12 months
respectively) will extend the NRAs' decision making process and lead to an
unnecessarily complicated and time-consuming notification procedure.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the Commission consider using only one
timescale, namely the three-month period proposed in paragraph 3. Moreover,
paragraphs 4 - 6 should be deleted in order to ensure that no further delay is
introduced into the consultation process.
In the end, the Commission adopted the view that a shorter timescale is
essential and decided that the measures that NRAs intend to take will go into
effect one month (instead of three months as had been initially proposed) after
the date of the communication referred to in paragraph 2. A period of a further
two months (thus a total of three months) will be required in case the
Commission has serious doubts with regard to the compatibility of the measure
with Community law and in particular the provisions of Article 7 of this
Directive.39
The Commission was convinced that the safeguards of paragraphs 1 to 3
are enough to ensure that speed - in terms of a shorter regulatory reaction
time - will not be achieved at the expense of transparency and legal certainty.
Further modifications and additions make this argument even stronger. Indeed,
NRAs will be required to publish their national consultation procedures;40 when
they communicate their draft measure to the Commission, they will have to
state the reasons and the grounds on which the measure in question is
based;41 they will "take the utmost account of comments of other national
regulatory authorities"42 (which is stronger in comparison with the words "shall
take such comments into account as far as possible");43 and the Commission
37
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will be able, if necessary, to require NRAs to amend or withdraw the draft
measure in question.44
• Finally, it should be stressed that, in exceptional circumstances, i.e. when
NRAs consider that there is an urgent need to act in order to protect
competition and the interests of users, they may adopt measures immediately
and thus avoid the consultation procedure set out in paragraphs 1 to 4.45
It seems that such a proposal gives NRAs very wide powers and perhaps
too much discretion to act in a manner not in concert with the spirit of Article 6
of the Framework Directive. Indeed, the consultation mechanism of Article 6
would be of little use if such discretionary powers were left to NRAs to
establish exceptional circumstances without safeguards being introduced.
This is therefore the reason why the Commission makes clear that, in the
case that NRAs have made use of paragraph 5 and adopted measures on the
grounds of exceptional circumstances, they will immediately communicate
them, alongside the full reasoning on which those measures were taken, to the
Commission and the other national regulatory authorities. If the Commission
cannot consider those measures to be justified and compatible with the
provisions of Article 7 of the Framework Directive, it will be empowered to
require NRAs to amend or abolish them.46
It should be stressed here that the Commission has a responsibility to improve
the consistency of NRAs' actions and to ensure that their decisions are
compatible with the principles which are set out in the new regulatory
framework. Thus the Commission will have to improve the co-ordination
between NRAs at EU level and to achieve homogeneity of implementation. In
order to succeed in this target, it is indispensable that the Commission is
empowered
44
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"to challenge, and if necessary, require NRAs to suspend, the decisions taken
if it considered they were not justified according to the regulatory framework. In
deciding whether to do so, the Commission would consult the High Level
Communications Group, and if necessary, the Communications Committee".47
However, it is strange that, despite the aforementioned Commission statement,
nothing in Section 6 of the Working Document on a common regulatory
framework made clear that the Commission would have the power to block a
NRA's decision which is considered to be contrary to the EU regulatory
framework. On the contrary, it seemed that the final decision would belong to
NRAs which could proceed with a decision that the Commission was opposing.
This conclusion stems also from sub-paragraph 3 of section 6(2) of the
Working Document on a common regulatory framework which stated that "the
national regulatory authority shall take such comments into account as far as
possible in making the final decision, and shall communicate the final decision
to the Commission without delay". So, the fact that NRAs were equipped with
such a significant degree of discretion to depart from the principles set out in
the EU regulatory framework could lead to uncertainty and raise a significant
risk of market fragmentation. This is therefore the reason why many
commentators asked the Commission to insert a provision allowing it the
possibility to revoke NRAs' decisions when these are inconsistent with EU
telecoms regulation and the harmonisation process.48
As it has been already seen, the Commission responded to those comments
by introducing provisions according to which NRAs will be required to amend or
abolish measures which cannot be regarded as compatible with Community
law and in particular with the provisions of Article 7 of the Proposed Framework
47
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Directive.49
In sum: the final text of Article 6 of the Framework Directive leaves adequate
room for NRAs to deal quickly and effectively with a market problem by taking
account of national circumstances while, at the same time, providing legal
certainty for market players.
6. RIGHT OF APPEAL
According to Section 4 of the Working Document on a common regulatory
framework, an undertaking affected by a decision of a NRA will have a right to
appeal against this decision to an independent body. This provision is a further
step in the right direction since a NRA's decision will be reviewed not only on
procedural issues (e.g. whether it was outside the powers of the regulator) but
also on the merits of the case in question. It is obvious that, by providing the
aforementioned independent body with the right to make a proper evaluation of
the facts of the case and not being limited to a review of the decision-making
process, a reasonable degree of legal certainty is achieved.
At the same time, however, more detail should be given with regard to the
process and nature of the appeal body. Indeed, it is important that the right to
appeal does not lead to burdensome litigation, lengthy and time-consuming
procedures and thus to a less predictable legal environment. Thus, in order to
increase legal certainty, the Commission introduced three more paragraphs in
Article 4 and gave more detailed information about the process and nature of
the appeal body.
49
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7. EXCHANGE AND PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO
NRAS AND THE COMMISSION
Section 5 of the Working Document on a common regulatory framework allows
NRAs to collect information from market players, but provides that the
information required should be proportionate and justified. It also establishes
the right of NRAs to exchange confidential information as long as its
confidentiality is respected.
However, the Commission's proposals raised serious concerns regarding the
content, security and confidentiality of the information given from undertakings
to NRAs. Thus the level of detail of information made available by market
players should be assessed against some sensitive issues regarding business
demands for confidentiality. Indeed, operators would be reluctant to provide
NRAs with data when they know that regulators will be entitled to exchange
these data between each other. In addition, it is logical that they will not be
thrilled if NRAs are able to publish such information and, consequently,
competitors can get hold of their business secrets. As Vodafone AirTouch has
characteristically put it,
"most of the information submitted to NRAs is likely to include business
secrets which, if disclosed to any third party, would be extremely harmful to the
concerned party. Indeed, much of this information would be of considerable
value to the concerned party's competitors. The proposed text will generate
reluctance on the part of many undertakings to submit business secrets to
their national regulatory authorities in the knowledge that the confidentiality of
such information cannot be reasonably protected, at least outside their national
territories".50
The same view is taken by the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) when it
expresses its concern that the Commission's proposals
"may significantly weaken the ability of NRAs to protect commercially
confidential information and as a result impair in practice the ability to obtain
information from operators who may fear publication of such information. This
50 Vodafone AirTouch comments on the DG Information Society Working Documents, May 2000,
at p. 6.
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has the potential to greatly hinder the effectiveness of NRAs".51
The Commission was clearly aware of the reaction and of the undesirable
effects that its proposal could cause. This is therefore the reason why it
included some words and sentences which, it thought, could act as a
safeguard in the light of the NRAs' excessively discretionary powers. Thus the
Commission believes that the fact that the information submitted to NRAs by
market players can be exchanged between NRAs and obtained by the
Commission, as well as the fact that Member States must ensure public
access to all information submitted to the NRAs, can be balanced by the
provisions that the use of information provided must respect the principle of
proportionality,52 that reasons will be given by the NRAs in order to justify their
request for information,53 that the information submitted in confidence is also
made available in confidence to another competent authority,54 that Member
States have to "balance the concerns of the parties submitting information and
the interests of the public in accessing that information",55 and that NRAs must
take "due account of considerations of commercial confidentiality".56
However, it should be stressed that, if the market players regard the
information they give to NRAs as confidential, the NRAs should be bound not
to submit it to another competent authority or to publish it. The exchange or
publication of confidential information should be possible only when the
undertakings have given their written consent or their agreement in advance. It
is therefore imperative for the Commission to set a limit of the nature of
information that can be made available and to state clearly that NRAs are not
entitled to exchange or publish confidential information. This was finally
recognised by the Commission in its Proposed Framework Directive where it
categorically states: "Where information has been submitted in confidence, the
Commission and the national regulatory authorities concerned shall maintain
51
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the confidentiality of the information provided".57 Furthermore, it makes clear
that NRAs will be entitled to publish information, "while respecting national and
Community rules on commercial confidentiality".58
However, the Commission does not clearly state what is going to happen
where the confidentiality of information is not respected by NRAs. In particular,
although the right of the undertakings to appeal to an independent body (when
they believe that the reasons given by the NRAs do not justify the request for
information) is established by Article 4 of the Framework Directive, there are no
provisions stating that NRAs could be held liable in case they disclose
confidential information. The lack of such a provision generates market
uncertainty and, therefore, the Commission fails to achieve its aim, namely
drawing the right balance between transparency and commercial sensitivity.
8. CAN EX-ANTE OBLIGATIONS BE IMPOSED ON
UNDERTAKINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN
DESIGNATED AS HAVING SMP STATUS? CAN NRAS
IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS THAT GO BEYOND THOSE
SET OUT IN THE SPECIFIC MEASURES?
The wording of Section 14(1) of the Working Document on a common
regulatory framework - "In determining whether to impose ... obligations on
undertakings, including those with significant market power, ..." - suggested
that NRAs will be able to impose ex-ante obligations even on undertakings
which are not designated as having SMP. However, it is understood that, as a
rule, ex-ante obligations may only be imposed on entities having SMP and,
therefore, the words "including those" should be deleted. Likewise, it should be
clarified in Section 14(5)(a) that ex-ante obligations should only be imposed
upon undertakings designated as having SMP. Therefore, the words "on
entities designated as having SMP" should be inserted after the words "ex-ante
57
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In the end, the Commission decided that the first paragraph of section 14
would not be incorporated in Article 14 of the Proposed Framework Directive.
One could argue that this is an implication that, as a rule, ex-ante obligations
can be imposed only on undertakings with SMP. Moreover, by referring to
"regulatory obligations set out in the Specific Measures",59 it makes clear that
again, as a rule, the imposition of ex-ante obligations that go beyond e.g. those
set out in Articles 9 to 13 of the Proposed Access Directive is not allowed.
The same approach is followed in the Proposed Access and Interconnection
Directive. More analytically: Section 4(1) of the Working Document on access
and interconnection stated that NRAs will have the power to intervene where
parties fail to enter into an interconnection agreement. However, it is not clear
which measures NRAs are empowered to take in order to solve a dispute
between undertakings. Therefore, in order to avoid legal uncertainty, this
section should contain a reference to sections 8 and 9 to 13 of the Working
Document on Access and clarify that the imposition of ex-ante obligations
outside the scope of those sections is not allowed.
In addition, the wording of Section 4(1) could lead to more regulation than is
already permitted by the Interconnection Directive (according to which only
operators having SMP are obliged to offer interconnection). Indeed, Section
4(1) does not explicitly refer to SMP operators so that the provision may be
interpreted as if the obligation of offering interconnection can be also imposed
on operators who do not have SMP. What is therefore required is an
amendment which will ensure that the power of intervention is restricted only to
cases in which an operator having SMP refuses to offer interconnection.
This was finally recognised by the Commission which, as a result of the
comments received, decided that the text should be amended to read as
follows:
"Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities are
empowered to impose the obligations identified in Articles 6 to 13 of this
Directive on operators that have been designated as having significant market
power in a relevant market. In the absence of agreement between
undertakings on access and interconnection arrangements, Member States
shall ensure that the national regulatory authority is empowered to intervene at
59
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the request of either of the parties involved or at its own initiative, taking
account of the policy objectives and procedures included in Articles 6, 7, and
13 to 18 of Directive [on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services]".60
Finally, although some market players expressed their concerns61 about the
possibility for NRAs to intervene on their own initiative in an access or
interconnection dispute, the Commission rightly did not make any alterations.
Indeed, it is questionable whether small companies would dare to challenge
the powerful firms which can influence the decision-making process and
control the 'rules of the game'. This is therefore the reason why NRAs must be
entitled to intervene at their own initiative: the threat of regulatory intervention
gives the priority to commercial negotiation but, at the same time, can have an
incentive effect on the market players to deal with the situation in a fast and
efficient way.
The approach of Article 5(2) was also followed in Article 8(1) of the
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive. Indeed, this paragraph makes
clear that ex-ante obligations can be imposed only on operators which have
been designated as having SMP status; and that NRAs can impose only those
obligations which are within the scope of Articles 9 to 13 of the Directive.
However, Article 8(2) of the Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive
introduces two exceptions to the 'rules' that NRAs can impose ex-ante
obligations only on operators with SMP; and that NRAs cannot impose
obligations that go beyond those set out in Articles 9 to 13 of the Access and
Interconnection Directive. Comments on Article 8(2) will be made in the
following section which deals with the issue whether access to mobile networks
should be mandated or not.
60
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9. ACCESS TO MOBILE NETWORKS - CASES WHERE
SMP STATUS WILL NOT BE A PREREQUISITE FOR
IMPOSING OBLIGATIONS
According to current telecommunications regulation, TOs with significant
market power are obliged to grant all reasonable requests for access to their
networks. However, this requirement is confined to operators of public
telecommunications networks and does not apply to other forms of
communications infrastructure. Since the new regulatory framework for access
to infrastructure will apply to any operator with SMP across sectors, a key
issue is whether specific forms of access to certain infrastructures should be
mandated or not.
With regard to mobile operators in particular, the Commission - contrary to
its position set out in the 1999 Communication Review - decided not to
mandate access to mobile networks. In other words, no specific regulatory
obligations on mobile operators to grant access will be introduced. This results
from the fact that the extent of competition in mobile markets varies across
Member States and, therefore, any decisions by NRAs about imposing access
on mobile network operators must be made by carrying out a detailed market
analysis and taking into account the state of competition and the extent of
customer choice as well as the economic impact and the benefits to be
achieved. At the same time, it is obvious that the Commission took into serious
consideration the vast investment required to establish mobile networks and
accepted the mobile operators' argument that imposing on them an obligation
to provide access to service providers would undermine their incentive to
innovate and invest.62
However, the Commission did not yield to pressure from mobile operators
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that Section 8(4) of the Access and Interconnection Working Document should
63
be deleted. As it is put in the Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive,
"National regulatory authorities may, without prejudice to the provisions of
Article 6, impose on operators, including operators other than those with
significant market power, the obligations set out in Article 9 to 13 in relation to
interconnection, in order to comply with international commitments".64
To put it simply, this paragraph gives NRAs the right to impose obligations
even on operators which are not designated as having significant market
power. In other words, in some cases SMP status will not be a prerequisite for
imposing obligations on operators. The idea behind this approach is the
Commission's conviction that ex-ante sector specific rules will continue to be
needed when, as is the case in the mobile sector, there is no single network
operator dominance and a limited number of players is coupled with high
barriers to enter the market. As the Commission states, amongst those factors
which constrain the competitiveness of the market at present is
"the existence of legal barriers to market entry that exist in the mobile sector,
where currently the availability of spectrum means that the number of players
is limited to four or five, which has not been enough to ensure competitive
pricing in all segments of the mobile market".65
This is therefore the reason why - according to the Commission's thinking -
Section 8(4) (now Article 8(2)(a)) has to remain: to keep the mobile markets
open by giving NRAs the flexibility to intervene and interpret the state of
competition in the light of national circumstances.
However, it is stated that the obligation to offer interconnection can be imposed
on operators who do not have SMP status "in order to comply with international
63 See for instance: Orange comments on the DG Information Society Working Documents, May
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Information Society Working Documents, May 2000, at para. 3.5, p. 12; GSM Europe
comments on the DG Information Society Working Documents, 19 May 2000, at pp. 7-8.
64
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 8(2)(a).
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commitments"66 or where "the structure and characteristics of a particular
market justify this approach".67 Thus, in both cases, nothing clarified when and
under what circumstances such a measure might be justified. In addition, with
regard to Article 8(2)(b) of the Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive,
nothing clarifies (the same as in Article 14(1 )(c) of the Proposed Framework
Directive) when and under what circumstances a "prior agreement of the
Commission" can be given so that NRAs can impose obligations for access
and interconnection that go beyond those set out in Articles 9 to 13 of this
Directive.
Therefore, in order to avoid legal uncertainty and excessive regulatory
intervention, those circumstances must be outlined by the Commission -
possibly in the Guidelines on Market Analysis. Otherwise, the new SMP test
would serve little purpose if NRAs are equipped with a significant degree of
discretion to establish 'exceptional circumstances' without an economically in-
depth market analysis and a list of tests being required to justify this status.
10. FACTORS DETERMINING WHEN AN OPERATOR
SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO GRANT ACCESS
The Commission states that, in order to determine whether an operator should
be obliged to grant access, four factors should be taken into account. These
factors include the availability of sufficient capacity to provide access and the
feasibility of providing access to the requesting company.68 It is logical to
assume that the term "feasibility" - like the term "overriding difficulty" met in the
Commission's Access Notice of August 199869 - includes the essential
65
Working Document on Access and Interconnection, at p. 4.
66
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 8(2)(a).
67
Working Document on Access and Interconnection, Section 8(4).
68
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 12(2)(b); Working Document on
Access and Interconnection, Section 12(3)(b).
69 Commission's Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in
the Telecommunications Sector (hereafter the Commission's 1998 Access Notice) [1998] O.J.
C 265/2, at para. 91.
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requirements70 which are laid down in the Interconnection Directive, i.e.
security of network operations, maintenance of network integrity,
interoperability of services and protection of data.71 Besides, the Commission's
reference to "the technical and economic viability of using or installing
competing facilities"72 strengthens this argument.
In addition, the Commission takes into account market uncertainty, the
technical risks and the vast investment associated with a high-risk market, and
stresses the need to provide companies with the chance to recoup their
production costs and the time to launch a new product.73 The same approach
is also met in the Commission's Access Notice, which cites as an example of a
possible justification for refusing access "the need for a facility owner which
has undertaken investment aimed at the introduction of a new product or
service to have sufficient time and opportunity to use the facility in order to
place that new product or service on the market".74 This is in accordance with
the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the Oscar Bronner case where he
states that "particular care is required where the goods or services or facilities
to which access is demanded represent the fruit of substantial investment".75
The fourth factor that should be taken into account by NRAs in order to
determine whether or not to impose obligations on operators to grant access is
"the need to safeguard competition in the long term".76 This could also be
explained as the Commission's aim not to hinder the incentive to invest in
alternative infrastructure. As Jacobs illustrates,
"in the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of
consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has
70 The essential requirements are defined as the "non-economic reasons in the general interest
which may cause a Member State to restrict access to the public telecommunications network
or public telecommunications services", see Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the
establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the
implementation of open network provision, 90/387/EEC, at Article 2(6).
71
Interconnection Directive, at Article 10.
72
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 12(2)(a); Working Document on
Access and Interconnection, Section 12(3)(a).
73
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 12(2)(c); Working Document on
Access and Interconnection, Section 12(3)(a).
74
Commission's 1998 Access Notice, at para. 91(e).
75 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791. Opinion of Jacobs, A.G., 28 May 1998, at para. 62.
76
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 12(2)(d); Working Document on
Access and Interconnection, Section 12(3)(d).
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developed for the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a
production, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there
would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus
while competition was increased in the short term it would be reduced in the
long term".77
11. LIST OF CANDIDATE MARKETS FOR INCLUSION IN
THE DECISION ON RELEVANT PRODUCT AND
SERVICE MARKETS
The Access and Interconnection Working Document contains a reference to
Annex II which includes
"a initial list of wholesale markets to be considered for inclusion in the Notice
on Relevant Product and Service markets to be published by the Commission
in accordance with the procedure in section 14 of the Working Document on a
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
» 78
services .
However, the problem is that the candidate markets in Annex II are set out
without proper analysis and reasoning. In addition, it should be stressed that
the identification by the Commission of product and services markets
susceptible to the introduction of ex ante obligations constitutes the basis for
the proposed access regime. Indeed, NRAs will not be able to impose such ex-
ante regulation in markets not identified in the Decision on Relevant Product
and Service markets. Ex-ante regulatory intervention in markets not listed in
this Decision can be justified only in exceptional circumstances - and only after
the prior agreement of the Commission.79
Bearing in mind that Annex II is not a draft of the Notice, it is highly
77
Oscar Bronner, Opinion of Jacobs, A.G., 28 May 1998, at para. 57.
78
Working Document on Access and Interconnection, Section 7(2)(b).
79
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(1)(c); Working Document on a common regulatory
framework, Section 14(2)(b).
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questionable whether the decision to include at this stage a list of possible
markets would be the right one. Indeed, it is premature to attempt to identify
markets when the regulatory proposals are not to apply before 2003. Due to
the rapid technological developments, the relevant markets put forward for
consideration in the working document are likely to have changed significantly
by the time the proposed regulatory package is implemented. Additionally, it is
certain that a list which pre-determines relevant markets will pre-empt the
debate on the Notice on Relevant Product and Service Markets and,
consequently, will unduly influence the NRAs' decisions.
As a result of the above arguments, the Commission decided to delete
Annex II and not to include it in the Proposed Access and Interconnection
Directive.
12. CONCLUSIONS
a) The Commission believes - and this has been confirmed by the vast
majority of the comments received in the course of the public consultation -
that common principles should be established for regulation of access across
all communications infrastructure.80 This Commission's objective for a
horizontal approach to all transport network infrastructure and associated
services will certainly be achieved with the introduction of the Framework and
Access and Interconnection Directives.
80 DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: A common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, 27 April 2000, Chapter I, at p. 5;
Communication from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000)
239 final, 26.4.2000, at pp. 8 and 20; Communication from the Commission "Towards a new
framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999
Communications Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at pp. 3 and 6; Commission
Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence
Green Paper, COM (1999) 108 EN final, 10.3.1999, at pp. 2 and 9; Working Document of the
Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the Convergence Green
Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 30.
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b) Consistently with the principle of continuity,81 the obligations imposed under
the current Interconnection and TV Standards Directives will be carried forward
into the new regulatory framework and, in particular, in the Access and
Interconnection Directive. Thus, with regard to access and interconnection, all
obligations that were applied under Articles 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 14 of the
Interconnection Directive will be maintained.82 The same applies for the
obligations in relation to conditional access systems.83 Thus all providers of
services subject to conditional access are obliged to "offer to all broadcasters,
on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis, technical services enabling
the broadcasters' digitally-transmitted services to be received by viewers
authorised by means of decoders administered by the service operators, and
comply with Community competition law, in particular if a dominant position
appears"; and they are also obliged to "keep separate financial accounts
84
regarding their activity as conditional access providers".
c) Due to the rapidity of technological and market development, detailed rules
cannot keep up with the pace of changes. Frequent changes in regulation
would be required, thereby leading to lack of legal certainty. This uncertainty
can discourage investment and the incentive to develop new services. So, the
target of dis-engaging from detailed regulation can be achieved with the
increasing use of complementary non-binding regulatory measures. It is
believed that the use of "soft-law" (such as the Guidelines on market analysis
and the calculation of SMP) could play a significant role in achieving the
desired flexibility in this dynamic and fast-moving market. As the Commission
has put it:
"Such measures can be more easily and quickly agreed or adapted than
legislation and - where they are agreed by consensus of interested parties and
backed up by effective sanctions in cases of non-compliance - can be very
effective. They provide a flexible tool for regulators, and will allow for regulation
81
See, for instance, the Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, at p. 5.
82
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 7; Working Document on Access and
Interconnection, Section 7.
83
Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive, Article 6(1), Annex Part I; Working Document
on Access and Interconnection, Section 6(1) and Annex I (b).
84
Directive 95/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the
use of standards for the transmission of television signals [1995] O.J. L281/51 (the TV
Standards Directive), at Article 4(c).
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that is responsive to the changing needs of the communications services
market".85
However, many commentators86 have warned that non-binding regulatory
measures are in general not considered as capable of decreasing legal
uncertainty. In addition, non-compliance with the provisions of those measures
has no (direct) legal consequence. Therefore, lack of clarity and transparency
can arise for market players as to whether or not they are bound by such
measures. This is therefore the reason - to increase legal certainty - why the
Commission opted for the introduction of a Decision on Relevant Product and
Service Markets (which is binding in its entirety and has immediate legal effect
for its addressee) instead of a Notice (which is a non-binding legal instrument)
as had been initially proposed.
d) Taking account of the transitional nature of the sector-specific measures
and of the overall objective that regulation should be kept to the minimum
where competition is self-sustaining, it is necessary to develop mechanisms to
ensure the gradual phasing-out of sector-specific regulation. It seems that the
principle of 'forbearance' - according to which the NRAs are required to
forbear from applying rules when the regulatory objectives are being met in
some other ways - constitutes a satisfactory solution. The application of this
principle is found in the Framework Directive - and in particular in Article 14(4)
- which provides that NRAs will evaluate on a regular basis whether certain
rules are still necessary and will determine the moment that sector-specific
regulation can be abolished.
In addition, the principle of forbearance and the decision not to mandate
access to mobile and cable networks is another step closer to the realisation of
the objective to keep regulation to the minimum necessary and not to expand it
any further.
e) From the above, it is obvious that the new access regulatory framework will
be characterised by a consistent set of rules and a continuity with the existing
regime. This is in accordance with the general agreement that convergence is
85 The 1999 Communications Review, at para. 3.3.2, p. 18.
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an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. However, this attempt to
achieve continuity with the current regulatory framework and the objective to
keep regulation to the minimum necessary would be meaningless without
safeguards which could prevent NRAs from exploiting their discretion and
imposing unjustified ex-ante obligations. What the Commission has to do,
therefore, is draw the right balance in order to achieve flexibility within a
harmonised EU framework.
More analytically:
• The Commission should have a major role in supervising the consistent
implementation and application of the Community regulation and thus
preventing NRAs from getting out of line with the agreed harmonised European
principles. This can be achieved with the introduction of the Commission's
Decision on Relevant Product and Service Markets, the Guidelines on market
analysis and the calculation of SMP, the right to appeal introduced by Article 4
of the Framework Directive, the consultation and transparency mechanism set
out in Article 6 of the Framework Directive as well as the market definition and
analysis procedure laid down in Article 14 of the same Directive which provides
clear and unambiguous rules to be followed by NRAs when deciding whether
to impose, maintain or remove obligations on undertakings.
• On the other hand, market development is different in each Member State
and thus NRAs must have the opportunity to intervene and interpret the state
of competition in the light of national circumstances. Indeed, an inflexible and
over-centralised regulatory approach cannot deal with these differences
because it is not in a position to be close enough to the national market in
question and have a precise knowledge of the state of competition. Only NRAs
can have the detailed knowledge of national markets to be able to react in a
fast and effective way, an essential condition for attracting investment into the
emerging markets.
As a result, for the sake of flexibility and consistency with the principle of
subsidiarity - that is, action at EU level is justified only if the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be achieved satisfactorily at the national level and can
be achieved better by the Community - there will always be the opportunity for
NRAs to establish "exceptional circumstances" in order to depart from the
86 See for instance: Response of the Dutch Government to the 1999 Communications Review,
January 2000, at p. 5; Microsoft's comments on the 1999 Communications Review, February
2000, at p. 2.
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"norm". So, NRAs can adopt measures immediately - when they consider that
there is an urgent need to act in order to protect competition and the interests
of users - and thus avoid the consultation procedure set out in paragraphs 1 to
4 of Article 6 of the Framework Directive (i.e. they do not have to communicate
the draft measure in advance to the Commission and thus wait for the
Commission's decision in order to adopt the measure);87 they can impose ex-
ante regulation in markets not identified in the Commission's Decision on
Relevant Product and Service Markets;88 in relation to interconnection, they
can impose obligations even on undertakings which are not designated as
having significant market power;89 and they can impose on SMP operators
obligations for access and interconnection that go beyond those set out in
Articles 9 to 13 of the Access and Interconnection Directive.90
Hence, there is the risk that the aforementioned NRAs' significant degree of
freedom could lead to excessive regulatory intervention and thus legal
uncertainty. Accordingly, safeguards are required so that the Commission can
monitor effectively the implementation and enforcement of the legislation to
ensure that the harmonised EU framework will not be affected. I believe that
the following three provisions answer the concerns that there could be different
interpretation in different Member States of the principles and objectives which
underline the EU communications regime, something which could lead to the
fragmentation of the internal market. In particular:
• Ex-ante regulatory intervention in markets not listed in the Decision on
Relevant Product and Service Markets cannot be justified without NRAs
seeking and receiving the prior agreement of the Commission.91
• The Commission will require NRAs to amend or withdraw any draft
measures which are not in accordance with Community law and in particular
the provisions of Article 7 of the Framework Directive.92
• If NRAs have made use of Article 6(5) of the Framework Directive and
adopted measures on the grounds of exceptional circumstances, they will
immediately communicate them, alongside the full reasoning on which those
measures were taken, to the Commission and the other national regulatory
87








Proposed Framework Directive, Article 14(1 )(c).
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authorities. If the Commission cannot consider those measures to be justified
and compatible with the provisions of Article 7 of the Framework Directive, it
will require the NRAs in question to amend or abolish them.93
The aforementioned conditions provide a safety net and contribute towards a
regime characterised by transparency, legal certainty and predictability. This in
turn provides the right climate to encourage further investment and commercial
initiative in the telecommunications and multimedia sectors.
Of course absolute legal certainty can only be provided at the expense of
flexibility which, never the less, is also indispensable to enable NRAs to
implement and apply the Community legislation according to local market
conditions. In addition, absolute certainty exists only in the sphere of fantasy or
when someone has the magic power to gaze into the crystal ball and foresee
the future. Unfortunately the real world is different and, under the current
circumstances, the Commission's approach looks pragmatic and, therefore,




ibid., Article 6(5) sub-paragraphs 2 and 3.
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Chapter 7
The New European Licensing
Framework for Electronic
Communications Networks and Services
288
1. INTRODUCTION
In the light of the widespread public debate on the 1999 Communications
Review,1 the 2000 Communication on the results of the public consultation,2
and the subsequent Working Document on the authorisation of electronic
communications networks and services,3 this Chapter introduces the key
elements of the existing Licensing Directive4 and comments on the future
licensing framework for electronic communications networks and services. Its
aim is to assess whether the current situation requires adaptation and, if so,
what kind of changes are needed in order to ensure that the Proposed
Authorisation Directive5 can contribute to lighter and more transparent and
simplified national licensing regimes.
1 Communication from the Commission, "Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications Review"
(hereafter the 1999 Communications Review) COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999.
2
Communication from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000)
239 final, 26 April 2000.
3 DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: The authorisation of electronic
communications networks and services, 27 April 2000.
4
Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a
common framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of
telecommunications services (hereafter: The Licensing Directive), OJ L 117, 7.5.1997, p. 15.
5
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of
electronic communications networks and services (hereafter the Proposed Authorisation
Directive), COM (2000) 386, 12 July 2000.
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2. THE CURRENT LICENSING DIRECTIVE
The licensing regime in the telecommunications sector is covered by the
Licensing Directive, which provides the legal basis for supervising access to
the market and for monitoring compliance with the requirements imposed on
operators. The most important issues of the Directive are three in number:
First, the prohibition of any constraint in the number of new entrants. The
only justifying restrictions are limited, inter alia, to security of network
operations, maintenance of network integrity, interoperability, protection of
data, and scarce resources - the last linked mainly with the efficient use of the
frequency spectrum.6 However, the reasons for these restrictions must be
made public, be objectively justified, and based on non-discriminatory,
proportionate and transparent criteria.
Second, there is clearly a preference for moving away from individual
licences and detailed licence provisions - "the introduction of individual
licensing systems should be restricted to limited, pre-defined situations"7 - and
heading towards general authorisations (which are associated with the
absence of an explicit decision and a prior approval by the national regulatory
authority).8
Third, the Directive provides security for new entrants by setting up time
limits and other procedural demands and by establishing harmonised principles
which Member States have to implement through their national regulatory
authorities. So, for instance, the Directive refers to the conditions which are
allowed to be attached to general authorisations and individual licences,9 it
requires that those conditions are objectively justified and based on the
principles of non-discrimination, proportionality and transparency,10 and it
states that licence fees should cover only the administrative costs, be
published and proportionate to the work entailed.11
6
Licensing Directive, at Article 2(1 )(d).
7
ibid., at recital 13.
8
ibid., at Article 2(1 )(a).
9
ibid., at Articles 3(2), 8(1), and Annex.
10
ibid., at Articles 3, 4 and 8.
11
ibid., at Articles 6 and 11.
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3. THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT
LICENSING REGIMES - IDENTIFICATION OF THE
PROBLEM
The Licensing Directive states that
"the regulatory regime in the field of telecommunications should be compatible
and consistent with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services and should take into account the need to facilitate the
introduction of new services as well as the widespread application of
technological improvements; ... therefore, general authorization and individual
licensing systems should provide for the lightest possible regulation compatible
with the fulfilment of applicable requirements".12
However, has the Commission's aim of creating a flexible, transparent, open
and light licensing regime in the telecommunications sector - a key factor for
the establishment of competition and the development of new services - been
achieved?
a) According to the current Licensing Directive, individual licences can be used
with regard to "the provision of publicly available voice telephony services, the
establishment and provision of public telecommunications networks as well as
other networks, involving the use of radio-frequency".13 This provision means
that in practice all voice telephony services, public networks and all radio-
based networks could be subject to individual licences. In a few words,
therefore, Member States are allowed to insist on the use of individual
licences, even though the Directive makes clear that priority should be given to
general authorisation. As a consequence, the majority of Member States have
made extensive use of this discretion so that individual licences have become
12
ibid., at recital 4.
13
ibid., at Article 7(2).
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the rule rather than the exception. This degree of control on market entry
creates administrative barriers which may be disproportionate, and has
contributed to a large variation in licence regimes for telecommunications
across the EU. As stated in the Commission's Fifth Report on the
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package,
"There are wide divergences between the national licensing regimes, ranging
from the lightest possible, where operators are free to enter the market without
formality (Denmark) or are required simply to register (The Netherlands) or
notify (Finland, Sweden) their intention to do so (except where the use of
frequency spectrum is requested), to the extremely heavy, where individual
licences are the rule and in some cases a government minister is required to
sign every licence".14
b) The Annex of the Licensing Directive contains an exhaustive list of
conditions (ranging from conditions regarding universal service, disabled users,
and the effective use of radio frequency, to conditions to facilitate monitoring
and enforcement by NRAs) which may be attached to general authorisations
and individual licences. However, although this list represents the maximum
conditions that may be imposed (and therefore their use is not obligatory), it
appears that many Member States have taken it that all those conditions must
necessarily be used.15 In addition, some Member States have imposed
conditions which exceed those set out in the list of the Licensing Directive. As
the Commission illustrates,
"In the lightest systems the conditions for the provision of networks or services
are laid down in the legislation, providing the greatest possible transparency
(Denmark, Sweden). In others (Belgium, France), onerous conditions going far
beyond the letter and the spirit of the directives are laid down in the licences
themselves, and in some cases are entirely confidential as between the issuing
authority and the operator concerned. At least one regime involves the
submission of detailed business plans covering long periods into the future
14 Communication from the Commission, "Fifth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package", COM (1999) 537, 10 November 1999, at p. 12.
15
Proposed Authorisation Directive, at p. 3.
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(Belgium)".16
It is therefore obvious that the current Licensing Directive has not prevented
Member States from developing heavy and non-transparent licensing regimes.
c) Additional market entry hindrances are the cumbersome licensing
procedures and excessive licensing fees applied in many Member States. In
particular, some NRAs have established unreasonably onerous requirements -
for instance, imposing requirements for information to be provided as a prior
condition for market entry - and non-transparent procedures. As the
Commission states,
"the problem remains of at least one ministry carrying out a second evaluation
(France) which, in a certain number of cases, can be a source of inconsistent
decisions between the two regulatory authorities which share responsibility for
issuing licences. This can also lead to excessive delays in issuing licences or a
lack of transparency in those decisions.17
In order to illustrate the heavy, lengthy, and bureaucratic procedures for
licensing which can be imposed in some Member States, it is useful to cite the
comments of the US Government regarding the licensing regime in Spain:
"In Spain, any applicant seeking to obtain a national facilities based licence
must have at least one point of interconnection in each of the 50 regions of
Spain. This condition must be accomplished within one year from the date on
which the carrier begins to carry traffic pursuant to its interconnection
agreement with Telefonica. In addition to this burdensome build-out
requirement, Spain also requires applicants for a facilities-based license to
provide an excessive amount of information including: (1) detailed information
about the network they intend to build; (2) a description of how the build-out will
be financed; (3) evidence that the technical project has been signed by a
qualified engineer who is a member of the Spanish engineers association; and
(4) a business plan that covers the first four years of the term of the license
16
Communication from the Commission, "Fifth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package", COM (1999) 537, 10 November 1999, at p. 12.
See also Versatel Telecom International, submission regarding the 1999 Communications
Review, February 2000, at p. 2.
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and includes economic information regarding the project (including details
about the amounts to be invested during the term of the license)".18
In addition, the procedures in some Member States (for instance, Italy, Greece,
and France) are too lengthy and the deadlines exceed the time limits
established under the Licensing Directive.19 It should be remembered here
that, for general authorisations, the time limit before starting to operate cannot
exceed four weeks from receipt by the NRA of all the information it requires;20
and for individual licences, the applicant market player must be informed of the
NRA's decision within six weeks of receipt of the application.21
Moreover, there is a great diversity in terms of financial and administrative
costs of gaining licences and authorisations across different Member States.
This diversity in licence fees stems from the already illustrated variation of
licensing regimes in the EU which range from the lightest possible to the
extremely heavy. Indeed, the regulatory workload involved in managing the
heavy-handed licensing regimes has as a direct result the imposition of
excessive administrative charges on operators, especially in Germany, France,
and Luxembourg.22
Consequently, due to the existing licensing regimes, i.e. regimes where
individual licences have become the rule and the imposition of licence
conditions has exceeded the limit set out in the Annex to the Licensing
Directive; due to the lengthy, cumbersome, and sometimes non-transparent
procedures for granting licences; and due to the unjustified variation of the
administrative costs across different Member States, there is need for lighter,
more transparent, and simplified national licensing regimes. Indeed, only then
can the aim of an effective internal market be achieved without the need for
creation of a single European licence for electronic communications services or
17
Communication from the Commission, "Fifth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package", COM (1999) 537, 10 November 1999, at p. 13.
18 United States comments regarding the 1999 Communication Review, February 11, 2000, at
p. 3.
19 Communication from the Commission, "Fifth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package", COM (1999) 537, 10 November 1999, at p. 13.
20
Licensing Directive, at Article 5(2).
21
ibid., at Article 9(2).
22 Communication from the Commission, "Fifth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package", COM (1999) 537, 10 November 1999, at p. 13.
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mutual recognition of authorisations. Otherwise, there is the risk of hampering
the development of an integrated and competitive European market.
The Commission has correctly identified the problems and this is well
illustrated in the declaration of the objective of the Proposed Authorisation
Directive:
"The present proposal to revise the existing authorisation and licensing
regimes is based on the need to stimulate a dynamic, competitive market for
communications services, to consolidate the internal market in a converging
environment, to restrict regulation to the necessary minimum and to aim at
technological neutrality and accommodate converging markets ... An efficient
and effectively functioning single European market can be achieved by
rigorously simplifying existing national regimes using the lightest existing
regimes as a model ... The aim of this Directive is to implement an internal
market in electronic communications services through the harmonisation and
simplification of authorisation rules and conditions in order to facilitate the
provision of electronic communications services and networks throughout the
Community".23
4. TACKLING THE PROBLEMS - SPECIFIC PROPOSED
MEASURES
4.1. Simplifying the licence application procedure
The Commission moves away from the current variable national licensing
regimes by proposing the simplification of the licence application process. This
is achieved by abolishing individual licenses and making all electronic
communications networks and services subject to general authorisations,24
with specific rights of use being limited to the assignment of radio frequency
23




and numbers only.25 Moreover, the Proposed Authorisation Directive
establishes the principle that providers of electronic communications networks
and services may only be subject to limited procedural requirements. This
means that the undertakings concerned may be required simply to notify their
intention to enter the market, but cannot be obliged to obtain an explicit
decision or any other administrative act by the national regulatory authority
before exercising their rights arising from the authorisation. Immediately after
the submission of the notification, the undertakings will be free to start their
commercial activities.26
In addition, it specifies that the notification referred to in paragraph 2 of
Article 3 will comprise merely a declaration to the NRA of the intention to begin
the provision of electronic communications networks and services. In addition,
the information which NRAs may request under the notification procedure must
be kept to what is strictly necessary, i.e. entailing only the identification of the
undertaking, contact persons, and a short description of the service to be
provided.27 This provision will make sure that no excessive amount of
information has to be provided as a prior condition for market entry and will
eliminate the already identified practice in some Member States where
undertakings are obliged to submit detailed business plans covering many
years of the term of the licence.
4.2. Disentangling different categories of conditions -
Maximum list of conditions attached to the general
authorisation and to the rights of use for radio
frequencies and numbers
The aim of Article 6 of the Proposed Authorisation Directive is further to limit
and harmonise the conditions which may be attached to the general
authorisation for the provision of electronic communications services or
networks and to the specific rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers.
This is achieved by establishing an exhaustive list of such conditions laid down






that all conditions must be objectively justified in relation to the service
28
concerned, non-discriminatory, proportionate, and transparent. In addition, it
establishes the principle that specific obligations - such as obligations of
transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, granting access to
specific network facilities and associated services, and price control and cost
accounting29 - which may be imposed on providers of electronic
communications services and networks by virtue of their SMP (as defined in
Article 13 of the Proposed Framework Directive30), must be imposed
separately from the general rights and obligations under the general
authorisation.31 It also requires that the criteria and procedures for imposing
such specific obligations on undertakings must be mentioned in the general
authorisation.32 This will play a significant role in achieving the required amount
of transparency for undertakings. Finally, it requires a strict separation between
conditions under general law (e.g. taxation, company law) which are applicable
to all undertakings, conditions under the general authorisation, and conditions
attached to rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers. In particular, it
states that the general authorisation should contain only conditions which are
specific to the electronic communications sector (limited to those set out in
Annex A of the Proposed Authorisation Directive). The target is to increase
transparency and to promote a lighter regime by not duplicating conditions
which are already applicable by virtue of other existing national laws.33 The
simplification of the regime is also promoted by preventing NRAs from
duplicating the terms of the general authorisation where they grant the right to





29 See Articles 9 to 13 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and
associated facilities (hereafter the Proposed Access and Interconnection Directive), COM
(2000) 384, 12 July 2000.
30
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (hereafter the
Proposed Framework Directive), COM (2000) 393, 12 July 2000.
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4.3. Compliance with general authorisation conditions or
rights of use
Article 10 of the Proposed Authorisation Directive provides procedural
safeguards in case undertakings do not comply with the conditions of the
general authorisation or for rights of use. In particular, in case of non¬
compliance, NRAs are required to inform the undertakings concerned about
those findings in order to ensure that the undertakings have the chance to
state their views or remedy any breaches. The time limit of the aforementioned
procedure may not exceed one month after notification; however, it could vary
in case of a different agreement between NRAs and the undertakings in
question.35
The reasoned measures taken by NRAs for non-compliance or for not
remedying the breaches within the aforementioned time limits must be
announced to the undertakings concerned within one week of their adoption
and at least one week before they go into effect. In addition, these measures
must be proportionate to the infringement. In practice, this means that NRAs
will not be allowed to withdraw the right to provide electronic communications
services or networks or usage rights.36 However, it is stressed that an ultimate
sanction (for example, depriving undertakings of their rights to operate) can be
used in exceptional circumstances. In particular, NRAs may adopt interim
measures immediately - and thus avoiding the aforementioned consultation
and notification procedure set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 - when there is an
urgent need to act in order to prevent a serious threat to public safety, security
or health, and to protect the economic and operational interests of other
undertakings.37 It is obvious that such discretionary powers left to NRAs to
establish exceptional circumstances could lead to excessive regulatory
intervention and thus legal uncertainty for market players. This is why the
Commission introduced two safeguards: first, if NRAs have adopted urgent
interim measures on the grounds of exceptional circumstances, the






and to propose any remedies;38 and secondly, the undertakings affected by
measures taken by NRAs will have the right to appeal39 against those
measures to an independent body in accordance with the procedure set out in
Article 4 of the Proposed Framework Directive. However, those safeguards are
not enough to tackle the problem of legal uncertainty. It is submitted, therefore,
that the Commission should explicitly state that NRAs have to be prevented
from acting in a manner not in concert with the spirit of Article 6 of the
Proposed Framework Directive. This means that when NRAs have adopted
measures on the grounds of exceptional circumstances, they will have to
communicate them immediately, alongside the full reasoning on which those
measures were based, to the Commission and the other national regulatory
authorities. If the Commission cannot consider those measures to be justified
and compatible with the provisions of Article 7 of the Proposed Framework
Directive, it will be empowered to require NRAs to amend or abolish them.40
4.4. Rights to use radio frequencies and numbers -
Procedure for restricted granting of rights to use radio
frequencies
It has already been mentioned that Article 5 of the Proposed Authorisation
Directive establishes the principle that the granting of specific rights may
continue to be necessary for the use of radio frequencies and numbers. In
addition, it introduces time-limits and transparency procedures in order to
prevent NRAs from treating undertakings in a discriminatory way and to
optimise the use of those scarce resources.
In particular, it states that, when NRAs are to decide on granting individual
rights to use radio frequencies and numbers, no excessive delays can be
caused by bureaucratic procedures.
So, these decisions will have be taken, communicated and published within








Proposed Framework Directive, Article 6(5) sub-paragraphs 2 and 3.
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within six weeks in the case of frequencies.41 Where comparative bidding
procedures are to be used, the six-weeks period can be extended to up to six
months in order to ensure an open, fair, objective and transparent decision¬
making process.42 Only such a design of comparative biddings (also known as
"beauty-contest mechanisms") can optimise the efficient assignment of radio
frequencies, especially bearing in mind that the decisions taken during a
comparative bidding procedure entail the risk of being biased towards
incumbent operators with an established track record.43
The Commission's commitment to transparent procedures when granting
individual rights to use radio frequencies and numbers is illustrated in Article
5(2)(b) where it states that "such rights of use shall be granted through open,
non-discriminatory and transparent procedures", and requires NRAs to clarify
the situation in their national regimes with regard to transferability and
secondary trading of usage rights. Moreover, the Commission requires the
application of the principle of proportionality where NRAs grant rights of use for
a limited period of time - "the duration shall be appropriate for the service
concerned".44 It seems that the aim of this provision is to facilitate the entry of
new market players and to avoid undermining the incentive for firms to invest.
Indeed, the Commission takes into account the technical risks and the vast
investment associated with entering a new market and realises that a
reasonably extended period of time is indispensable in order to give
undertakings the chance to develop and reap the benefits of their investment.
Furthermore, the Proposed Authorisation Directive provides that there
should be no limitation on the quantity of licences granted to use radio
frequencies and numbers. However, it establishes an important exception to
this rule: restriction of rights of use for radio frequencies will be possible where
this is necessary to achieve a better frequency utilisation.45 This restriction is
not allowed in the area of numbers, in line with the Full Competition Directive
which placed an obligation on Member States to make adequate numbers
41




See the comments of the United Kingdom Government on the EC Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 15.
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available from 1 July 1997.46
Article 7 of the Proposed Authorisation Directive imposes strict conditions
regarding the limitation of rights of use for radio frequencies and establishes
procedures which must be followed in order to ensure that the assignment
process is transparent and non-discriminatory. In particular, when Member
States are considering - due to spectrum scarcity - limiting the granting of
rights of use for radio frequencies, they are required to give due account to the
need to maximise benefits for users and to stimulate the development of
innovation and competitiveness; give all interested parties a minimum period of
30 days to comment on the decision to limit before the NRAs doing so; publish
a reasoned decision; review the situation at regular intervals or at the request
of undertakings, and invite applications for rights of use on the basis of
objective, non-discriminatory, detailed, transparent and proportionate selection
criteria.47
In line with the requirement for NRAs to review the frequency allocation
regimes at regular intervals, the Proposed Authorisation Directive stipulates
that, where the number of licenses is limited due to spectrum scarcity, Member
States must review whether advances in technology can lead to an adjustment
in the distribution of radio spectrum and, in particular, whether those
developments can allow spectrum to be made available for further licences.48 If
so, Member States are required to publish their findings and invite applications
for such rights. The aim of this provision is to enhance transparency and
certainty for market players, since the Commission has not been informed by
the Member States about any national reviews of current frequency allocation,
nor whether advances in technology can allow spectrum to be made available
for extra licences.49 It is submitted that further transparency is achieved if the
Commission states that NRAs' decisions to limit the granting of rights to use
radio frequencies will have to follow the consultation mechanism outlined in
Article 6 of the Proposed Framework Directive.
46 Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ L
074/13. See the paragraph which was added to Article 3(b) of the 1990 Services Directive.
47
Proposed Authorisation Directive, Article 7, paras 1 and 3.
48
ibid., Article 7(2).
49 See for instance the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the context of European
Community policies such as telecommunications, broadcasting, transport, and R&D
(hereafter: the Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy), COM (1998) 569 final, 9 December
1998, at Annex II, p. II.
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It should be stressed here that, where the granting of use for radio
frequencies needs to be limited, the Commission introduces criteria which will
play a predominant role and become the guideline for NRAs when they take
decisions on spectrum allocation. According to the Commission's thinking, the
selection criterion which must be given paramount weight is "the need to
facilitate the development of competition and of innovative services".50
Although none can argue against the significance of this criterion, it is
disappointing that the Commission does not make any reference to the need to
safeguard public interest objectives, especially since the Council has stated:
"The proliferation of wireless technology, digital television and other new
communication services will continue making frequency spectrum a sought-
after commodity ... Governments should take into consideration the needs of
the broadcasting sector when allocating spectrum. It is in particular stressed
that, because of the rapidly expanding mobile-communications industry,
adequate space should be saved for the television industry given its
contribution to political and cultural pluralism".51
It is obvious that the Council's recommendation implies that, when Member
States decide that the granting of use for radio frequencies needs to be limited,
priority should be given to public broadcasting. This stems from the fact that
the role of public broadcasters is considered to be synonymous with the public
service remit of providing universally accessible services, reflecting all needs,
cultures and groups in the society, offering impartial information and sound
education and preserving plurality of opinions. Hence, if priority is given to
public broadcasting, then priorities should be also given to other services of
equal - if not higher - social significance (e.g. health, national defence, public
safety, air traffic control, and emergency services). Therefore, the Commission
should have explicitly stated in the Proposed Authorisation Directive that
Member States will have to take measures to ensure that adequate radio
spectrum (and on an exclusive basis) is reserved for applications that
safeguard public interest objectives. So, it seems that the objective of reaching
a satisfactory balance between conflicting demands on the allocation of
frequencies is a pseudo-dilemma. Indeed, this objective should refer
50
Proposed Authorisation Directive, Article 7(3).
51 Council's Recommendation on Media Pluralism, January 19th 1999.
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exclusively to the need to reconcile the commercial interests of market players
from different sectors. Demand for public interest applications should be
satisfied first. Only then should considerations similar to those set out in
paragraph 3 of Article 7 - i.e. whether the services stimulate technological
innovation and promote competition - play a predominant role in spectrum
allocation decisions.
4.5. Information required under the general authorisation
and for rights of use - Publication of information
It has already been stressed that the cumbersome licensing procedures
applied in many Member States create barriers to market entry. One of those
market entry barriers is the imposition of unreasonably onerous requirements,
for instance requiring applicants to provide an excessive amount of information
as a prior condition for market entry. This is why the Proposed Authorisation
Directive limits the information that NRAs may request under the notification
procedure of Article 3 to the minimum necessary,52 and stipulates that no
information may be required prior to or as a condition for market access.53
Moreover, it provides that the information required should be proportionate and
objectively justified.54 Thus it makes clear that it is not necessary to require
systematic and regular verification of compliance with all conditions under the
general authorisation or attached to rights of use. Such systematic verification
of compliance may only be required for conditions 1 (financial contribution to
the funding of universal service) and 2 (administrative charges) of Part A, for
condition 6 (usage fees) of Part B, and for condition 5 (transfer of rights and
conditions for such transfer) of Part C of the Annex.55 In addition, it allows
NRAs to collect information for comparative bidding procedures for
frequencies, for publication of comparative overviews of quality and price of
services for the benefit of consumers, and for clearly described statistical
52
Proposed Authorisation Directive, Article 3(3).
53




ibid., Article 11(1 )(a).
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purposes.56 Finally, it provides that reasons and purposes will be given by the
NRAs in order to justify their request for information.57
However, the Proposed Authorisation Directive requires Member States to
publish and keep up to date any information on rights, conditions, procedures,
charges, fees and decisions regarding general authorisations, rights of use of
radio frequencies and numbers, and rights of way.58 Although it is
understandable that the target of this provision is to enhance transparency by
ensuring that market players, consumers and other interested parties have
easy access to the aforementioned information, it makes no reference to any
kind of protection of commercially confidential information. Indeed,
undertakings would be reluctant to provide NRAs with important data when
they know that NRAs will be required to publish such information and,
consequently, competitors can get hold of their business secrets. This is
particularly true with regard to Article 11(1 )(d), according to which NRAs are
allowed to collect information for comparative bidding procedures for
frequencies, for publication of comparative overviews of quality and price of
services. As Vodafone AirTouch has put it:
"Quality and price of services are two of the essential elements used by
competitors to differentiate themselves in the marketplace. Most operators, in
particular mobile operators, already have quality of service obligations forming
part of their licences, breach of which can have serious consequences. The
high churn rates in the mobile sector already demonstrate that end-users are
aware of these factors. Vodafone AirTouch also questions the overall benefit of
such publications in fast-moving, competitive and innovative markets, such as
the mobile sector".59
In any case, even if Articles 11 and 15 do not refer to business secrets and
commercially confidential information, a relevant provision should be included
as a safeguard, in line with Article 5 of the Proposed Framework Directive.
56






Response of Vodafone AirTouch to the Working Documents of DG Information Society, May
2000, at pp. 14-15. See also the One 2 One's comments on the DG Information Society
Working Documents, May 2000, at pp. 18-19; GSM Europe comments on the DG Information
SocietyWorking Documents, 19 May 2000, at p. 8.
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4.6. Reducing fees and charges
It has been shown so far that one of the major targets of the Proposed
Authorisation Directive is to simplify the procedures and conditions for
authorisation of the existing national regimes. Moreover, it has already been
observed that the regulatory workload involved in managing the burdensome
licensing regimes has as a direct result the imposition of excessive
administrative charges on operators. The target therefore is to reduce the
administrative costs incurred by limiting the regulatory workload.
Predictably enough, NRAs put forward the view that such an approach could
lead to under-financed, non-independent and ineffective national regulators. As
the Oftel and DTI response to the Working Document on the authorisation of
electronic communications networks and services of April 27 2000 put it,
"The scope of costs that can be recovered from operators needs to be
expanded to cover all those associated with fulfilling the objectives placed on
NRAs by the new regulatory framework, not just the management, control and
enforcement of the general-authorisation scheme. Without this, NRAs will
continue to face financial shortfalls for such activities as international
representation and consumer-protection measures and so remain financially
dependent of state budgets".60
Whereas the National Post and Telecom Agency in Sweden (PTS) states:
"It is of importance for an independent regulator that is not state-financed to
also in the future be able to cover its cost from administrative charges in order
to ensure its independence. It must therefore be made clear that the
administrative costs are not strictly related to the authorisation process. The
NRAs must be able to cover all costs, such as fees for participating in
international organisations and groups, and other duties that fall on the
authority. In other words, that it can perform all its duties under EC (e.g. costs
60 DG Information Society Working Documents - An initial response from the United Kingdom
from the Department of Trade and Industry, The Department of Culture, Media and Sport, the
Office of Telecommunications and the Radiocommunications Agency, May 2000, at pp. 20-21.
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incurred due to obligations according to the R&TTE Directive) and national law,
implemented according to each Member State's constitution. The [Proposed
Authorisation Directive] should allow for this".61
However, although the Commission recognises the need to finance the
activities of the NRAs in managing and enforcing authorisation schemes and
rights of use, it proposes that the administrative charges should be limited to
the minimum necessary, i.e. covering only the actual administrative costs for
these activities.62 This will contribute towards lighter national licensing regimes.
Moreover, the target of increasing transparency is satisfied by requiring NRAs
to publish annual overviews of the total sum of the charges collected and of the
administrative costs incurred. In addition, the Proposed Authorisation Directive
stipulates that an adjustment of charges has to be made in the following year if
the total sum of the charges collected exceeded the expenditure of the NRAs.63
It seems therefore that the aforementioned proposals can facilitate market
entry and stimulate the development of competition. Further incentive to
market entry is given by the provision that administrative charges should be
distributed in proportion to the turnover on the relevant services of the
undertakings concerned as calculated within the last accounting year.64 In
addition to that, small and medium-sized companies - i.e. undertakings with an
annual turnover for the relevant services referred to in paragraph 1 (b) which do
not exceed EUR 10 million - are exempted from paying administrative
charges.65
As an exception to general authorisations, fees for the rights to use radio
frequencies, numbers or rights of way can be imposed by the NRAs - in
addition to administrative charges - in order to ensure the optimal use of such
61 Comments of the National Post and Telecom Agency in Sweden (PTS) on the DG Information
Society Working Documents, May 2000, at p. 6.
62




ibid., Article 12(1 )(b). For the opposite view, i.e. that fees should not be proportional to
turnover, see: Response of the Norwegian Government to the DG Information Society
Working Documents, 19 May 2000, at p. 7; comments of the Finnish Ministry of Transport and
Communications on the DG Information Society Working Documents, May 2000, at p. 3;
Royal KPN N.V. comments to the Working Documents of DG Information Society, May 2000,
at p. 16; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, comments on the DG Information Society Working
Documents, May 2000, at p. 1; Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) comments
on the Working Documents of DG Information Society, May 2000, at p. 3; Telecom Austria
comments to the Working Documents of DG Information Society, May 2000, at pp. 8-9.
65
Proposed Authorisation Directive, Article 12(2).
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resources.66 This discretion of NRAs to impose additional charges for the use
of frequencies finds its application in the form of competitive biddings
(auctions). It should be stressed that there are widespread concerns about the
fact that auctions can result in excessive charges for the players involved and
that these charges are passed on to the consumer.67 The Commission's
objective of ensuring the efficient use and allocation of radio frequencies
cannot be achieved since the imposition of such high charges is driven by
national budgetary thinking, i.e. a policy with the sole aim being to maximise
revenue. Therefore, the provision that such fees must be objectively justified
and respect the principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and
proportionality cannot be considered as adequate safeguards in this case.
4.7. Modification of rights and obligations
The Proposed Authorisation Directive stipulates that Member States may need
to amend rights, conditions, procedures, charges and fees relating to general
authorisations and rights of use where this is objectively justified. However, in
order to create the necessary transparency, Member States will have to
respect the principle of proportionality and to give timely notice of their intention
to proceed to such amendments so that interested parties will have adequate
time - at least four weeks - to express their views.68
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the way Article 14 is drafted gives Member
States complete discretion to alter the rights, conditions, procedures, charges
and fees concerning general authorisation and rights of use. This can
potentially prevent appropriate checks from taking place, especially when a
66
ibid., Article 13.
67 See for instance: Motorola's response to the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 7
April 1999, at p. 3; Norwegian Administration's response to the questions in the Green Paper
on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 5; comments of the Telecommunications
Administration Centre of Finland (TAC) on the Green Paper of Radio Spectrum Policy, 13
April 1999, at p. 8; response by the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) to the
Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 10 April 1999, at p. 13; European
Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) - Reflection Document
on the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, April 1999, at p. 8; Telia's comments on
the EC Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, 15 April 1999, at pp. 8-9.
68
Proposed Authorisation Directive, Article 14.
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Member State decision on amendment of rights and obligations departs from
the principles set out in the EU regulatory framework and thus raises serious
doubts with regard to the compatibility of the decision with Community law.
Therefore, Article 14 should explicitly state that the consultation and
transparency mechanism set out in Article 6 of the Proposed Framework
Directive should be followed prior to any amendments being imposed. This
means that - apart from giving interested parties the chance to comment - the
Member States' decisions to amend rights, conditions, procedures, charges
and fees relating to general authorisations and rights of use will have to be
notified to the Commission and will be published in draft. Normally, these
measures that Member States intend to take will go into effect one month from
the date of receipt of the aforementioned notification by the Commission.69 In
addition, Member States will be required to publish their national consultation
procedures;70 when they communicate their draft measure to the Commission,
they will have to state the reasons and the grounds on which the measure in
question is based;71 and the Commission will be able, if necessary, to require
Member States to amend or withdraw the draft measure in question.72
Finally, Article 14 should make clear that Member States are required to
ensure that a provider of electronic communications networks and services will
have the right to appeal - at the end of the consultation process of Article 6 of
the Proposed Framework Directive - against decisions by Member States to
amend rights and obligations. Details regarding the appeal process and the
nature of the appeal body can be found in Article 4 of the Proposed Framework
Directive.
69









1. It has been confirmed by the vast majority of the comments received in the
course of the public consultation that, in view of the emergence of
convergence, common principles should apply to all communications
infrastructure and associated services, irrespective of the types of services
carried over them. In other words, networks should be governed by a single set
of technologically neutral rules.73 This objective of a horizontal approach to all
infrastructure and associated services will certainly be achieved with the
introduction of the Proposed Authorisation Directive, which states that it will
apply "to all authorisations relating to the provision of electronic
communications services and networks".74 Thus for instance, in relation to
authorisation of transmission networks, there will be no discrimination between
telecommunications networks and broadcasting networks.75 However, it has
already been illustrated and explained why, when Member States decide that
the granting of use for radio frequencies needs to be limited, priority should be
given to public broadcasting as well as to all those services and applications of
high social significance which safeguard public interest objectives.
73 DG Information Society Working Document, Subject: A common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, 27 April 2000, Chapter I, at p. 5;
Communication from the Commission, "The results of the public consultation on the 1999
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework", COM (2000)
239 final, 26.4.2000, at pp. 8 and 20; Communication from the Commission "Towards a new
framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999
Communications Review", COM (1999) 539, 10 November 1999, at pp. 3 and 6; Commission
Communication reporting on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence
Green Paper, COM (1999) 108 EN final, 10.3.1999, at pp. 2 and 9; Working Document of the
Commission, summary of the results of the public consultation on the Convergence Green
Paper, SEC (98) 1284, 29.7.1998, at p. 30.
74
Proposed Authorisation Directive, Article 1(2).
75
It should be remembered here that, according to the Proposed Framework Directive:
"electronic communications network means transmission systems and, where applicable,
switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals
by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks,
fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks,
networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable TV networks, irrespective of
the type of information conveyed;
309
2. In general, the Proposed Authorisation Directive will succeed in limiting to a
great extent the large variations between the national licensing regimes. In
particular, it will contribute towards light licensing regimes by abolishing
individual licences and making all electronic communications networks and
services subject to general authorisations, with specific rights of use being
limited to the assignment of radio frequency and numbers only. Furthermore,
the fact that administrative charges will be limited to the minimum necessary,
i.e. covering only the actual administrative costs, will also play an important
role in promoting lighter licensing regimes.
It will also simplify the licence application process by subjecting the providers
of electronic communications networks and services to limited procedural
requirements only. Thus no explicit decision and prior approval by the national
regulatory authority can be required; a notification of the intention to enter the
market suffices while the information which NRAs may request under the
notification procedure must be kept to what is strictly necessary. In addition, a
systematic and regular verification of compliance with conditions attached to
authorisations will be needed only when this is objectively justified and will be
limited to those conditions identified in the proposed Directive.
The aim of transparency is achieved by introducing a further limited and
exhaustive list of the conditions which may be attached to the general
authorisation for the provision of electronic communications services or
networks and to the specific rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers.
Moreover, the target to increase transparency is met by requiring NRAs to
publish annual overviews of the total sum of the charges collected and of the
administrative costs incurred.
Furthermore, it provides security for market players by setting up time limits
and other procedural demands (such as those laid down in Articles 5, 7, and
10) in order to prevent NRAs from treating undertakings in a discriminatory way
and to ensure that no excessive delays are introduced on account of
bureaucratic procedures.
However, as already illustrated, some provisions can lead to excessive
electronic communications service means services provided for remuneration which consist
wholly or mainly in the transmission and routing of signals on electronic communications
networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used
for broadcasting, but excluding services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content
transmitted using electronic communications networks and services". See the Proposed
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regulatory intervention and thus to legal uncertainty for market players. In
particular, Article 7 allows NRAs to limit the granting of rights to use radio
frequencies. Article 10 allows NRAs to adopt interim measures immediately -
even when as a result of those measures undertakings are deprived of their
rights to operate - when there is an urgent need to act in order to prevent a
serious threat to public safety, security or health. Article 14 also gives NRAs
complete discretion to alter the rights, conditions, procedures, charges and
fees concerning general authorisation and rights of use.
Therefore, the Commission has to state explicitly that the aforementioned
provisions will have to follow the consultation and transparency mechanism set
out in Article 6 of the Proposed Framework Directive. This means that the
Commission will require NRAs to amend or withdraw any draft measures which
are not in accordance with Community law and in particular the provisions of
Article 7 of the Proposed Framework Directive;76 and, if NRAs have adopted
measures on the grounds of exceptional circumstances (such as those referred
to in Article 10(4) of the Proposed Authorisation Directive), they will
immediately communicate them, alongside the full reasoning on which those
measures were taken, to the Commission and the other national regulatory
authorities. If the Commission cannot consider those measures to be justified
and compatible with the provisions of Article 7 of the Proposed Framework
Directive, it will require the NRAs in question to amend or abolish them.77
This will provide not only the necessary legal certainty but will also ensure
the same interpretation across Member States of the principles and objectives
which underlie the EU communications regime, something which will prevent
the fragmentation of the internal market.
It is submitted that, if the Commission can monitor effectively the
implementation and enforcement of this Directive, the cumbersome national
licensing regimes will become things of the past. This in turn will strengthen the
internal market, facilitate market entry, stimulate competition, and encourage
further investment and commercial initiative in the telecommunications and
multimedia sectors.
Framework Directive, at Article 2.
76
Proposed Framework Directive, Article 6(4).
77
ibid., Article 6(5) sub-paragraphs 2 and 3.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF PART IV
Part IV of this thesis examined the fourth phase of the transition from a
regime of a State-run monopoly to an effectively competitive market. As
already illustrated, the role of this fourth phase is to secure that the new EU
electronic communications regime can work satisfactorily in the converging
environment by being flexible enough and capable of coping with rapid market
developments.
Part IV concluded that the new regulatory framework is in line with the main
policy objectives of achieving legal certainty, flexibility, continuity, and
transparency. In particular, it was shown that the decision to construct the
definition of 'significant market power' along the lines of the competition law
concept of dominant position is crucial in the attempt to render the new
regulatory framework sufficiently flexible to allow the development towards the
new communications markets. Moreover, it was illustrated that the new
technology-neutral regime is based on market concepts, as opposed to the
current ONP framework which is based on a technology-determined approach.
Furthermore, the importance of the application of the principle of proportionality
has been highlighted, especially given the Commission's determination that the
degree of regulatory intervention must be proportionate to the level of
competition in the market. In addition, it was shown that the target of dis¬
engaging from detailed regulation can be achieved with the increasing use of
complementary non-binding regulatory measures (soft-law), something which
can play an important role in achieving the desired flexibility in these dynamic
and fast-moving markets.
It is submitted that the structure of the new regulatory framework is the
appropriate one in order to enable effective competition to emerge. More
importantly, when effective competition is finally present in the communications
sector, regulators will be in a position to sustain competition in the market
without having to significantly alter the structure of the regime. Indeed, where
competition is self-sustaining, they will simply use the mechanisms provided by
the new framework in order to ensure the gradual phasing-out of sector-
specific regulation and rely on the application of competition law which can
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effectively handle the issues appearing in the converging markets. As a result,
regulation will be decreasingly used as effective competition develops and the
national regulatory authorities will have the ability to cope with changes in
market structure over time. This in turn will strengthen the internal market,
stimulate further competition, allow a more sound basis for long term planning
in the industry and set the environment for massive investment and




The introduction of real competition implies much more than the translation into
national law of Directives abolishing legal monopolies in the Member States.
Full liberalisation would be meaningless without the vigorous enforcement of
the rules of competition. Alongside the measures taken by the national
regulatory authorities, therefore, the application of competition law comes to
the forefront in order to ensure that, once removed, the legal barriers will not
be replaced by new anti-competitive market structures and de facto
monopolies.
This thesis has focused on specific abusive behaviour of the incumbents
aimed at preserving their position against newcomers, and examined how
competition law can deal with such cases. In particular, it discussed the
jurisprudence of the ECJ and the European Commission's cases involving
cases of refusal to supply and essential facilities, and attempted to define to
what extent Article 82 (ex 86) of the Treaty is applicable to the control of
bottlenecks.
It showed that the introduction of the essential facilities doctrine is
particularly important in the run-up to the complete liberalisation of the
telecommunications sector. It also highlighted how the doctrine demonstrates
the Commission's concern to prevent national operators from gaining a
competitive advantage over new market entrants. Yet the Commission's efforts
to fight the abusive behaviour of the incumbents against newcomers and to
ensure that market foreclosure is avoided would serve little purpose if an
uncritical and over-interventionist approach was chosen. Indeed, the
Commission recognises that an over-liberal application of the essential
facilities doctrine could undermine the incentive to invest in alternative
infrastructure. The 1998 Access Notice reflects the Commission's approach in
balancing these two important considerations and so it attempts to take a step
towards the creation of a legal environment that will facilitate entry and
promote technical innovation while, at the same time, ensuring that the
incentive to invest in alternative networks is not affected.
In addition, this thesis examined the Commission's policy on strategic
horizontal alliances between several telecommunications operators, which hold
strong positions in their respective domestic markets. It was shown that the
Commission assumed a positive attitude and rewarded those strategic
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alliances whose parents prefer to adapt to the new environment in order to
respond to the requirements of multinational enterprises rather than trying to
protect themselves artificially against outside competition. The Commission
has recognised that certain restrictions on competition between the parent
companies can be justified under certain circumstances. However, the
Commission has also made it clear that those restrictions on competition must
be kept to a minimum in order to ensure that the clearing of the strategic
alliances will not lead to re-monopolised market structures. To address the
aforementioned concerns, the Commission has taken from the parent
companies a number of necessary undertakings as a pre-condition to let the
deals go through. It was shown that, especially when the strategic alliances
involve incumbents, the liberalisation of home markets is an indispensable
criterion by which the restrictions on competition are made acceptable. This
shows the link between competition cases and implementation of the
liberalisation timetable and illustrates how the Commission can impose
conditions, not only on governments, but also on the parties to the agreement,
in the form of non-discriminatory treatment of their competitors regarding
access to the network.
This thesis also attempted to analyse EU competition policy on the strategic
alliances and mergers which are spurred on by the accelerating change of
markets with the convergence of the telecommunications, media and
information technology sectors. Indeed, EU competition policy - after its
success in liberalising the telecommunications markets and after dealing with
those alliances with a more horizontal nature - had a new challenge to
confront: potential anti-competitive behaviour generated by this rapid change,
and the new possibilities for vertical integration between market players who try
to occupy the key bottleneck positions and control market developments.
The Commission has shown that it seeks to achieve the balance between
risks and benefits in its application of EU competition rules. Thus it takes a
positive attitude to the creation of strategic alliances which promote technical
innovation, offer new products and services and, therefore, contribute to the
development of multimedia markets. At the same time, the Commission's
target is to maintain open and competitive market structures in the untested
multi-media markets. This can be achieved by preventing the gatekeepers
from further strengthening their positions (or forming new super-monopolies) or
preventing dominant telecommunications operators from moving into related
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fields such as Internet or digital television. Otherwise, market foreclosure can
hinder innovation, hold back market development and have an enormous
impact on the future competitive structures of the EU communications sector.
The thesis has shown that the current ONP regime cannot work satisfactorily
in the future converging environment. There are two main reasons: (1) the
inability of the regime to address the issues from a wider point of view (and not
just from a strict telecommunications one); and (2) because the regime has
become obsolete, since the emergence of new converged services requires a
technology-neutral regulation which is based on market concepts and not one
like the current ONP framework, which is based on a technology-determined
approach. The regulatory framework in its current form is not flexible enough
and thus not capable of predicting and coping with rapid market developments.
So the acceptance that the current ONP framework is not sufficient to
address the issues of a fully converged market - especially the access issues
- raises the question of whether competition law alone can be an effective
instrument for the realisation of that target.
From a market perspective, sole reliance on competition law would be
sufficient if effective competition was introduced and established in the
distinguishable markets and then in the converged environment. It was
confirmed, however, that the telecommunications sector - and especially the
local access market - is not being exposed to competitive forces since the
incumbents control almost all local access by virtue of their monopoly
background. Thus it was established that sole reliance on competition law
during an intermediate stage can neither encourage market entry, nor ensure
efficient and non-discriminatory access to networks and, therefore, cannot
promote the development of open and competitive markets. Moving directly to
the application of competition rules alone could lead to new forms of integrated
dominance and to new multimedia market monopolies. Therefore, since the
market is still developing, adequate regulatory safeguards are required in order
to promote and establish effective competition.
Beyond the market perspective, it was established that a series of social
objectives cannot be ensured by means of only competition law. It was
submitted that the justification for regulatory intervention is associated with a
social policy aim involving issues such as the need for universal access to
networks - achieved through universal service obligations. Regulation is also
required in order to meet public interest objectives such as media plurality and
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diversity, taste and decency, impartial information, dissemination of culture and
languages, education, and the need to protect consumers, especially minors,
from 'inappropriate' material - i.e. positive and negative obligations within the
audiovisual sector which are usually linked with public service broadcasting.
From the above points, it was concluded that sector-specific regulation will
continue to be necessary. The role of economic regulation in particular will be
to provide the temporary measures in order to guarantee equal and fair
conditions to all market players until the converged market has matured. Then,
its role will also be associated with the social policy aim of securing certain
public interest objectives.
Thus, at this transitional stage of development, sector-specific regulation
should be divided into two different regulations (economic and social) and,
accordingly, specific rules should focus on two general areas:
• rules to provide temporary measures in order to prevent market failures
from restricting or distorting competition. These rules will have to mimic the
effect of competition and address issues such as access to networks and
interconnection, access to digital gateways, standards and interoperability,
pricing, and the establishment of objective licensing criteria for ensuring an
equitable distribution of limited resources (like frequencies and numbering);
• rules to ensure public interest objectives (including the universal service
obligation in the telecommunications industry and the public service mission
conferred on public broadcasters) and rules of content.
The reality of technological convergence strengthened the view which
supported the change from a sectoral organisation of regulation towards a
more horizontal approach. The first important step towards horizontal
regulation was the decision to separate the regulation of content provision from
that of service provision and infrastructure for all three sectors of the
convergence.
The agreement on the separation of infrastructure and content regulation
resulted in the acceptance of the notion that similar regulatory conditions
should apply to all network infrastructure and associated services, irrespective
of the types of services carried over them. In other words, networks should be
governed by a single set of technology-neutral rules.
It was submitted that the shift towards the horizontal regulation of networks
should not change the nature of the services which are carried through this
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infrastructure. In other words, services must be regulated independently of the
form of distribution. Regulation will have to reflect the distinctive nature and
characteristics of a given service.
Based on the general agreement that a single set of technologically neutral
regulatory rules should apply to all transport network infrastructure irrespective
of the types of services carried over them, and on the fact that the regulatory
regime for ensuring access in the telecommunications sector is far more
mature and comprehensive than in the neighbouring sectors, the application of
ONP-type open provision rules seems the most reasonable, practical and
efficient approach. It was concluded, therefore, that for a number of years -
and until effective infrastructure competition has finally become established -
the regulatory model of infrastructure in the converging environment should
resort to the existing European regulation, namely the ONP regime and
interconnection regulation of the telecommunications sector.
As a consequence, the scope of the new infrastructure ONP style regulatory
regime will become broader. It will not be confined to the telecommunications
sector but will apply to all forms of cable- and radio-based infrastructure
(including cable TV and broadcast infrastructure, Internet etc.), and to any
operator with significant market power across sectors. In addition, it will cover
issues such as access agreements between private networks and service
providers and it will not distinguish between fixed-network and mobile
communications network/services.
The crucial point is that this expansion of ONP telecommunications rules to
the other sectors contradicts the Commission's stated target for dis-engaging
from detailed regulatory intervention. Therefore it becomes obvious that, in
order to pursue the goal of a light regulatory approach, convergence enforces
reconsideration of the present regulatory regime's basic principles and tools.
So a large majority of the prescriptive regulations currently in place will need to
be replaced by a harmonised framework of very light and general principles
and overall targets which can identify and monitor barriers to competition within
a converging market and can ensure equal and fair conditions for market
players.
These specific regulatory rules are incorporated into the current EU
Communications Reform Package which includes five harmonisation
Directives, namely a Framework Directive and four specific Directives on
access and interconnection, authorisation, universal services and user rights,
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and data protection in telecommunications services. In addition, it comprises a
Regulation on the unbundling of the local loop, a Decision on Community radio
spectrum policy, and a draft consolidated and simplified Liberalisation
Directive.
This thesis has attempted to assess whether the Commission's proposal to
simplify the current regulatory regime goes beyond merely reducing the
number of Directives. It has identified the Commission's decision to construct
the definition of 'significant market power' along the lines of the competition law
concept of dominant position as central in its attempt to render the forthcoming
regulatory framework sufficiently flexible to allow the development towards the
new multi-media markets.
Taking account of the transitional nature of the sector-specific measures and
of the overall objective that regulation should be kept to the minimum where
competition is self-sustaining, it was noted that it is necessary to develop
mechanisms to ensure the gradual phasing-out of sector-specific regulation. It
was submitted that the principle of "forbearance" and an increasing use of
complementary non-binding regulatory measures could play a significant role
in order to dis-engage from detailed regulation and achieve the desired
flexibility in the new dynamic and fast-moving markets. It was also concluded
that the Commission's proposals (the comments and suggestions received)
can contribute towards a new regime characterised by transparency, legal
certainty and predictability. This in turn will provide the right climate to
encourage further investment and commercial initiative in the
telecommunications and multimedia sectors. The final conclusion of this thesis
is that the Commission's latest reform package looks pragmatic and, therefore,
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